This action is brought by the plaintiff, an employee, against the employer to recover on the common law for personal injuries. This appeal is from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and from an order denying defendants’ motion for a new trial.
The plaintiff had been in defendants’ employ some years before the accident, and during the time of his employment had operated a machine used for cutting lumber. At one time the machine was equipped with a stopping, device by which the motion' of the chain to which the cutting knives were attached could be suspended, and it was the practice to suspend the operation of the knives while the lumber was being clamped to the table preparatory to cutting. This, device had been removed by defendant some time before the accident, because it interfered with the rapidity with which the work could be accomplished. The plaintiff, without protest or objection, continued to operate the machine, and in doing this he assumed the risk of injury.
The negligence upon which plaintiff relies is the failure of the foreman to furnish him with a helper as promised. The time is not definitely given, but the accident occurred within an hour after the alleged promise was made. It does not appear whether sufficient time had elasped after the promise and before the accident to have enabled the foreman to provide the services of a helper. It is not shown that any appreciable time elapsed after the request to the foreman and before the accident. Ho liability was created by the failure to provide a helper until a reasonable time had elapsed within which the foreman could give the necessary direction. The defendants’ duty to the plaintiff was to furnish him a safe place in which to work, reasonably safe tools to work with and a sufficient number of efficient fellow-workmen to safely perform the work required of him; the questions of a safe place and the efficiency of plaintiff’s coemployees are not in this case.
It is contended on the part of appellants that there was a sufficient number of 'coemployees in the factory at the time to have assisted the plaintiff, and that the failure of the superintendent to assign one to this duty was negligence of a fellow-
It seems from the evidence that, if there was negligence in the failure to provide an. assistant,, it was that of a fellow-servant' with regard to a detail of the work, and it follows that the judgment must be reversed on the law and facts.
The judgment and order should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event.
Jenks, P. J., and Woodward, J.,, concurred; Hirsohberq and Burr, JJ., dissented.
Judgment and order reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event, . .