[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 23, 2007
No. 06-14537 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-61474-CV-KMM
JONATHAN HUGHES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COCONUT CREEK POLICE DEPARTMENT,
et al.,
Defendants,
MICHAEL LEONARD,
RODNEY SKIRVIN,
THOMAS SYE,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 23, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jonathan Hughes, a Florida state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Officers Michael Leonard,
Rodney Skirvin, and Thomas Sye, all of the Coconut Creek Police Department
(“CCPD”), in his civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 In his
complaint, Hughes alleged that Officers Leonard, Skirvin, and Sye violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by (1) entering Hughes’s bedroom without a warrant;
and (2) having his car towed to the police station without a warrant and
subsequently searching it after it was impounded. The defendants asserted the
defense of qualified immunity. Each claim is analyzed below.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Mercado
v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1156 (11th Cir. 2005). In conducting a de novo
review of the district court’s disposition of a summary judgment motion based on
qualified immunity, we (1) resolve all issues of material fact in favor of the
plaintiff; and (2) answer the legal question of whether the defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity under that version of the facts. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188,
1
The district court dismissed Hughes’s complaint against the CCPD and Driscoll Towing and
Hughes does not appeal that decision. Therefore, Hughes has abandoned any claims with respect
to the CCPD and Driscoll Towing.
2
1190 (11th Cir. 2002).
In order to state a claim for relief under § 1983, “a plaintiff must show that
he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state
law.” Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). Each
defendant named in Hughes’s complaint was a CCPD police officer at the time of
the alleged Fourth Amendment violations; thus, the focus is on whether or not the
officers’ actions in seizing Hughes’s car and searching his bedroom without a
warrant violated the Constitution and whether the officers are immune from suit for
their actions.
Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary
functions from civil liability if their conduct “does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396
(1982). Hughes concedes that the officers were performing their discretionary
functions at the time his constitutional rights were allegedly violated. “Once the
defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary authority, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.”
Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002).
In order to evaluate whether qualified immunity is appropriate, we must
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engage in a two-step analysis. We must first address the threshold question of
whether, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do
the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.”
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).
“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations
established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified
immunity.” Id. If, on the other hand, “a constitutional right would have been
violated under the plaintiff’s version of the facts,” we must then determine whether
the right was clearly established. Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1346.
A. Warrantless Search of Hughes’s Bedroom
On appeal, Hughes argues that his father did not have the authority to
consent to Officer Leonard’s search of Hughes’s bedroom because Hughes (1) was
24 years old; (2) paid rent; (3) cooked his own food; and (4) told his father not to
allow anyone into the bedroom. Hughes asserts that the officers should have asked
more questions to determine whether Hughes had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his bedroom.
“The Fourth Amendment2 generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a
2
The Fourth Amendment provides that: “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
4
person’s home, whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects.”
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2797, 111 L.Ed.2d 148
(1990). This prohibition does not apply, however, if the individual whose property
is searched voluntarily consents. Id. In addition, third parties may consent to
searches when they possess “common authority over or other sufficient
relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). The
Supreme Court has explained that:
The authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest
upon the law of property. . . but rests rather on mutual use of the
property by persons generally having joint access or control for most
purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the
co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right
and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number
might permit the common area to be searched.
Id. at 172 n.7, 94 S.Ct. at 993 n.7 (internal quotations and citations omitted). We
have applied this third-party consent rule broadly. See United States v.
Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1473 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that we have applied
the third-party consent rule broadly and citing to United States v. Woods, 560 F.2d
660, 666 (5th Cir. 1977), which held that a co-habitant who was not known to be
the co-owner of the house had the authority to consent to the search).
violated . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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Nonetheless, “even if the consenting party does not, in fact, have the
requisite relationship to the premises, there is no Fourth Amendment violation if an
officer has an objectively reasonable, though mistaken, good-faith belief that he
has obtained valid consent to search the area.” United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d
1120, 1148 (11th Cir. 1997).
In the instant case, Hughes does not dispute that his father voluntarily
consented to the search; rather, Hughes argues that his father did not have the
authority to consent. Assuming, arguendo, that Hughes’s father did not have the
authority to consent, there was no Fourth Amendment violation because Officer
Leonard had an objectively reasonable, good-faith belief that he had obtained valid
consent to search the bedroom. See Brazel, 102 F.3d at 1148. Hughes’s father
informed Officer Leonard that he owned the trailer. Hughes’s father also gave
Officer Leonard permission to “search [Hughes’s bedroom] and take whatever
items he need[ed].” Moreover, there is no evidence that the bedroom door was
locked when Officer Leonard arrived. Further, Hughes’s father did not tell Officer
Leonard that: (1) Hughes had a key to the bedroom; (2) Hughes paid rent; and
(3) Hughes told his father not to allow anyone into the bedroom. Therefore,
Officer Leonard had no reason to believe that Hughes’s father did not have shared
authority over Hughes’s bedroom. Accordingly, the officers did not violate
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Hughes’s Fourth Amendment rights with respect to the search of his bedroom, and,
therefore, we need not consider the second prong of the qualified immunity
analysis. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. at 2156.
