Reed v. Quarterman

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit

))))))))))))))))))))))))))
FILED
October 9, 2007
No. 05-70046
Charles R. Fulbruge III
)))))))))))))))))))))))))) Clerk

JONATHAN BRUCE REED,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
No. 3:99-CV-0207-N

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PRADO, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner-Appellant Jonathan Bruce Reed (“Reed”) was

convicted and sentenced to death in 1983 for the murder of Wanda

Wadle (“Wadle”). Reed comes before us to request a Certificate of

Appealability (“COA”) on eight issues for which he was denied a

COA by the district court after the court rejected Reed’s

petition for habeas corpus relief. Reed also appeals the district

court’s denial of habeas relief on the one claim for which the

district court granted him a COA: his Batson claim alleging that

the prosecution violated his rights under the Sixth and

1
Fourteenth Amendments through the racially discriminatory use of

its peremptory challenges. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79

(1986).

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Around 12:40 p.m. on November 1, 1978, Kimberly Pursley

(“Pursley”), Wadle’s roommate, returned to their shared

apartment. As Pursley entered the apartment, she heard a man’s

voice from Wadle’s bedroom say “don’t come in here” and “stay out

there.” Pursley remained in the living room. After a few moments,

a man stepped out of the bedroom and snapped closed a knife

sheath. The man stated that he was from maintenance and was there

to check the air filter, and he pointed toward the ceiling.

Pursley looked toward the ceiling and then noticed her roommate’s

nude body on the floor of the bedroom. The man then threw Pursley

to the floor and bound and gagged her. He asked if she had any

money, and Pursley nodded yes. The man began to search Pursley

and Wadle’s purses, which were located on the living room sofa.

He made several circuits of the apartment during which he drank

water from a glass in the kitchen and looked through the bedroom

and living room areas. He then attempted to strangle Pursley,

straddling her with his legs and grabbing her throat. Pursley

feigned unconsciousness. The man released her throat and left the

apartment.

Pursley managed to free herself from her bindings and went

to check Wadle, whom she found with blood oozing from her mouth,

2
her gaze fixed, and her hands tied with a telephone cord. Around

Wadle’s head were a plastic bag and belt pulled taut. Pursley

went outside her apartment to call for help. A neighbor, Rosemary

Asencio (“Asencio”), appeared and let Pursley into her apartment

to call the police while she went to investigate Wadle’s

condition. Asencio found Wadle lying naked on her back with her

legs spread apart and her head and shoulders under the bed.

Asencio managed to remove the plastic bag and belt from Wadle’s

neck and began CPR. Emergency medical technicians arrived and

took Wadle to the hospital, where she died nine days later

without ever regaining consciousness.

Pursley identified Reed as her assailant in a corporeal

lineup. At the same lineup, two other residents of Pursley and

Wadle’s apartment complex identified Reed as a person they had

seen in the complex shortly before the time of the murder. These

residents, Mikki Flanagan (“Flanagan”) and Phil Hardin

(“Hardin”), as well as Pursley, subsequently testified at Reed’s

trial.1 Flanagan testified that Reed came to her door shortly

1
Reed contends that these witnesses’ identifications are
unreliable because the witnesses met with police to review a
small number of photographs before picking Reed out of the
lineup. Reed also argues that the witnesses collaborated in
forming a description of the perpetrator. He notes that Flanagan
was present while Pursley met with the composite artist to record
her recollection. Reed states that Pursley initially identified
her assailant as wearing a white or light blue shirt, and then
later testified that the shirt was red. Reed also notes that
Flanagan and Hardin spoke together about their observations and
jointly viewed the lineup containing Reed.

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after noon on November 1, 1978, claiming that he was there to

check air conditioning filters. Hardin testified that he saw Reed

in the complex around noon on November 1, 1978, wearing a red

shirt and blue jeans. Pursley and Flanagan also testified that

Reed had worn a red shirt and blue jeans. A fourth eyewitness was

Ken Ezelle (“Ezelle”), a maintenance worker for the apartment

complex who testified that he saw a man with a red shirt and blue

jeans running away from the area of Wadle and Pursley’s

apartment, where a woman could be heard screaming.2 In his

defense, Reed presented testimony from his employer and family

members to establish that he could not have been in the vicinity

of Wadle’s apartment at 12:40 p.m. and that he was not wearing a

red shirt and blue jeans on the day in question. Reed also relied

on the absence of physical evidence connecting him to the crime.

In March 1979, Reed was convicted and sentenced to death for

murdering Wadle in the course of committing robbery and

aggravated rape. The trial court granted Reed’s motion for a new

trial, and Reed was tried again in 1983. At this second trial,

in addition to the aforementioned eyewitnesses, the state

produced as a rebuttal witness William McLean, Jr. (“McLean”), a

cellmate of Reed in Texas prison who testified that Reed had

confessed to him that he had murdered Wadle. In March 1983, Reed

was again convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Reed’s conviction and

2
Ezelle did not attend a lineup.
4
sentence, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.

Reed v. State, No. 69,292 (Tex. Crim. App. March 29, 1995)

(unpublished), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1050 (1996). Reed then

pursued state post-conviction relief. His state application for a

writ of habeas corpus was denied by the Court of Criminal Appeals

in September 1998. Ex parte Reed, No. 38,174-01 (Tex. Crim. App.

Sept. 16, 1998) (unpublished), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1021

(1999).

Reed filed his petition for federal habeas relief in 1999.

The magistrate judge assigned to the case recommended that relief

be denied, and the district court adopted the magistrate’s

recommendation on February 19, 2003. Reed filed a Rule 59(e)

motion to alter or amend the judgment. Reed subsequently filed a

motion to disqualify the magistrate judge, alleging that the

magistrate judge had discussed Reed’s case with a witness. The

magistrate judge recused himself, and another magistrate judge

was assigned. Reed’s Rule 59(e) motion was then denied. Reed

filed his notice of appeal on May 1, 2003. Reed also moved for a

transfer of his case to a different district judge, alleging that

the district judge to whom his case had been assigned exhibited

signs of diminished competency. In September 2003, this court

vacated the district court’s orders and remanded the case for

reconsideration. Reed v. Dretke, No. 03-10432, 2003 U.S. App.

LEXIS 27937 (5th Cir. Sept. 15, 2003). The district judge recused

himself and a new district judge was assigned to the case. The
5
district court held an evidentiary hearing on Reed’s

prosecutorial misconduct claims on February 24, 2005. On July 26,

2005, the district court denied habeas relief on all of Reed’s

claims. The district court granted a COA on Reed’s Batson claim,

and denied a COA as to all other of Reed’s claims.

II. REED’S REQUESTS FOR A COA

A. Standards of Review

Reed’s federal habeas petition was filed after the effective

date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA); therefore, his petition is subject to AEDPA’s

requirements. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Under

AEDPA, a petitioner can appeal a district court’s dismissal of a

habeas petition only if the district court or this court issues a

COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). Because the district court denied Reed’s

request for a COA as to eight of his claims, Reed must seek a COA

from this court to obtain further review of those eight claims.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); see also Coleman v. Quarterman, 456 F.3d

537, 541 (5th Cir. 2006).

We will issue a COA if Reed can make “a substantial showing

of the denial of a constitutional right” by demonstrating that

“reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of

the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). At this stage, our inquiry “is a

6
threshold inquiry only, and does not require full consideration

of the factual and legal bases of [the petititoner’s] claim.”

Neville v. Dretke, 423 F.3d 474, 482 (5th Cir. 2005). Because

Reed was sentenced to death, “we must resolve any doubts as to

whether a COA should issue in his favor.” Martinez v. Dretke, 404

F.3d 878, 884 (5th Cir. 2005).

