[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
April 4, 2007
No. 06-13612 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00183-CV-1-DHB
ROBERT DIXON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CHIEF TOOLE,
FNU JOHNSON,
Captain,
FNU HUFFMAN,
Captain,
SARGEANT JOHN DOE,
in their individual capacities,
SARGEANT JANE DOE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(April 4, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, DUBINA and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Robert Dixon, a Georgia prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s grant of summary judgment on his claims of excessive force and
unsafe conditions of confinement, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On
appeal, Dixon argues that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by
placing him in a stripped “suicide cell” for two days and requiring him to wear
only a paper gown, placing him in an observation cell with inmates infected with
both HIV and Hepatitis-C, and keeping him in restraints for 17.5 hours.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Cash v.
Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000). “Summary judgment is proper if the
pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Id. at 1305 (quotations and citation omitted). We must view the facts in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party. See id. Arguments not raised on appeal
are deemed abandoned. See Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570,
1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989).
The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, forbids cruel and unusual punishments. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII;
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Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 n.20 (11th Cir. 2004). The amendment
governs “the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under
which he is confined.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1242 (11th Cir. 2003).
“However, not every governmental action affecting the interests or well-being of a
prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny.” Id. (quotation and citation
omitted). “[T]he Eighth Amendment imposes a narrow restriction- ‘cruel and
unusual’-on only a limited sphere of prison administrative conduct-
‘punishment.’” Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1274 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated on
other grounds, 449 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 2006).
The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that:
[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Though § 1997e(e) does not define physical injury, we
have held that, in order to satisfy the statute, “the physical injury must be more
than de minimis, but need not be significant.” Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279,
1286 (11th Cir. 1999), op. reinstated in part on reh’g, 216 F.3d 970 (2000)
(finding that a “dry shave” was not the kind of physical injury cognizable under
1997e(e)); see also Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1258 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000)
(bruises received during an arrest were non-actionable de minimis injury) (Fourth
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Amendment excessive force claim).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court did not err in
finding that Dixon’s claims for compensatory damages did not surmount § 1997e’s
bar because he failed to put forth evidence of physical injury besides discomfort.
Dixon asserted that sleeping on a concrete platform aggravated preexisting injuries
and exposure to Inmate Jeff Sanders resulted in his contracting Hepatitis-C.
However, he did not put forth any evidence that his injuries had worsened or that
he contracted Hepatitis-C. Dixon averred that his time in restraints resulted in
welts; however, mere bruising from the application of restraints is only a de
minimis injury. Thus, Dixon’s claims for compensatory damages fail. The district
court found that Dixon’s injunctive relief claims were moot, and Dixon abandoned
any challenge to that finding by not arguing the point here. Moreover, our review
of the complaint reveals that Dixon sought no other specific forms of injunctive
relief. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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