[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
May 25, 2007
No. 06-15493 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
BIA Nos.
A97-199-437
A97-199-438
FABIAN SALGADO,
MARIA LUZMILA SALAZAR,
Petitioners,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(May 25, 2007)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Fabian Salgado and Maria Luzmila Salazar, natives and citizens
of Colombia, through counsel, petition for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA’s”) order, affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of
Salgado’s application for withholding of removal.1 In Colombia, Salgado worked
for the oil industry as a pipe supervisor, which led to him being threatened by the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”). His application for asylum
and withholding of removal recounted: (1) a 1990 attack on one of the camps
where he worked, resulting in the murder of one of the men whom the FARC
accused of being an informant; (2) the 1995 kidnaping of a coworker from a car in
which Salgado was riding; and (3) the 1970 kidnaping of his brother by the
National Liberation Army (“ELN”).
Salgado submitted various documentation to support his application,
including an accusation that he filed in Bogota regarding one of the FARC’s
attacks. At the asylum hearing, Salgado testified as to those incidents, as well as
an incident that occurred in 1994, when members of the FARC detained a group of
1
The petitioners do not challenge the denial of asylum or relief under the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(“CAT”), 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-18. Accordingly, those issues are deemed abandoned. See Sepulveda
v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that petitioners abandon issues
not raised in the opening brief).
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workers that Salgado supervised, and beat him, breaking his shoulder with a rifle
butt, requiring an operation. He also testified that the FARC wanted him to install
valves in pipes so that they could extract oil, and that he was involved with Propaz,
an organization that works with the “peasantry” in trying to keep their children
away from the FARC, in 1991 or 1992.
On appeal, Salgado argues that the record establishes that he had been the
victim of past persecution by the FARC, as evidenced by the beating that he
received, resulting in broken ribs and an injured shoulder, and death threats that he
received. Additionally, he contends that the IJ did not analyze whether he had
established a pattern or practice of discrimination by the FARC, and therefore,
erred in denying relief.
We “review only the [BIA’s] decision, except to the extent that it expressly
adopts the IJ's opinion.” Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir.
2001). “A factual determination by the BIA that an alien is statutorily ineligible
for asylum or withholding is reviewed under the substantial evidence test.” Id.
(internal citations and quotations omitted). We must affirm the decision if it is
“supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole.” Id. at 1283-84. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
To the extent that the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions are based on a legal
determination, review is de novo. Mohammed v. Ashcroft, 261 F.3d 1244,
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1247-48 (11th Cir. 2001). “Findings of fact made by the Immigration Judge may
be reversed by this Court only when the record compels a reversal; the mere fact
that the record may support a contrary conclusion is not enough to justify a
reversal of the administrative findings.” Silva v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229,
1236 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted). However,
“[i]ssues not argued on appeal are deemed waived.” Mingkid v. U.S. Att’y. Gen.,
468 F.3d 763, 767 n.1 (11th Cir. 2006).
Withholding of removal may be granted if the alien establishes that, if
returned to his country, his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. INA § 241(b)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). An alien is entitled to
withholding of removal if he can establish, with specific and credible evidence: (1)
a past threat to life or freedom through proof of past persecution on account of a
protected ground; or (2) a future threat to life or freedom if it “is more likely than
not” that the protected ground will cause future persecution. 8 C.F.R. §
208.16(b)(1), (2). If an alien does not establish past persecution, he bears the
burden of showing a well-founded fear of future threat to life or freedom by
showing that it is more likely than not that he will suffer persecution on the basis
of the protected ground, and he could not avoid persecution by relocating to
another part of his country, if, under all of the circumstances, it would be
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reasonable to expect him to do so. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2). The alien does not
need to prove that he or she would be “singled out” for persecution if (1) there is a
“pattern or practice of persecution” against similarly situated individuals, and (2)
his or her inclusion within that group of individuals makes it “more likely than not
that his or her life or freedom would be threatened upon return to that country.”
See 8 C.F.R. 208.16(b)(2)(i),(ii).
“If an alien's testimony is credible, it may be sufficient, without
corroboration, to satisfy his burden of proof in establishing his eligibility for relief
from removal.” Chen v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 463 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2006);
see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(a), 208.16(b). “Conversely, an adverse credibility
determination alone may be sufficient to support the denial of an asylum
application.” Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotations and citations omitted) ( analyzing the denial of withholding of
removal as well). Once the IJ has made the adverse finding, the alien then has the
burden to show that the IJ's credibility decision was not supported by “specific,
cogent reasons” or was not based on substantial evidence. Chen, 463 F.3d at 1231.
The record here demonstrates that the IJ based his denial on an adverse
credibility finding, and to the extent that Salgado does not challenge that finding,
he has waived the argument on appeal. Regardless, the IJ’s determinations were
specific regarding Salgado’s inconsistent recounting of how and why the FARC
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persecuted him, and were supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we
deny Salgado’s petition.
PETITION DENIED.
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