In determining whether reasonable jurists would debate the

district court’s assessment of Reed’s claims, we must keep in

mind that the district court’s decision must be made pursuant to

AEDPA’s deferential standards. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274,

282 (2004); Leal v. Dretke, 428 F.3d 543, 548 (5th Cir. 2005).

AEDPA permits relief only on two bases. First, the petitioner is

entitled to relief if the state court decision was “contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Leal, 428 F.3d at 548. A decision

is contrary to federal law if it is “opposite to that reached by

[the Supreme] Court on a question of law” or if it resolves a

case differently from the way the Supreme Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 412-13 (2000). A decision unreasonably applies federal law

when it “identifies the correct governing legal rule from

[Supreme Court] cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of

the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. Additionally,

a state court decision unreasonably applies federal law if it

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“either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme

Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply.” Id.

Second, the petitioner is entitled to relief when the state

court decision was “based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Leal, 428 F.3d at 548. We note

that “[t]he state court’s findings of fact are entitled to a

presumption of correctness and the petitioner may overcome that

presumption only by clear and convincing evidence.” Leal, 428

F.3d at 548 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).

B. Analysis

Reed seeks a COA as to eight issues on which the district

court denied habeas relief and denied a COA. We address each

issue in turn.

1. Discovery Regarding McLean

Reed first seeks a COA on his claim that the district court

abused its discretion by denying his request for discovery of

files regarding contact between the prosecution and the informant

McLean.

A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in

federal court, is not entitled to discovery as a matter of

course. Bracy v. Gramly, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). The habeas

petitioner is entitled to discovery only where “good cause” is

8
shown. Id. The Supreme Court has held that good cause is shown

where “specific allegations before the court show reason to

believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully

developed, be able to demonstrate that he is confined illegally

and is therefore entitled to relief.” Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S.

286, 300 (1969).

On November 30, 2004, the district court scheduled an

evidentiary hearing, at Reed’s request, on the subjects of the

Dallas County district attorney’s office’s knowledge of McLean’s

alleged perjury and the existence of any agreement between McLean

and the Dallas County district attorney’s office.3 McLean had

recanted his testimony against Reed in an unsolicited sworn

statement sent to the Dallas County district attorney’s office in

1986. Before the hearing, Reed sought discovery of state files

pertaining to McLean. Specifically, Reed sought discovery of

files regarding McLean in the possession or control of the Dallas

County district attorney’s office, sheriff’s office, and police

department, and multiple named individuals who were employed by

the Dallas County police department, sheriff’s office, or

district attorney. The government opposed this request. Reed also

requested records pertaining to McLean from the Texas Board of

Pardons and Paroles and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,

which the government did not oppose.

3
The hearing, which was held on February 24, 2005, also
addressed the existence of any fingerprint evidence.

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 In a December 23, 2004 order, the district court granted

Reed’s motion for discovery “to the extent the motion is

unopposed” and denied it “[t]o the extent the motion is opposed.”

The district court explained that “[p]etitioner has already

obtained significant information on the subjects requested, and

the Court is of the view that further prehearing discovery is

unnecessary for Petitioner adequately to present his case on the

limited subject matter of the hearing.”

In its July 26, 2005 opinion denying Reed’s habeas petition,

the district court went into greater length regarding Reed’s

claim that McLean testified in exchange for promises by the

district attorney’s office. The district court credited the

testimony of the former district attorney, Knox Fitzpatrick

(“Fitzpatrick”), that he had no agreement with McLean to give

McLean favorable treatment in exchange for testimony against Reed

and that he believed McLean’s testimony to be truthful. The

district court further found that McLean’s testimony was “not

credible and of little probative value.” Regarding Reed’s

evidence of letters from McLean to Fitzpatrick asserting the

existence of a deal between them, the court found that “McLean’s

assertion of a deal in his correspondence was not truthful and

was an attempt to manipulate Fitzpatrick into assisting him.”

Regarding Fitzpatrick’s subsequent efforts to assist McLean in

obtaining a transfer to a different facility, the court concluded

that “Fitzpatrick’s intervention for McLean is equally consistent

10
with an assistant district attorney who was advised that a

cooperating witness was in physical danger as a result of his

cooperation.”

The district court also addressed whether the district

attorney’s office knew that McLean’s testimony was false. While

the district court conceded that “Reed makes a persuasive case

through expert medical testimony that the substance of McLean’s

testimony of Reed’s confession was false,” the court found that

“[t]he medical evidence now suggesting that McLean’s testimony

was false was not available to Fitzpatrick or the District

Attorney’s office at the time of Reed’s trial.” As a result, the

court found that “the record before it establishes clearly that

Fitzpatrick and the District Attorney’s office believed that

McLean’s testimony regarding Reed’s confession was true.”

Reed now argues that the district court abused its

discretion by denying discovery of the state’s files where such

discovery was opposed by the state. Reed claims that his request

“targeted information directly relevant” to his claims that

McLean perjured himself with the knowledge of the government and

in exchange for government promises. Reed proposes that the

content of the communications could show “the existence of a

bargain for McLean’s testimony against [Reed] and how the

substance of McLean’s allegations against [Reed] were developed.”

Moreover, Reed argues that he has made a sufficient demonstration

that McLean’s testimony was perjurious, and that the district

11
attorney’s office knew this fact, to satisfy the “good cause”

requirement. Reed further contends that he has also presented

sufficient evidence that the district attorney’s office made

promises to McLean in exchange for his testimony. Reed notes that

by holding an evidentiary hearing on the subject of McLean’s

testimony, the district court implicitly found that Reed met a

higher standard than is required for obtaining discovery.

The state responds that reasonable jurists would agree that

the district court properly denied Reed’s discovery request. The

state contends that Fitzgerald “was subjected to a vigorous

cross-examination by Reed at the evidentiary hearing,” even in

the absence of the documents sought. The state further argues

that “Reed’s contention that there might have been documents out

there proving that [the] State knew that McLean’s veracity was

questionable is speculative, at best.”

We agree with Reed that reasonable jurists could debate

whether the district court abused its discretion by denying

Reed’s discovery request. See Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 487

(5th Cir. 2000). Reed has a strong argument that he has satisfied

the “good cause” requirement necessary to obtain discovery--that

is, that he has put forth “specific allegations” that “show

reason to believe that [he] may, if the facts are fully

developed, be able to demonstrate that he is confined illegally

and is therefore entitled to relief.” See Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-

12
09.

Reed relies on Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959),

where the Supreme Court held that it is a violation of the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution for

the prosecution to knowingly use perjured testimony. This court

has held that a conviction must be set aside where the petitioner

has demonstrated that (1) the witness gave false testimony; (2)

the falsity was material in that it would have affected the

jury’s verdict; and (3) the prosecution used the testimony

knowing it was false. May v. Collins, 955 F.2d 299, 315 (5th Cir.

1992). False evidence is deemed material for this analysis “if

there is any reasonable likelihood that [it] could have affected

the jury’s verdict.” Westley v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 714, 726 (5th

Cir. 1996). Since there is clearly a reasonable likelihood that

McLean’s statements that Reed had confessed to the Wadle murder

could have affected the jury’s verdict, there can be no doubt

that McLean’s testimony was material. Accordingly, if McLean lied

on the witness stand regarding Reed’s confession and the district

attorney’s office, and if the district attorney knew that McLean

was lying, Reed should be entitled to habeas relief. Reed’s

allegations suggest that if the facts are fully developed, he may

be able to demonstrate an entitlement to relief on this bases.

