[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 26, 2007
No. 06-13375 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-14322-CV-DMM
STANLEY N. TAVORN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CHARLES SHOCKLEY,
DAVID FARCUS,
M. L. ENGLISH,
R. F. CARTER,
K. J. GREEN,
CONNIE SHOOTS,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 26, 2007)
Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Florida state prisoner Stanley N. Tavorn appeals the district court’s dismissal
of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil complaint against prison officials M.L. English and
Connie Shoots.1 Tavorn contends the district court erred in dismissing his case
because he did not agree to settle the instant case. According to Tavorn, he and the
defendants orally discussed settlement of a separate case, but they did not reach a
final, binding agreement that extended to the instant case.
Generally, a party who consents to the entry of a judgment lacks standing to
appeal it. Reynolds v. Roberts, 202 F.3d 1303, 1312 (11th Cir. 2000). However,
there are two exceptions to this general rule: “(1) where the party did not actually
consent or (2) where the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the
judgment.” White v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 776 F.2d 976, 977 (11th Cir.
1985).
We review the district court’s enforcement of a settlement agreement for an
abuse of discretion. See Brooks v. Georgia State Bd. of Elections, 59 F.3d 1114,
1119 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he duty of an appellate court is simply to ascertain
whether or not the trial judge clearly abused his discretion in approving or rejecting
1
The district court dismissed the other defendants, Charles Shockley, David Farcus, R.F.
Carter, and K.J. Green, in an order that is not at issue on appeal.
2
a settlement agreement.”); Murchison v. Grand Cypress Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d
1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1994) (“We review the district court's decision to enforce a
settlement agreement without an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion.”).
Although the district court has the authority to summarily enforce a
settlement agreement without an evidentiary hearing, “the district court may
enforce only complete settlement agreements.” Murchison, 13 F.3d at 1486.
“Summary enforcement of an alleged settlement is improper when there is a
substantial factual dispute as to the terms of the settlement.” Id. The parties must
be allowed an evidentiary hearing when there is a dispute about the material facts
concerning the existence or terms of a settlement agreement. Id. In Londono v.
City of Gainesville, 768 F.2d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 1985), we vacated a district
court’s order enforcing a settlement agreement the defendant denied agreeing to,
and we remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing because, based on the record
before us, we were unable to discern the terms of the settlement agreement and the
factual basis for the district court’s conclusion that an enforceable contract was
formed.
In this case, the record does not contain the settlement agreement, evidence
of the oral settlement discussions, or an evidentiary hearing on the settlement
agreement, and the parties dispute the terms of any such agreement. Therefore, we
3
cannot ascertain our own jurisdiction because, without the terms of the settlement
agreement, we are unable to determine whether Tavorn consented to the dismissal
order. See White, 776 F.2d at 977. Moreover, as in Londono, we cannot review
the factual basis for the district court’s apparent conclusion an enforceable
agreement was formed. Therefore, even if we could establish jurisdiction, we
cannot determine whether the district court’s dismissal of the case was an abuse of
discretion.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order dismissing the case, and we
remand this case to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
the existence and terms of the settlement agreement.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
4