[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
------------------------------------------- U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-16730 April 27, 2007
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
-------------------------------------------- CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 05-00194-CR-T-26-TGW
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DARIO SERRANO-ARAUZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(April 27, 2007)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-Appellant Dario Serrano-Arauz appeals his 135-month sentence
imposed after he pled guilty to (1) aiding and abetting in the possession with intent
to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 46 App. U.S.C. § 1903(a), (g); 18
U.S.C. § 2; and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii); and (2) conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while aboard a vessel subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 46 App. U.S.C. § 1903(a),
(g), and (j); and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii). No reversible error has been shown;
we affirm.
Serrano-Arauz first argues that the district court erred in denying him a
minor role reduction, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). He asserts that he was less culpable
than other persons found on the boat, which was carrying 1,640 kilograms of
cocaine. Serrano-Arauz also contends that he was unable to present evidence
demonstrating that he was entitled to a minor role reduction because the district
court, which sentenced Serrano-Arauz’s co-defendants before sentencing him, had
a “preconceived idea” of Serrano-Arauz’s sentence and did not make its minor role
determination based on the facts of Serrano-Arauz’s case.
We review for clear error the district court’s determinations about a
defendant’s role in an offense. United States v. Ryan, 289 F.3d 1339, 1348 (11th
Cir. 2002). The burden is on the defendant to establish his role by a
preponderance of evidence. Id. Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), “[a] defendant
warrants a two-level reduction for playing a minor role in an offense if he is less
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culpable than most other participants, although his role could not be described as
minimal.” Id. Sentencing courts should consider two elements when determining
a defendant’s role in an offense: “first, the defendant’s role in the relevant conduct
for which [he] has been held accountable at sentencing, and, second, [his] role as
compared to that of other participants in [his] relevant conduct.” United States v.
De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 940 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
As an initial matter, Serrano-Arauz’s argument that he was unable to offer
evidence in support of a minor role reduction is without merit. The district court
heard Serrano-Arauz’s extended argument about why he should receive a minor
role reduction.1 In addition, Serrano-Arauz has not articulated what evidence or
argument about his relevant conduct he was unable to present to the district court.
We also conclude that the district court committed no clear error in
determining that Serrano-Arauz’s role in the offense was more than minor. About
the first element of the De Varon analysis, Serrano-Arauz’s sentence was based
only on the relevant conduct for which he was held accountable at sentencing: the
1,640 kilograms of cocaine seized from the boat on which he was traveling. And
1
Serrano-Arauz argued that he should receive a role reduction because, among other things, (1)
he was traveling on a boat that was designed to move cargo and that was carrying washing machines;
(2) the boat’s owner decided to carry drugs without Serrano-Arauz’s knowledge; (3) Serrano-Arauz
did not receive a substantial financial benefit for his work on the boat; (4) Serrano-Arauz was a
cabinetmaker who was hired to do woodwork on the boat; and (5) he did not have an equity interest
in the smuggled drugs.
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the district court correctly pointed to the boat’s significant amount of drugs in
denying Serrano-Arauz a minor role reduction. See id. at 943 (noting that, in the
drug courier context, the amount of drugs is a “material consideration” in
assessing a defendant’s role in his relevant conduct). About the second element,
Serrano-Arauz was part of a small group traveling on the boat, which was carrying
a substantial amount of cocaine. Serrano-Arauz has failed to show that he was
“less culpable than most other participants in [his] relevant conduct,” id. at 944;
and we see no clear error in the district court’s decision not to apply a minor role
reduction in this case.
Serrano-Arauz also argues that his sentence was unreasonable. He contends
that, in determining his sentence, the district court failed to consider all of the
sentencing factors set out at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Serrano-Arauz asserts that the
district court relied on the “status quo” of sentencing defendants in similar cases to
135 months’ imprisonment and that the district court’s reference to the section
3553(a) factors at sentencing failed to show that Serrano-Arauz was sentenced
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct.
738 (2005).
We review Serrano-Arauz’s sentence for reasonableness in the light of the
section 3553(a) factors. United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1244-46
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(11th Cir. 2005). Under section 3553(a), a district court should consider, among
other things, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
characteristics of the defendant, the need for adequate deterrence and protection of
the public, policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, provision for the
medical and educational needs of the defendant, and the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7).
Serrano-Arauz’s sentence was reasonable. The district court correctly
calculated his Guidelines imprisonment range as 135 to 168 months; and the court
sentenced Serrano-Arauz to the lowest point of that range.2 See United States v.
Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that “ordinarily we would
expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable”).
Before sentencing Serrano-Arauz, the district court noted that it had
reviewed the section 3553(a) factors and that a reasonable sentence for Serrano-
Arauz was at the bottom of his advisory Guidelines range. The district court also
explained that this case involved a large quantity of cocaine; and the district court
listened to Serrano-Arauz’s statements about why he continued to work on the
boat and about some of his personal characteristics. The district court judge was
2
Except for disputing the district court’s decision not to apply a minor role reduction to his
sentence, Serrano-Arauz does not challenge the district court’s calculation of his Guidelines range.
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not required to discuss all of the section 3553(a) factors at the sentencing hearing.
See United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that
“nothing in Booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record
that it has explicitly considered each of the section 3553(a) factors or to discuss
each of the section 3553(a) factors”). We conclude that the district court correctly
determined Serrano-Arauz’s Guidelines range and considered the section 3553(a)
factors in imposing the sentence in this case. Nothing in the record convinces us
that Serrano-Arauz’s sentence was unreasonable in the light of the section 3553(a)
factors.
AFFIRMED.
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