First, Reed has made and supported a specific allegation

that the district attorney knew that McLean lied regarding Reed’s

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confession. As the district court acknowledged, Reed has produced

medical evidence that suggests that the substance of McLean’s

testimony of Reed’s confession was false. Specifically, McLean

testified that Reed told him that Wadle was using a tampon at the

time of the murder, which prevented Reed from completing a sexual

assault. The report by the doctor who examined Wadle for rape

within hours of her assault, however, made no mention of a

tampon. The doctor has subsequently declared that he would

certainly have noticed and made note of a tampon if one had been

present during the examination. The report that did note the

presence of a tampon was the autopsy report created following

Wadle’s death, nine days after her assault. Based on the autopsy

report, Reed concludes that Wadle had only begun her menstrual

period shortly before her death. Reed asserts that the autopsy

report provides further evidence that Wadle would not have been

wearing a tampon at the time of the assault.

The district court concluded that this evidence did not

imply that the district attorney’s office was aware that McLean’s

testimony was false. The district court stated that “[t]he

medical evidence now suggesting that McLean’s testimony was false

was not available to Fitzpatrick or the District Attorney’s

office at the time of Reed’s trial.” This statement appears to be

incorrect: the report by the doctor who examined Wadle for rape

was almost certainly available to the district attorney at the

14
time of Reed’s trial. Moreover, assuming McLean was lying, there

is reason to wonder how he decided to introduce the tampon into

his account. Reed raises a plausible theory: that the district

attorney’s office, erroneously relying on the autopsy report,

coached McLean to mention the tampon to bolster its claim that

Reed committed murder in the course of committing aggravated

rape.

Reed has also made and supported a specific allegation that

the district attorney had made promises to McLean in exchange for

his testimony, and that therefore the district attorney knew that

McLean was lying when he testified that no such promises had been

made.4 Reed cites letters from McLean to Fitzpatrick asserting

the existence of a deal between them in relation to Reed’s case.

Reed also points to letters that Fitzpatrick wrote to the Texas

Department of Corrections on McLean’s behalf regarding a possible

transfer. The district court correctly noted that McLean is not

entirely credible, and that Fitzpatrick’s acts are consistent

with a desire to protect a cooperating witness. Still, reasonable

jurists could debate whether Reed’s evidence is sufficient to

show good cause for further discovery. Moreover, Reed points to

contact McLean had with the Dallas County police department in

suspicious proximity to McLean’s transfer to Reed’s cell and to

4
Here, Reed relies not only on Napue but on Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), where the Supreme Court held
that the prosecution has a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence.
15
the dramatic reduction in the amount of jailtime McLean was

offered in exchange for his guilty plea (from thirty years to

fifteen years).

Because reasonable jurists could debate whether the district

court abused its discretion by denying Reed’s discovery request

for state files concerning McLean, we grant a COA to Reed on this

issue.

2. Discovery of Information Concerning the Identity and
Location of Physical Evidence

Reed also moved for the district court to compel the state

to locate the remaining physical evidence in his case, identify

the custodians who have control of it now, determine the chain of

custody related to this evidence, and identify any items of

physical evidence seized in connection with the Wadle murder that

have been lost, destroyed, or are no longer in the custody or

control of the state. Reed also sought this information with

respect to evidence from the murders of three other women killed

in Texas after his imprisonment. The district court granted

Reed’s discovery request solely with respect to fingerprint

evidence; specifically, the court authorized that Reed obtain the

production of (1) the fingerprint evidence collected from the

scene of Wadle’s murder that was not matched with Reed or any

known person, and (2) the fingerprint evidence collected by the

state of Texas from the scenes of the other three murders that

has not been matched with any known person. Reed now argues that

16
the district court abused its discretion by denying the remainder

of his discovery request with respect to evidence pertaining to

the Wadle murder; Reed does not appear to be appealing the denial

of the remainder of his request with respect to the other three

murders.

The district court engaged in an extended analysis of Reed’s

discovery request. The court first noted the “good cause”

requirement that a habeas petitioner seeking discovery must

satisfy. Citing Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904, the court explained that

in order to determine whether Reed met that standard, it must

identify the essential elements of Reed’s claim for habeas

relief. The district court identified the first ground of Reed’s

habeas claim presented to support his discovery request as an

“actual innocence” claim. Citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390

(1993), Robison v. Johnson, 151 F.3d 256, 267 (5th Cir. 1998),

and Lucas v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1069, 1074 (5th Cir. 1998), the

district court held that “claims of actual innocence based on

newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground

for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional

violation occurring in the underlying state court proceeding.”

The court therefore concluded that Reed’s actual innocence claim,

standing alone, was not sufficient to support his discovery

request.

The district court identified Reed’s second ground as a

claim that the requested information was necessary for the

17
purpose of establishing a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” in

response to an anticipated argument by the state that Reed’s

claim that the state knowingly used perjured testimony was

procedurally barred. The court stated that “[i]f Petitioner’s

allegations establish a prima facie claim for relief on habeas

corpus, he will be allowed appropriate discovery of evidence that

may be likely to show his actual innocence in order to provide

the necessary facilities and procedures to allow an adequate

opportunity in this Court to overcome such bar.” The court

therefore proceeded to discuss Reed’s claim that the state

knowingly used perjured testimony at his trial.

The court first noted that Reed’s federal habeas petition

and the petition presented to the state habeas court did not

include an allegation that the state knew of the falsity of

McLean’s testimony. The court stated, however, that Reed had

submitted a declaration from a law school student assisting his

case stating that McLean told him that prosecutors assisted him

in fabricating testimony against Reed. The district court wrote

that “[a]ssuming that these material new factual allegations

could be incorporated into the amended habeas petition in this

Court,” Reed would have failed to exhaust state remedies by not

presenting the evidence in state court. Accordingly, the court

determined that it “cannot grant relief on this claim absent a

sufficient justification under the law to excuse such failure to

exhaust state remedies.” The court stated, however, that “[p]roof

18
of actual innocence . . . can establish the kind of fundamental

miscarriage necessary to overcome the imposition of the bar.” The

court therefore found that good cause existed for Reed to

discover evidence of actual innocence.

Having concluded that good cause existed, however, the

district court held that “the request stated in Petitioner’s

motion exceeds the proper scope of discovery in this proceeding.”

The court authorized the discovery of fingerprint evidence, but

denied Reed’s request for additional discovery of information

regarding material evidence from the Wadle murder and the other

three murders. The court explained that

express representations to this Court from the Dallas
County District Attorney’s office and attorneys for
Respondent indicate that there is presently no biological
evidence from the investigation of the murder of Wanda
Jean Wadle remaining in the possession of or subject to
the control of prosecutorial agencies of the State of
Texas other than (1) the victim’s pubic hair cuttings
which have not been shown to be capable of identifying a
person other than the victim, and (2) evidence retained by
the Dallas County Clerk from the trial which would be
equally available to Petitioner’s attorneys.

Accordingly, the district court found “sufficient justification

for orders granting discovery of fingerprint evidence, but . . .

insufficient justification for discovery orders regarding

biological evidence for [DNA] testing since Petitioner has not

shown that such evidence is likely to exist.”

In his request for a COA on this issue, Reed first

disagrees with the district court’s conclusion that actual

innocence, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for federal

19
habeas relief. Relying on the Supreme Court’s grant of

certiorari in House v. Bell, No. 04-8990, since decided by the

Supreme Court at 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006), Reed proposes that

“Herrera does not foreclose all such freestanding ‘actual

innocence’ claims.” We need not decide this question, nor

address the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell. As explained

above, the district court found that good cause existed for the

discovery of evidence that would support Reed’s claim of actual

innocence. The district court limited Reed’s discovery regarding

physical evidence not because Reed’s habeas claims were

deficient but because Reed had failed to demonstrate that there

was any likelihood that the evidence he was seeking existed.

Reed then addresses the district court’s decision regarding

the scope of discovery. Reed argues that “courts have authorized

the use of all of the federal civil discovery rules to

facilitate forensic DNA testing in habeas corpus litigation.”

Reed cites Toney v. Gammon, 79 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir. 1996),

where the Eighth Circuit held that the petitioner was entitled

to discovery of physical evidence for purposes of DNA testing.

