[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
April 25, 2007
No. 06-11373
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-00119-CV-J-25MMH
MARITIME TUG & BARGE, INC.,
as owner of the M/V Isabelle C, for exoneration
from or limitation of liability,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ROYAL INDEMNITY COMPANY,
A Member of Royal Specialty Underwriting, Inc.,
MARTIN K. EBY CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(April 25, 2007)
Before CARNES, WILSON and HILL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Maritime Tug & Barge, Inc. appeals from the judgment of the district court
dismissing with prejudice its 46 U.S.C. § 185 petition for exoneration from or
limitation of liability. It raises two issues.
As to Maritime Tug’s contention that we should vacate the district court’s
judgment and instruct it to dismiss the petition without prejudice, we decline to do
so because of the way we interpret the words “with prejudice” in the judgment.
The district court dismissed Maritime Tug’s § 185 petition because it had not been
filed within the six-month time period specified in the section. The dismissal
properly was with prejudice as to any future § 185 petition by Maritime Tug. The
district court, however, did not have before it a 46 U.S.C. § 183 affirmative
defense nor did it rule on the merits of the limitation of liability issue.
Accordingly, the district court’s judgment does not encompass the § 183 merits
issue, and we do not interpret it as being with prejudice as to that issue. Nor do
we interpret the district court’s judgment as implying any view on whether a state
court has jurisdiction to decide the § 183 merits issue; the state courts themselves
are quite capable of addressing issues involving their own jurisdiction.
Maritime Tug also contends that the district court abused its discretion in
denying as futile the motion to amend the complaint. Insofar as the amended
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complaint sought to reassert the § 185 petition, the district court properly denied
it. Insofar as the other claims that the motion to amend sought to assert, the
amendment may not have been futile. However, given the fact that a proceeding
involving those same claims is now pending in state court, it clearly would be
within the district court’s discretion to dismiss a declaratory judgment action in
favor of the state court proceeding. We have no doubt that if we remanded the
case with instructions to permit the motion to amend, that is what would happen.
Accordingly, we decline to vacate the district court’s decision denying the motion
to amend.
The bottom line of our decision is that the district court correctly dismissed
the § 185 petition without affecting any § 183 defense or other claim or defense
that may be asserted in the state court.
AFFIRMED.
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