[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
May 24, 2007
No. 06-16293 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00133-CR-2-RDP-JEO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CALVIN LEE BURRELL,
a.k.a. Calvin Lee Black
a.k.a. Kelvin Burrell,
a.k.a. Kevin Burrell,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(May 24, 2007)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Calvin Lee Burrell appeals his conviction for being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He argues that the
evidence was insufficient to show: (1) that he was the individual who pawned the
two firearms that are the subject of this charge; and (2) that the two rifles in
question were “firearms” for purposes of § 922(g)(1).
This court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, to determine
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any
reasonable juror could have concluded that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. United States v. Hunt, 187 F.3d 1269, 1270 (11th Cir. 1999). To
hold that the testimony of a government witness is incredible as a matter of law, we
must find that the testimony is “unbelievable on its face,” meaning that the facts to
which the witness testified “physically could not have possibly [been] observed” or
were “events that could not have occurred under the laws of nature.” United States
v. Rivera, 775 F.2d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir. 1985) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
In order to convict Burrell of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the
jury must have found three elements: “(1) that [he] was a convicted felon, (2) that
[he] was in knowing possession of a firearm, and (3) that the firearm was in or
affecting interstate commerce.” United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292, 1297
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(11th Cir. 2000). “For purposes of § 922(g)(1), a firearm is defined to include any
weapon which will or is designed to or may be readily converted to expel a
projectile by the action of an explosive.” United States v. Adams, 137 F.3d 1298,
1300 (11th Cir. 1998). The government need not show that the firearm is operable
to sustain a conviction. Id.
Because the evidence included, inter alia: (1) testimony from a pawn shop
employee, who identified Burrell as the individual who pawned two firearms; (2)
surveillance video of Burrell pawning the firearms; (3) pawn documents containing
Burrell’s signature; and (4) expert testimony stating that the items that Burrell
pawned were firearms, the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to
convict Burrell. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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