Toney is distinguishable from the instant case, however, because

there the state “acknowledged that the exhibits from Toney’s

state criminal trial remain in the custody of St. Louis County

authorities and are available for testing if ordered by the

court.” Id. Reed also relies on Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002,

1009 (9th Cir. 1997), where the Ninth Circuit stated:

20
 Jones’s motion for expansion of the record, which we treat
as a discovery motion, sought a court order for the FBI
laboratory to conduct tests on the clothes Jones was
wearing the night of the murder as well as on blood
samples from both Lee and himself . . . . Jones contended
that he needed this material to argue effectively that his
trial lawyer had rendered ineffective assistance. We
believe this to be “good cause,” particularly given that
there was never any hearing for the ineffective assistance
claim at the state-court level.

Unlike the petitioner in Jones, Reed cannot point to specific

evidence that once existed and may continue to exist that holds

the potential to exonerate him. Statements to the district court

by the Dallas County district attorney’s office and the state’s

attorneys strongly indicate there is no such evidence. Reed has

not shown any likelihood that physical evidence exists that would

render his request for information on chain of custody more than

a “fishing expedition.” See Ward v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 1355, 1367

(5th Cir. 1994).

Accordingly, we conclude that reasonable jurists would not

debate whether the district court abused its discretion by

denying Reed’s discovery request for information regarding the

location and custody of physical evidence. We therefore deny

Reed’s request for a COA on this issue.

3. Penry Claim

Reed seeks a COA on his Penry claim, in which he argues that

the former Texas capital sentencing scheme did not permit his

sentencing jury to consider fully his mitigating evidence. See

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). At trial, Reed presented

21
evidence concerning his prior conduct in prison, his nonviolent

criminal history, his abnormal family life, and his sociopathic

personality. Reed requested that the trial court instruct the

jury to give full effect to the mitigating evidence he presented.

The trial court denied Reed’s request and instead instructed the

jury that “in determining each of these special issues you may

take into consideration all of the evidence submitted to you in

the full trial of the case.” The trial court asked the jury to

answer the following three special issues:

Special Issue I: Was the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased committed deliberately and
with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result?

Special Issue II: Is there a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute
a continuing threat to society?

Special Issue III: Was the conduct of the defendant in
killing the deceased unreasonable in response to the
provocation, if any, by the deceased?

The jury answered “yes” to each question.

Reed raised his Penry claim on direct appeal. Citing Penry,

the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained its inquiry as

“whether, in the absence of instructions informing them they

could consider and ‘give effect’ to appellant’s mitigating

evidence, the jury was provided with a vehicle for expressing a

‘reasoned moral response’ to that evidence.” The court concluded

that Reed’s evidence “does not rise to the level that would

require a special instruction on mitigating evidence.”

22
 The Texas court stated that Reed’s evidence regarding his

prison conduct and his mostly nonviolent criminal history could

be given effect within the second special issue. The court

determined that Reed’s evidence of an abnormal childhood could be

given consideration within the scope of the second issue and

further stated, quoting Draughon v. State, 831 S.W.2d, 331, 338-

39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), “[s]ympathetic as we may be to his

plight during childhood and adolescence, we do not think

appellant might rationally be found less morally culpable for his

adult behavior on this basis, according to contemporary moral

values shared by a significant segment of our society.” Finally,

the Texas court determined that Reed’s evidence of his

sociopathic personality, because it included testimony that his

violent behavior would reduce with age, could be considered

within the scope of the second special issue. The court therefore

overruled Reed’s point of error.

The district court hearing Reed’s federal habeas petition

also denied relief on Reed’s Penry claim.5 The district court

stated that, under AEDPA, it must measure the Texas court’s

decision against Supreme Court precedent rather than Fifth

Circuit precedent. The court noted, however, that this circuit’s

5
Reed did not include a Penry claim in his original federal
habeas petition. After the Supreme Court decided Tennard v.
Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004), Reed moved for leave to amend his
petition to add his Penry claim, and the district court granted
the motion.
23
caselaw can be persuasive authority for determining whether the

state court decision is an “unreasonable application” of Supreme

Court precedent. Accordingly, the district court looked to

several then-recent Fifth Circuit habeas decisions addressing

mitigating evidence, including Bigby v. Dretke, 402 F.3d 551 (5th

Cir. 2005); Brewer v. Dretke, 410 F.3d 773 (5th Cir. 2005),

rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1706 (2007); Coble v. Dretke, 417 F.3d 508 (5th

Cir. 2005), withdrawn by Coble v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 345 (5th Cir.

2006); and Cole v. Dretke, 418 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2005), rev’d

sub nom. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654 (2007).

The district court determined that Reed’s evidence of prior

good conduct while in prison and his nonviolent criminal history

was evidence suggesting good character. Citing Coble, the court

explained that under Fifth Circuit law, evidence of good

character tends to show that the crime was an aberration, and

therefore good character evidence can find adequate expression

under Texas’s second special issue. Regarding Reed’s evidence of

a troubled childhood, the district court noted that “the Fifth

Circuit apparently evaluates such evidence based on the degree of

troubled childhood.” The court concluded that Reed’s evidence of

a troubled childhood was on par with, or less severe than, the

evidence presented in Coble and in Jacobs v. Scott, 31 F.3d 1319,

1327 (5th Cir. 1994), and therefore could be considered within

the framework of Texas’s special issues. Finally, regarding

Reed’s evidence of a psychiatric disturbance, the district court
24
determined that because the evidence indicated that Reed’s

tendency toward violence would go into remission as he aged, this

evidence was cognizable under the second special issue. The

district court therefore concluded that this circuit’s precedent

indicated that the Texas court’s resolution of Reed’s Penry claim

was not contrary to clearly established federal law as decided by

the Supreme Court. The district court denied Reed relief and also

denied him a COA on this issue.

The district court decided Reed’s claim without the benefit

of several important developments in the caselaw. First, this

court’s recent en banc decision in Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d

287 (5th Cir. 2006) (en banc), suggests that this court has

revised its view of what constitutes clearly established Supreme

Court law on the question of mitigating evidence. In contrast

with earlier Fifth Circuit opinions, Nelson emphasized that it

was clearly established federal law that the jury must be able to

give “full consideration” and “full effect” to a defendant’s

mitigating evidence. Id. at 297. Nelson maintained that under

this standard, “a juror cannot be precluded from electing a

sentence less than death if he believes that the mitigating

evidence offered makes the defendant less morally culpable for

the crime, even if he nonetheless feels compelled to answer the

two special issues in the affirmative.” Id. at 293.

Moreover, the Supreme Court has since overturned two of the

Fifth Circuit decisions upon which the district court based its
25
decision, Brewer and Cole. See Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct.

1706 (2007); Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654 (2007).

In Brewer, the Supreme Court noted that “[i]t may well be true

that Brewer’s mitigating evidence was less compelling than

Penry’s, but contrary to the view of the CCA, that difference

does not provide an acceptable justification for refusing to

apply the reasoning in Penry I to this case.” 127 S. Ct. at 1712.

This statement suggests that this court’s practice, on which the

district court in Reed’s case relied, of evaluating the evidence

of a troubled childhood for Penry purposes based on the severity

of this evidence is contrary to clearly established federal law.

The Court further declared that

[n]owhere in our Penry line of cases have we suggested
that the question whether mitigating evidence could have
been adequately considered by the jury is a matter purely
of quantity, degree, or immutability. Rather, we have
focused on whether such evidence has mitigating relevance
to the special issues and the extent to which it may
diminish a defendant’s moral culpability for the crime.

