[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
April 5, 2007
No. 06-15041 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00034-CR-T-30-EAJ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MANUEL JUAREZ-MEDELLIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(April 5, 2007)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Manuel Juarez-Medellin appeals his 41-month sentence for reentering the
United States without permission after being deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §
1326(a), (b)(2). On appeal, Juarez-Medellin argues (1) that his sentence was
unreasonable because it exceeded the length of imprisonment necessary to satisfy
the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and (2) that the district
court failed to adequately state the reasons for the imposition of Juarez-Medellin’s
sentence, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). We affirm.
The facts relevant to Juarez-Medellin’s sentencing claims are these. On
January 24, 2006, Juarez-Medellin was indicted for being in the United States after
having been deported and returning without consent, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §
1326(a), (b)(2). He pled guilty and proceeded to sentencing. The presentence
investigation report (“PSI”) assigned Juarez-Medellin a base offense level of 8,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a), and recommended a 16-level enhancement for
having a conviction for drug trafficking, pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i), and a 3-
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, for an adjusted offense level of 21.
The PSI noted that in addition to prior convictions for possession of
marijuana, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and illegal entry, which
yielded three criminal history points, Juarez-Medellin also faced pending charges,
in Philadelphia, of simple assault, aggravated assault, recklessly endangering
another person, indecent assault, and a failure to appear at trial. With a criminal
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history category II, Juarez-Medellin’s advisory Guidelines range was 41 to 51
months’ imprisonment. Juarez-Medellin filed no objections to the PSI.
At the sentencing hearing, Juarez-Medellin asserted no objections to the PSI,
and the district court adopted the PSI’s calculations. In support of mitigation,
Juarez-Medellin argued that a lower sentence, of 30 months’ imprisonment, was
appropriate because he had changed his life since his marriage and the birth of his
child, and he had not been in trouble since his marijuana conviction when he was
20 years old. The government responded that a reasonable sentence would be
within the Guidelines range, noting the charges which were pending in
Philadelphia and which included a physical altercation.
The district court stated that it had heard the statements of Juarez-Medellin
and his counsel, and, having reviewed the PSI and considering the § 3553(a)
factors, it was sentencing Juarez-Medellin to 41 months’ imprisonment (the low
end of the Guidelines range he faced). The district court added the “sentence was
sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the statutory purposes of
sentencing. . .and a sentence at the bottom of the guideline range is appropriate.”
This appeal followed.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, a district
court, in determining a reasonable sentence, must consider the advisory Guidelines
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range and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 543 U.S.
220, 258-63 (2005); United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005).
We review a defendant’s sentence for unreasonableness in light of the factors in §
3553(a) and the reasons given by the district court. United States v. Williams, 435
F.3d 1350, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 2006). We review the ultimate sentence imposed
for reasonableness. See Talley, 431 F.3d at 785 (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 260).1
A sentence within the Guidelines range is not per se reasonable, though “the party
who challenges the sentence bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is
unreasonable in the light of both [the] record and the factors in section 3553(a).”
Talley, 431 F.3d at 788.
The district court must first accurately calculate the Guidelines range, and
then it “may impose a more severe or more lenient sentence” after considering the
§ 3553(a) factors. United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir.
2005). These factors include the history and characteristics of the defendant, the
available sentences, the applicable Guideline range, the nature and circumstances
of the offense, and the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense.
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The government argues that we should review only for plain error because Juarez-Medellin
failed to object to his sentence as unreasonable after it was imposed. We need not address this issue
because, even under a reasonableness standard, Juarez-Medellin’s argument fails.
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18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We have clarified that a district court is not obligated to
specifically address and analyze on the record every § 3553(a) factor. Rather, a
statement that the court considered the factors prior to imposing sentence is
sufficient. United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005).
Here, imposition of Juarez-Medellin’s sentence fully complied with the
requirements of Booker. The district court applied the Guidelines in an advisory
fashion and gave Juarez-Medellin the opportunity to present mitigating factors at
sentencing. Prior to imposing sentence, the district court indicated that it had
considered the parties’ arguments in reaching its sentencing decision. Ultimately,
the court rejected Juarez-Medellin’s request for a sentence below the advisory
range, stating that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors prior to imposing a
sentence at the lowest end of the range Juarez-Medellin faced.
On this record, we can discern no Booker error in the imposition of sentence,
particularly given that Juarez-Medellin not only had illegally entered the country,
but also had committed criminal offenses and faced pending criminal charges in
Philadelphia -- a point the government highlighted in its response to Juarez-
Medellin’s argument in support of a lower sentence. Because the district court
adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors, including Juarez-Medellin’s history
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and characteristics, as well as the need to sentence him sufficiently, but not greater
than necessary, the sentence was not unreasonable.
We likewise are unpersuaded by Juarez-Medellin’s argument that the district
court failed to articulate its reasons for imposing sentence, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). We review whether a district court complied with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c)(1) de novo. United States v. Bonilla, 463 F.3d 1176, 1181 (11th Cir.
2006). “Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1), a district court is required to state, in
open court, the reason for its particular sentence, and if the sentence ‘is of the kind,
and within the range [recommended by the Guidelines] and that range exceeds 24
months, the reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the range.’”
Id. When stating its reasons for imposing a particular sentence as required by §
3553(c)(1), the court should “tailor its comments to show that the sentence
imposed is appropriate, given the factors to be considered as set forth in §
3553(a).” Id.
However, section 3553(c)(1)’s does not require “a sentencing court [to]
incant the specific language used in the guidelines which applies to each reason
given, nor does it mean that a court must state that a particular factor is not
applicable in a particular case.’” Id. at 1182 (quoting United States v. Parrado, 911
F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1990)). Indeed, nothing in our precedent or Booker
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“requires the district court, in its explanation of sentence under § 3553(c)(1), to
articulate its consideration of each individual § 3553(a) factor, particularly where .
. . it is obvious the court considered many of the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. (emphasis
in original).
Here, the district court complied with § 3553(c)(1) since it is obvious, given
its explanation of Juarez-Medellin’s sentence in relation to the § 3553(a) factors,
that it considered many of the § 3553(a) factors, which is all that is required by
Bonilla. The district court noted that it had heard and considered the parties’
arguments in mitigation, the advisory Guidelines range, and the § 3553(a) factors
in imposing sentence.
On this record, Juarez-Medellin has not shown that his sentence was
unreasonable, nor has he established a violation of § 3553(c). Accordingly, we
affirm his sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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