[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
May 24, 2007
No. 06-12883 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 02-80764-CV-DTKH
CURTIS SHERROD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
ARTHUR JOHNSON, Dr.,
FRAN GIBLIN,
CHRISTINE HALL, Dr.,
JEANNE BURDSALL, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 24, 2007)
Before BLACK, MARCUS and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this appeal, we consider whether the district court abused its discretion in
denying a plaintiff’s post-trial motions, which sought relief from the district court’s
order granting judgment as a matter of law for the defendant. For the reasons set
forth more fully below, we affirm.
Curtis Sherrod, a former school teacher with the Palm Beach County School
District (the District), proceeded to trial against the District on his claim that he
suffered retaliation for exercising his First Amendment right to free speech, in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of
Sherrod, the district court granted the District’s motion for judgment as a matter of
law, finding that Sherrod failed to establish that the School Board, the final
policymaker for the District, was liable under § 1983. See Monell v. New York
City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
Sherrod moved to set aside the order or, alternatively, for reconsideration. The
district court summarily denied Sherrod’s motion, and Sherrod sought relief under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) and moved for a new trial and to alter the judgment,
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. The district court summarily denied these motions as
well.
Both Sherrod, proceeding pro se on appeal, and the District argue the merits
of the district court’s order granting judgment as a matter of law. However, we
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previously dismissed this appeal, in part, for lack of jurisdiction because Sherrod’s
notice of appeal was untimely to appeal the district court’s final judgment and the
denial of his motion to set aside the order granting the motion for judgment as a
matter of law, or, alternatively, for reconsideration. We allowed this appeal to
proceed with respect to the order denying Sherrod’s Rule 59 and Rule 60(b)
motions. Thus, only this order is properly before us. However, we liberally
construe Sherrod’s pro se appellate briefs as a challenge to this order. See
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
We review the denial of Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) motions and motions for
a new trial for abuse of discretion. Willard v. Fairfield S. Co., Inc., 472 F.3d 817,
821 (11th Cir. 2006) (Rule 60(b)); Lambert v. Fulton County, Ga., 253 F.3d 588,
595, 598 (11th Cir. 2001) (new trial and Rule 59(e)). “A district court abuses its
discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in
making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous. A
district court may also abuse its discretion by applying the law in an unreasonable
or incorrect manner.” Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1251 (11th Cir. 2004).
“A district court by definition abuses its discretion in relying on an erroneous
interpretation of applicable law.” Jackson v. Crosby, 437 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 240 (2006). A district court also abuses its discretion
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by making a clear error of judgment. Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v, Denny’s, Inc.,
457 F.3d 1180, 1188 (11th Cir. 2006).
A district court may grant a new trial “for any of the reasons for which new
trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United
States . . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). “[G]ranting motions for new trial touches on the
trial court’s traditional equity power to prevent injustice and the trial judge’s duty
to guard the integrity and fairness of the proceedings before him . . . .” Christopher
v. Florida, 449 F.3d 1360, 1366 n.4 (11th Cir. 2006). “The only grounds for
granting [a Rule 59(e)] motion are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of
law or fact.” In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999). Rule 59(e) may
not be used “to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could
have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc., v. Village of
Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).
“A ‘significantly higher’ standard is generally used to decide whether a
movant is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b).” Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d
1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001). “An appeal of a ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion,
however, is narrow in scope, addressing only the propriety of the denial or grant of
relief and does not raise issues in the underlying judgment for review. Because of
this limitation, the law is clear that Rule 60(b) may not be used to challenge
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mistakes of law which could have been raised on direct appeal.” Am. Bankers Ins.
Co. of Florida v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999)
(citations omitted). Rule 60(b)(6)1 motions
must demonstrate that the circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary
to warrant relief. Even then, whether to grant the requested relief is . .
. a matter for the district court’s sound discretion. The appellant’s
burden on appeal is heavy. [I]t is not enough that a grant of the [Rule
60(b) motion] might have been permissible or warranted; rather, the
decision to deny the motion . . . must have been sufficiently
unwarranted as to amount to an abuse of discretion.
Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 387 (2006)
(citations and quotation marks omitted) (alterations and omissions in original).
Moreover, the movant “must demonstrate a justification so compelling that the
[district] court was required to vacate its order.” Id. (alteration in original).
Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we do not
discern an abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Sherrod’s motions.
Sherrod’s arguments in these motions relating to the School Board’s liability under
Monell were raised previously in his initial motion to reconsider. See Michael
Linet, 408 F.3d at 763 (holding that Rule 59(e) may not be used “to relitigate old
matters”). Moreover, these arguments are ones that should have been raised in a
timely direct appeal of the order. See Am. Bankers, 198 F.3d at 1338 (“[T]he law
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Subsection six authorizes relief for “any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6).
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is clear that Rule 60(b) may not be used to challenge mistakes of law which could
have been raised on direct appeal.”). In addition, after reviewing the evidence
presented at trial and the district court’s analysis of the School Board’s liability
under Monell in its order granting judgment as a matter of law, we have not found
either a manifest error warranting relief under Rule 59(e), Kellogg, 197 F.3d at
1119; see also Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1997)
(recognizing that this rule “enables the court to correct its own errors and thus
avoid unnecessary appellate procedures.”) (emphasis added), or any extraordinary
circumstances making the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief unwarranted, Cano, 435
F.3d at 1342. We likewise hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
failing to grant a new trial on these grounds.
Sherrod also argues that the district court erred in dismissing individual
defendants named in his fourth amended complaint, a claim he raised only in his
Rule 59 motion. Sherrod has failed to establish that the district court abused its
discretion in denying to grant a new trial or reconsider the dismissal of these
defendants. We note that naming these parties as defendants in their official
capacities would have no effect on the District’s liability under Monell in this case.
See Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Because suits
against a municipal officer sued in his official capacity and direct suits against
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municipalities are functionally equivalent, there no longer exists a need to bring
official-capacity actions against local government officials, because local
government units can be sued directly (provided, of course, that the public entity
receives notice and an opportunity to respond).”).
In light of the foregoing, the district court’s order denying Sherrod’s Rule 59
and Rule 60(b) motions is
AFFIRMED.
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