Id. at 1712-13. The Court also criticized this circuit for having

“mischaracterized the law as demanding only that such evidence be

given ‘sufficient mitigating effect,’ and improperly equated

‘sufficient effect’ with ‘full effect.’” Id. at 1713. These

statements by the Supreme Court indicate that the fact that

Reed’s mitigating evidence could be considered within the scope

of the special issues is not enough to satisfy Penry if Reed’s

evidence also had relevance to his moral culpability that the

sentencing jury was not permitted to consider.

26
 In light of Nelson, Brewer, and Abdul-Kabir, reasonable

jurists could debate whether the district court improperly

resolved Reed’s Penry claim. We believe that Reed’s Penry claim

merits further examination, and we therefore grant him a COA on

this issue.

4. Alternative Theory Claim

Reed seeks a COA on his claim that due process forbade the

trial court from allowing the jury to convict him under two

alternative theories without requiring unanimity as to one. Reed

notes that the jury in his trial was instructed that it could

convict Reed of capital murder either under a theory of murder in

the course of robbery or attempted robbery or under a theory of

murder in the course of attempted aggravated rape. The relevant

portion of the jury charge instructs the jury that if it decided

that

the defendant did then and there intentionally cause the
death of the complainant in the course of committing or
attempting to commit robbery of the complainant or in the
course of attempting to commit aggravated rape of the
complainant . . .

then it must “find the defendant guilty of capital murder, as

charged in the indictment.” In his federal habeas petition, Reed

argued that because the general verdict form offered the jury

only the option of finding Reed guilty or not guilty of capital

murder, without specifying whether he was guilty of murder in the

course of robbery or in the course of aggravated rape, it is

possible that the jury did not unanimously find Reed guilty

27
either of murder in the course of robbery or murder in the course

of aggravated rape.6 Reed cited Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624

(1991), arguing that Schad held that where there is “a material

difference requiring separate theories of crime to be treated as

separate offenses,” the United States Constitution requires

separate jury findings. See id. at 633. Reed argued that, unlike

that in Schad, his jury charge did not merely describe two

different “means of commission” of the crime of murder, but

rather described two separate offenses. See id. at 631.

Reed also relied on United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916

(5th Cir. 1991), where this court addressed compound jury charges

in a perjury trial. There, this court held that “where a single

count as submitted to the jury embraces two or more separate

offenses, though each be a violation of the same statute,” the

trial court must instruct the jury that it must unanimously find

that the defendant committed at least one of the offenses to

return a guilty verdict. Id. at 927. Reed argued that his jury

charge was analogous to the one found inadequate in Holley.

The district court briefly disposed of Reed’s claim. The

court noted that Reed raised this claim on his direct appeal and

that it was rejected by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The

Texas court had concluded that “[w]here a statute creates a

single offense, such as Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03, the

6
Reed’s counsel raised this objection to the jury charge at
trial.
28
different acts by which that offense may be committed may be

alleged in the same count of the indictment.” The Texas court

further explained that the jury in Reed’s case was not charged

with two separate offenses, but with two alternate means of

committing the offense of capital murder. The district court

noted that the Texas court’s disposition of this issue was a

disposition under the merits under AEDPA and therefore receives

the deference required by AEDPA. Citing Schad, the district court

held that the Texas court’s determination did not conflict with

the relevant Supreme Court precedent. The court therefore denied

relief to Reed on this claim and also denied him a COA.

We conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate that

the Texas court’s decision was a reasonable application of

Supreme Court precedent. While Reed attempts to distinguish his

case from the circumstances in Schad, where the Supreme Court

held that the jury instructions in question were constitutionally

permissible, the two cases are actually quite similar. In Schad,

the defendant was tried and convicted of first-degree murder

under a statute that defined first-degree murder as:

A murder which is perpetrated by means of poison or lying
in wait, torture or by any other kind of wilful,
deliberate or premeditated killing, or which is committed
in avoiding or preventing lawful arrest or effecting an
escape from legal custody, or in the perpetration of, or
attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape in the first degree,
robbery, burglary, kidnapping, or mayhem, or sexual
molestation of a child under the age of thirteen years .
. . .

501 U.S. at 628 n.1. At Schad’s trial, the prosecution advanced

29
theories of both premeditated murder and felony murder. The trial

court rejected the defendant’s requested jury instruction, which

would have required the jury to agree unanimously on one of the

alternate theories of first-degree murder. The plurality opinion

of the Supreme Court, by Justice Souter, characterized the

problem thus: “petitioner’s real challenge is to Arizona’s

characterization of first-degree murder as a single crime as to

which a verdict need not be limited to any one statutory

alternative . . . .” Id. at 630-31.

The plurality wrote that “[o]ur cases reflect a long-

established rule of the criminal law that an indictment need not

specify which overt act, among several named, was the means by

which a crime was committed.” Id. at 631. The plurality noted

that while its earlier cases involved alternatives for proving

the “requisite actus reus,” Schad’s case involved “what can best

be described as alternative mental states, the one being

premeditation, the other the intent required for murder combined

with the commission of an independently culpable felony.” Id. at

632. The plurality continued that “[w]e see no reason, however,

why the rule that the jury need not agree as to mere means of

satisfying the actus reus element of an offense should not apply

equally to alternative means of satisfying the element of mens

rea.” Id.

The plurality acknowledged that “there are limits on a

State’s authority to decide what facts are indispensable to proof
30
of a given offense.” Id. at 633. It stated that identifying these

limits raised “the problem of describing the point at which

differences between means become so important that they may not

reasonably be viewed as alternatives to a common end, but must be

treated as differentiating what the Constitution requires to be

treated as separate offenses.” Id. The plurality declined,

however, to formulate a “single test for the level of

definitional and verdict specificity permitted by the

Constitution,” and disapproved of this circuit’s former test from

United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977). Id. at

637. Instead, the plurality asked whether Arizona’s definition of

first-degree murder was consistent with the demands of due

process and fundamental fairness. Id. In doing so, the plurality

stated, “we look both to history and wide practice as guides to

fundamental values, as well as to narrower analytical methods of

testing the moral and practical equivalence of the different

mental states that may satisfy the mens rea element of a single

offense.” Id.

Looking to history and current practice, the plurality found

that Arizona’s first-degree murder statute was derived from the

traditional common law definition of murder and that numerous

states defined first-degree murder very similarly to Arizona. Id.

at 640-41. The plurality noted that numerous state court

decisions have held that it was unnecessary for all jurors to

agree upon a particular theory of first-degree murder where more
31
than one was presented. Id. at 641. The plurality concluded that

“[s]uch historical and contemporary acceptance of Arizona’s

definition of the offense and verdict practice is a strong

indication that they do not ‘offen[d] some principle of justice

so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be

ranked fundamental.’” Id. at 642 (quoting Patterson v. New York,

432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)).

In the second prong of its analysis, the plurality concluded

that a moral equivalence between premeditated murder and felony

murder “could reasonably be found, which is enough to rule out

the argument that [a] moral disparity bars treating them as

alternative means to satisfy the mental element of a single

offense.” Id. at 644.7

In the instant case, we are faced not with alternate

theories of premeditated murder and felony murder but with

alternate theories of murder in the course of a robbery and

murder in the course of attempted rape. It is a reasonable

application of Schad, however, to conclude that the same result

obtains. Looking to the historical analysis prescribed in Schad,

7
The concurring opinion by Justice Scalia relied exclusively
on historical practice. Justice Scalia wrote that
[s]ubmitting killing in the course of a robbery and
premeditated killing to the jury under a single charge
is not some novel composite that can be subjected to
the indignity of “fundamental fairness” review. It was
the norm when this country was founded, was the norm
when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, and
remains the norm today.
Id. at 651.
32
we note that numerous states have traditionally defined and

continue to define first-degree or aggravated murder as including

both a killing in the course of robbery and a killing in the

course of rape or attempted rape. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 189

(2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17;

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (2006). Indeed, the Arizona statute

upheld in Schad did so. Looking to Schad’s moral equivalence

analysis, we conclude that a court could reasonably find a moral

equivalence between murder in the course of robbery and murder in

the course of attempted rape. Accordingly, we hold that

reasonable jurists would not debate that the Texas court

reasonably applied Schad when it rejected Reed’s challenge to his

jury instructions. We therefore deny Reed a COA on this issue.