B. Warrantless Seizure of Hughes’s White Mazda
On appeal, Hughes argues that the officers did not establish probable cause
or exigent circumstances for the warrantless seizure of his vehicle. Hughes
contends that, on March 21, 2003, the victim never mentioned that Hughes
attacked her in a white Mazda. Accordingly, Hughes maintains that Officer
Leonard did not have probable cause to look in the white Mazda. Moreover,
Hughes argues that Leonard admitted that he went to Hughes’s trailer park to
search for a red Mazda, and Hughes never told the officers that the white Mazda
might be towed away. Finally, Hughes maintains that because the seizure of the
white Mazda was illegal, the subsequent search of the car at the police station was
also illegal.
In most circumstances, unless there is consent, police officers must obtain a
warrant supported by probable cause to justify a search under the Fourth
Amendment. United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S.Ct. 2966 (2006). “A warrantless search is allowed, however, where
both probable cause and exigent circumstances exist.” United States v. Tobin, 923
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F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991). “Probable cause exists when under the totality-
of-the-circumstances . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. (internal quotations and citation
omitted). “In other words, probable cause exists where facts lead a reasonably
cautious person to believe that the search will uncover evidence of a crime.” Id.
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
An exigent situation may arise when there is a danger that the evidence will
be destroyed or removed. Id. “The test of whether exigent circumstances exist is
an objective one.” Id. “The appropriate inquiry is whether the facts . . . would lead
a reasonable, experienced agent to believe that evidence might be destroyed before
a warrant could be secured.” Id. (internal quotations and alteration omitted).
“[T]he presence or absence of exigent circumstances must be examined as the
circumstances arise.” United States v. Rodgers, 924 F.2d 219, 223 (11th Cir.
1991).
Officer Leonard had probable cause to look in the white Mazda because he
knew that (1) the sexual assault had not occurred in the red Mazda, as the red
Mazda belonged to a neighbor and was completely unrelated to Hughes; (2) the
victim stated that she had been sexually assaulted in Hughes’s vehicle; (3) the
white Mazda was parked by Hughes’s trailer, and, presumably, it belonged to
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either Hughes or his father; and (4) under a totality of the circumstances, a
reasonable person would have concluded that Hughes was lying about the color of
the car to impede the investigation. See Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1510.
Moreover, exigent circumstances justified the warrantless towing of the
white Mazda. A reasonable, experienced law enforcement offer would have
believed that exigent circumstances existed because (1) Hughes stated that his
friend had a key to the car, and thus the friend could have removed the victim’s bra
before a search warrant was obtained; and (2) Hughes told Officers Leonard and
Skirvin that his friend was going to move the car that day, or the trailer park
management was going to have it towed, which meant that someone could tamper
with any physical evidence of the sexual assault. See Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1510.
The fact that Hughes told the police that the red Mazda, as opposed to the white
Mazda, was going to be towed is not determinative because, as discussed above,
Officer Leonard had reason to believe that Hughes was lying about the color of the
Mazda. Based on Hughes’s statements, however, Leonard still had reason to
believe that Hughes’s friend had a key to the car. The exigency of the
circumstances must be examined as the circumstances arise, and, once Leonard
saw the bra in plain view, he had reason to believe that Hughes’s friend might
remove the bra or tow the car before he could get a warrant. See Rodgers, 924
9
F.2d at 223.
Accordingly, because the officers had probable cause to conduct a
warrantless search of Hughes’s vehicle based on the “exigent circumstances”
exception, the officers did not violate Hughes’s Fourth Amendment rights by
conducting a search after the vehicle was impounded.3 See United States v.
Birdsong, 982 F.2d 481, 483 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that “once law enforcement
officers have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle, the
officers may conduct the warrantless search even after the vehicle is impounded
and in police custody”). In sum, taken in the light most favorable to Hughes, the
uncontested facts do not show that the officer’s conduct violated Hughes’s
constitutional rights. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. at 2156.
Accordingly, upon review of the record on appeal and consideration of the
parties’ briefs, we discern no reversible error, and we affirm the district court’s
grant of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
3
Although the officers argue that the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement also
applies, we need not consider that exception because exigent circumstances justified the warrantless
seizure of Hughes’s vehicle.
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