5. Circumstantial Evidence Instruction Claim

Reed seeks a COA regarding his claim that the trial court’s

decision to deny him the Texas circumstantial evidence

instruction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United

States Constitution. At the time of Reed’s offense, Texas law

required an instruction on the law of circumstantial evidence. In

Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), the

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined that such an

instruction was unnecessary. Reed sought a circumstantial

evidence instruction at trial, but it was denied. On direct

appeal, Reed argued that the denial of a circumstantial evidence

instruction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Texas Court of

33
Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating

simply that “[j]ury instructions on circumstantial evidence are

no longer required under Texas law.” Reed renewed his argument

before the state habeas court, which rejected his claim,

explaining in its findings of fact and conclusions of law that

“the procedural rule announced in Hankins did not increase

applicant’s liability for any acts he committed, did not increase

the punishment for his crime, and did not deprive him of any

defense that was available at the time the crime was committed.”

Reed argues that the state habeas court’s decision was

contrary to clearly established federal law because it

misinterpreted the scope of protection under the Ex Post Facto

Clause. Reed contends that the state court’s analysis “ignored

the fourth class of ex post facto protections recognized by the

Supreme Court in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798) . . . and

reaffirmed in Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000) and Stogner

v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 615 (2003).” According to Reed,

“[t]his fourth category prohibits retroactive application of a

lesser quantum of proof to an offense committed prior to the

change in the law.” Reed claims that the change in jury

instructions implemented by Hankins did permit a lesser quantum

of proof for convictions based on circumstantial evidence.

Because his conviction was based in part on circumstantial

evidence, Reed argues that the failure of the trial court to give

the pre-Hankins jury instruction violated the Ex Post Facto

34
Clause.

The district court concluded that Reed’s federal habeas

petition had “failed to show that the state court’s legal

analysis ‘resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.’” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). We find that

conclusion not subject to debate by reasonable jurists.

Reed correctly states that Carmell reaffirmed the fourth

category of ex post facto violation stated in Calder, which

consists of “[e]very law that alters the legal rules of evidence,

and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required

at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict

the offender.” Carmell, 529 U.S. at 522 (quoting Calder, 3 Dall.

at 390) (emphasis removed). While Calder spoke of alterations in

the rules of evidence, the Court has stated, relying on Cummings

v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867), that the fourth category also

includes changes to the burden of proof. Carmell, 529 U.S. at

540-41. The Court declared that “we think there is no good reason

to draw a line between laws that lower the burden of proof and

laws that reduce the quantum of evidence necessary to meet that

burden; the two types of laws are indistinguishable in all

meaningful ways relevant to concerns of the Ex Post Facto

Clause.” Id. at 541. Accordingly, Reed has identified a possible

analytic error by the state habeas court in failing to address
35
the fourth category of ex post facto violations in response to

Reed’s claim. However, under § 2254(d), we review only the state

court’s ultimate decision, and not its reasoning in reaching that

decision. Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en

banc). We find that Reed has failed to show that the state

court’s ultimate decision was contrary to clearly established

federal law.

Reed has failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s

decision to omit the circumstantial evidence instruction falls

into Calder’s fourth category of ex post facto violation, for he

has not shown that the omission of this instruction resulted in a

lesser quantum of proof being required. Reed argued in his habeas

petition that the Hankins court acknowledged that omitting the

circumstantial evidence instruction would result in a lesser

quantum of proof being required. He claimed that the Hankins

court had found that the instruction in question had imposed a

higher burden than that required for direct evidence, citing the

court’s statement that the instruction “erroneously suggest[ed]

‘that proof of circumstantial evidence is subject to a more

rigorous standard than is proof by direct testimonial evidence.’”

Hankins, 646 S.W.2d at 198 (quoting State v. LeClair, 425 A.2d

182 (Maine 1981)). This quotation is ambiguous: it could mean,

contra Reed, that the court found that the instruction

“suggested” a separate standard of proof without actually

creating such a standard, and that this suggestion was

36
“erroneous” because the proper standard of proof was elsewhere

established. We believe that a full reading of Hankins reveals

that the Texas court concluded not that the circumstantial

evidence instruction had established a separate and distinct

burden of proof, but rather that it confused the jury as to the

proper burden.

The Hankins court stated firmly that “there is but one

standard of proof for criminal convictions and where the jury is

properly instructed on that standard, a charge on circumstantial

evidence is valueless and invites confusion.” Id. at 199. The

court reiterated that “[t]he constitutionally required burden of

proof of criminal cases ‘is that the State establish all elements

of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Crocker

v. State, 573 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)). The court

further declared that “[r]ather than aiding jurors in applying

the reasonable doubt standard, an additional charge on

circumstantial evidence focusing on the ‘reasonable hypothesis’

theory serves only to distract jurors from examining the proper

standard of proof as the primary focus of their deliberations.”

Id. Thus the court emphasized that there has been only one

standard of proof for direct and circumstantial evidence--beyond

a reasonable doubt. The court also emphasized that the

circumstantial evidence instruction confused jurors and

potentially distracted them from applying this single standard.

Thus the Hankins court clearly represented that its decision on

37
jury instructions did not effect a substantive change in the law.

While we are not bound by the Hankins court’s

characterization of the effect of its decision, see Carmell, 529

U.S. at 544 n.31, we find that characterization to be persuasive.

There can be no ex post facto violation where a court merely

clarifies the law without making substantive changes. See

Thompson v. Nagle, 118 F.3d 1442, 1449 (11th Cir. 1997) (“When a

court clarifies but does not alter the meaning of a criminal

statute, the Ex Post Facto Clause is not implicated.”); see also

United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 197 (3d Cir. 2003); Smith

v. Scott, 223 F.3d 1191, 1194-96 (10th Cir. 2002). We therefore

conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate that the

district court correctly decided that the state court did not

reach a decision contrary to clearly established federal law in

rejecting Reed’s ex post facto claim. Accordingly, we deny Reed’s

request for a COA on this issue.

6. Appellate Delay Due Process Claim

Reed seeks a COA for his claim that he was denied due

process by the extended delay in the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals’ resolution of his direct appeal. Reed was convicted and

sentenced in March 1983. The record on appeal was approved by the

trial court in May 1984, and the case was submitted upon oral

argument on April 23, 1986. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

did not act on Reed’s appeal until November 1992, when the court

remanded the case for a retroactive Batson hearing. Following the

38
hearing, the trial court filed its findings of fact and

conclusions of law on May 6, 1993. The parties submitted briefs

in July and September 1993. After another year-and-a-half delay,

the Court of Criminal Appeals issued an opinion affirming Reed’s

conviction on March 29, 1995.

Reed argued in his state habeas petition that this extended

delay violated his federal due process rights. The state habeas

court held that “a showing of substantial prejudice to the

appellate process is a necessary condition for granting habeas

relief . . . .” The court decided that Reed “ha[d] failed to

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any delay by the

CCA in adjudicating his mandatory direct appeal substantially

prejudiced his appeal in any manner.”

In Reed’s federal habeas case, the district court concluded

that the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The

court agreed with the state habeas court that Reed had failed to

demonstrate substantial prejudice, arguing that the “bulk of any

prejudice arising from the delay fell on the State.” The court

explained that “[b]y the time of the retrospective Batson

hearing, the prosecutors had forgotten why they exercised their

peremptory challenges.” The court further noted that developments

in Supreme Court caselaw had helped Reed, citing Batson, Miller-

El, Tennard, and Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004). The district

court therefore rejected Reed’s habeas claim and denied him a COA

39
on this issue.

Reed now seeks a COA, arguing that “the District Court erred

in finding that the State was prejudiced more than [himself].”

Reed argues that he “lost the opportunity to investigate aspects

of the case while memories were fresh, or before the State ‘lost’

or destroyed all physical evidence from the crime scene that

might have exonerated him.” Reed argues that “no reasonable

jurist could conclude that [he] has any interest in further

delaying his vindication, especially when such delay makes that

ultimate vindication ever harder to achieve.”

We need not reach the question of prejudice, however,

because we hold that there is no Supreme Court decision

sufficiently on point to permit the conclusion that the state

court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

That is, there is no Supreme Court decision holding that

excessive delay in a direct appeal is a violation of the Due

Process Clause of the United States Constitution.

Reed relies on the numerous circuit court decisions that do

so hold, and that explain their holdings as the logical

application of Supreme Court precedent. Reed cites Rheuark v.

Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 1980), where this circuit held

that “due process can be denied by any substantial retardation of

the appellate process . . . .” We explained that while “[t]he

40
Constitution does not require the states to afford a right to

appellate review of a criminal conviction,” “[n]evertheless, when

a state provides a right to appeal, it must meet the requirements

of due process and equal protection.” Id. We cited the Supreme

Court decisions Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) and

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), in support of this

proposition.

Other circuits have reasoned similarly. Quoting Evitts v.

Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985), the Third Circuit declared that

“[i]t is axiomatic that once an appeal as of right has been

granted, ‘the procedures used in deciding appeals must comport

with the demands of the Due Process [] Clause[] of the

Constitution.’” Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160, 1169 (3d Cir.

1995). The court went on to explain that “[a]lthough the Supreme

Court has not explicitly recognized a criminal defendant’s right

to a speedy appeal, in Burkett v. Cuningham, 826 F.2d 1208 (3d

Cir. 1987) (Burkett I), we held that the Due Process Clause

‘guarantees a reasonably speedy appeal if the state has chosen to

give defendants the right to [appeal].’” Id.

The Tenth Circuit has also held that “a habeas petition may

be predicated on a due process violation arising from the state’s

delay in adjudicating a petitioner’s direct criminal appeal . . .

.” Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1557 (10th Cir. 1994). In

justifying its holding, the court explained that the right to a

speedy trial is a fundamental right imposed on the states by the

41
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1558

(citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 (1972)). The court

stated that while the Constitution does not require that a state

afford a criminal defendant a direct appeal, the Supreme Court

has held that:

if a State has created appellate courts as “an integral
part of the . . . system for finally adjudicating the
guilt or innocence of a defendant,” Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. at 18, the procedures used in deciding appeals
must comport with the demands of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Constitution.

Id. (quoting Evitts, 469 U.S. at 393). The court noted that the

Supreme Court had held that, to ensure a defendant’s right to a

meaningful appeal, the State must afford counsel to an indigent

defendant, the counsel must be effective, and an indigent

defendant must be provided with a free transcript of the trial

proceedings. Id. (citing Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396, Douglas, 372

U.S. at 358, and Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19-20). The court concluded

that “an appeal that is inordinately delayed is as much of a

‘meaningless ritual’ as an appeal that is adjudicated without the

benefit of effective counsel or a transcript of the trial court

proceedings.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

In accord with these decisions, the Second Circuit has held

that:

The Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the issue
of whether the Constitution guarantees a speedy criminal
appeal, once an opportunity for an appeal is provided. The
lower federal courts, however, have grappled with the
question, and it is now clear in this circuit that
substantial delay in the state criminal appeal process is

42
 a sufficient ground to justify the exercise of federal
habeas jurisdiction.

Cody v. Henderson, 936 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1991). Other

circuit courts that have held that excessive appellate delay can

constitute a due process violation include the Fourth Circuit

(United States v. Johnson, 732 F.2d 379, 381 (4th Cir. 1984)),

the Ninth Circuit (United States v. Turner, 8 F.3d 673, 676 (9th

Cir. 1993) (en banc)), and the First Circuit (United States v.

Pratt, 645 F.2d 89, 91 (1st Cir. 1981)).

These decisions reveal that a majority of circuit courts

have held that the principle that excessive appellate delay may

violate the Due Process Clause is a logical application of

Supreme Court precedent concerning the right to a speedy trial,

see Barker, and the right to a meaningful appeal where appeal is

afforded, see Evitts, Douglas, and Griffin. Nevertheless,

consensus of this kind is insufficient under AEDPA to permit this

court to overturn a state court decision holding that an

appellate delay did not constitute a due process violation.

As stated above, AEDPA limits the relevant area of law to

which we may look when addressing a habeas petition to “clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has

explained that “[i]f this Court has not broken sufficient legal

ground to establish an asked-for constitutional principle, the

lower federal courts cannot themselves establish such a principle

43
with clarity sufficient to satisfy the AEDPA bar.” Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 381 (2000). The circuit courts have

elaborated on this idea. Citing Williams, the Ninth Circuit held

that any principle upon which a habeas petitioner seeks to rely

must be found in the holdings of Supreme Court decisions, and

that “decisions of that Court are the only ones that can form the

basis justifying habeas relief.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d

1132, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002). Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit

declared that “[c]learly established federal law is not the case

law of the lower federal courts, including this Court,” but

rather the holdings of Supreme Court decisions. Putnam v. Head,

268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001).

The Third Circuit has stated that “the primary significance

of the phrase ‘as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States’ is that federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief

based on the state court’s failure to adhere to the precedent of

a lower federal court on an issue that the Supreme Court has not

addressed.” Matteo v. SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 890 (3d Cir.

1999). The court noted, however, that “we do not believe federal

habeas courts are precluded from considering the decisions of the

inferior federal courts when evaluating whether the state court’s

application of the law was reasonable.” Id. The court further

explained that “in certain cases it may be appropriate to

consider the decisions of inferior federal courts as helpful

amplifications of Supreme Court precedent.” Id.
44
 The First Circuit has also articulated a nuanced view of the

value of lower federal court opinions. In Ouber v. Guarino, 293

F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2002), the court stated that:

The AEDPA also requires that the relevant legal rule be
clearly established in a Supreme Court holding, rather
than in dictum or in holdings of lower federal courts.
This does not mean, however, that other federal court
decisions are wholly irrelevant to the reasonableness
determination. To the extent that inferior federal courts
have decided factually similar cases, reference to those
decisions is appropriate in assessing the reasonableness
vel non of the state court’s treatment of the contested
issue. Reference to such cases may be especially helpful
when the governing Supreme Court precedent articulates a
broad principle that applies to a wide variety of factual
patterns.

(internal citations omitted). The First Circuit has cautioned,

however, that the “section 2254(d)(1) inquiry--whether the

Supreme Court has prescribed a rule that governs the petitioner’s

claim--requires something more than a recognition that the

Supreme Court has articulated a general standard that covers the

claim.” O’Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 1998).

In light of these statements interpreting § 2254(d)(1), we

conclude that Reed’s habeas claim must fail. We find that the

Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on the

subject of appellate delay as a due process violation to “satisfy

the AEDPA bar.” See Williams, 529 U.S. at 381. Whether appellate

delay may constitute a due process violation is “an issue that

the Supreme Court has not addressed.” See Matteo, 171 F.3d at

890. While the conclusion that appellate delay violates the Due

Process Clause, as we have seen, can be derived from existing

45
Supreme Court holdings, this derivation requires more than a mere

application of Supreme Court precedent to a new factual scenario.

See Ouber, 293 F.3d at 26. The Supreme Court-articulated

principle upon which the Rheuark, Simmons, and Cody decisions, et

al., were based--that where appellate process is offered, it must

comply with due process--is an exceedingly general one. Thus,

these circuit court decisions were more than “helpful

amplifications of Supreme Court precedent,” see Matteo, 171 F.3d

at 890; these decisions broke new legal ground. Accordingly,

these circuit court decisions cannot form the basis of a

successful habeas claim. We conclude that reasonable jurists

would not debate whether the district court erred by rejecting

Reed’s habeas claim, and we therefore deny Reed a COA.

7. Eighth Amendment Claim

Reed argues that to execute him after his extended stay on

death row, attributable mainly to delay by the state, would

violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishment. The state court rejected Reed’s Eighth Amendment

claim as unsupported by existing law. Concluding that the state

court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law, the district

court denied habeas relief on this claim and also denied Reed a

COA.

Reed now seeks a COA from this court, arguing that

“reasonable jurists can--and do--disagree” about whether

46
execution after extraordinary delay violates the Eighth

Amendment. Reed misapprehends our inquiry under AEDPA. Our task

is to determine whether reasonable jurists would debate whether

the state court misapplied clearly established federal law. Reed

points to no decisions of the Supreme Court or of other federal

courts holding that execution after a significant delay may

violate the Eighth Amendment. In his brief before this court,

Reed cites only dissenting opinions and law review articles.

These sources are inadequate to create doubt regarding whether

the state court misapplied clearly established federal law.

Moreover, the caselaw of this circuit squarely supports the state

court’s decision. In White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 436-40 (5th

Cir. 1996), where the petitioner raised a similar claim, we

stated that “[n]o other circuit has found that inordinate delay

in carrying out an execution violates the condemned prisoner’s

eighth amendment rights,” and, addressing his claim on the

merits, we held that the petitioner had not been subjected to

cruel and unusual punishment on account of the delay. See also

Lackey v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 116 (5th Cir. 1996); Fearance v.

Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 635-40 (5th Cir. 1995). We therefore deny

Reed a COA on this issue.

8. Lesser Included Offense Instruction Claim

Reed seeks a COA for his claim that the trial court violated

his due process rights by denying his requested jury instruction

on first-degree, non-capital murder as a lesser included offense.

47
 Reed founds this claim on Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625

(1980), where the Supreme Court struck down as a violation of due

process an Alabama law barring trial judges from giving lesser

included offense instructions in capital cases. Beck held that

“the jury must be permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a

noncapital offense ‘in every case’ in which ‘the evidence would

have supported such a verdict.’” Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605,

610 (1982) (quoting Beck, 447 U.S. at 643, 627). Thus, “Beck held

that due process requires that a lesser included offense

instruction be given when the evidence warrants such

instruction.” Id. at 611.

This court has held that “Beck’s holding applies when the

state trial court refuses a lesser included offense instruction.”

Cordova v. Lynaugh, 838 F.2d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 1998). We

explained that “the source of that refusal, whether by operation

of state law or refusal by the state trial court judge, is

immaterial.” Id. at 767 n.2.8 In applying Beck’s mandate, we

adopted the federal standard, that “a lesser included offense

instruction should be given ‘if the evidence would permit a jury

rationally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and

8
In contrast to the circuit caselaw on appellate delay
discussed above, we view this holding as a “helpful
amplification[] of Supreme Court precedent” rather than as a
holding that breaks new legal ground. See Matteo, 171 F.3d at
890. As Cordova explains, Beck’s holding--that a lesser included
offense instruction must be given when the evidence warrants such
instruction--contains no limitations that might preclude it from
being applied to decisions by judges as well as legislatures.
48
acquit him of the greater.’” Id. (quoting Hopper, 465 U.S. at

612). We explained that “the federal standard . . . is equivalent

to the Beck standard that a lesser included instruction must be

given when the evidence would have supported such a verdict.” Id.

We concluded that “in a capital case, the jury must be allowed to

consider a lesser included noncapital offense if the jury could

rationally acquit on the capital crime and convict for the

noncapital crime.” Id.

Reed was convicted under Texas Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2),

which at the time stated that a person committed capital murder

who “intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing

or attempting to commit” one of several enumerated felonies,

including “robbery” and “aggravated rape.”9 Reed was convicted of

murder “while in the course of committing and attempting to

commit robbery and in the course of attempting to commit

aggravated rape.” As its language makes clear, § 19.03(a)(2)

applies only when the killing was both intentional and committed

in the course of committing or attempting to commit a specified

felony. Under § 19.03(a)(2), unlike under the felony murder

doctrine, the felony does not supply the requisite mens rea;

rather, there must be an independent intent to take a life. See

Lamb v. State, 680 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).

9
Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 5317, ch. 977, § 6, subsec. (a),
subd. (2), substituted “sexual assault” for “rape.”

49
 The Texas courts have defined “in the course of committing”

an offense under § 19.03(a)(2) as “conduct occurring in an

attempt to commit, during the commission, or in the immediate

flight after the attempt or commission of the offense.” Garrett

v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (citing

Riles v. State, 595 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)). The

courts have stated, with respect to robbery, that “[e]vidence is

sufficient to support a capital murder conviction if it shows an

intent to obtain or maintain control of property which was formed

before or contemporaneously with the murder.” Id. They have

further stated that “proof of a robbery committed as an

‘afterthought’ and unrelated to a murder would not suffice” to

prove capital murder. O’Pry v. State, 642 S.W.2d 748, 762 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1982). Presumably, these principles apply to rape as

well.

Reed sought a jury instruction on the lesser included

offense of first-degree murder. Under Texas law, first-degree

murder is committed when the accused “intentionally or knowingly

causes the death of an individual.” TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.

§ 19.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1974). The trial court denied Reed’s

request.

Reed objected to the trial court’s decision in his direct

appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Stating its

inquiry as “whether there is evidence in the record from which a

jury could rationally find a defendant is guilty only of the

50
lesser offense,” the Texas court denied Reed’s claim. The court

noted that rather than denying commission of robbery or sexual

assault, Reed “swore that he did not commit any of the actions of

which he was accused.” The court declared that “there was no

evidence admitted to prove either that appellant did not intend

to commit the robbery and the aggravated rape, or to show that

they did not occur.” The court concluded, “[w]e find there was no

evidence at trial that tended to establish appellant was guilty

only of murder, so that a rational trier of fact could have

reached that conclusion.”

In Reed’s federal habeas proceedings, the district court

held that Reed had failed to show that the Texas court’s legal

analysis resulted in a decision that was contrary to or involved

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

The district court further held that Reed “failed to rebut by

clear and convincing evidence the presumption that the CCA’s fact

findings were correct.” The district court therefore denied

Reed’s habeas claim as well as his request for a COA.

In his habeas petition, Reed challenged the Texas court’s

fact-finding regarding the nature of the evidence presented at

his trial. As stated earlier, when state court fact-finding is at

issue, the federal habeas court must assess whether the state

court decision is “based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Leal, 428 F.3d at 548. “The

51
state court’s findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of

correctness and the petitioner may overcome that presumption only

by clear and convincing evidence.” Leal, 428 F.3d at 548 (citing

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).

We believe that reasonable jurists could debate whether the

district court erred by concluding that Reed had not overcome the

presumption in favor of the state court’s fact-finding. We find

that Reed has pointed to evidence tending to show that Wadle’s

murder was not committed in the course of attempted robbery or

attempted aggravated rape. Reed notes that Wadle’s autopsy

indicated “no evidence of trauma to the victim’s genitalia,

internally or externally.” Other than the victim’s nudity, the

only evidence of an intent by Reed to commit rape came from

McLean, whose testimony was questionable. Reed therefore proposes

that a rational jury could have found Reed guilty of murder, but

not rape or attempted rape.

Reed also argues that a rational jury could have concluded

that Reed committed murder, but not “in the course of committing

or attempting to commit” robbery. He notes that the court of

appeals, in affirming the trial court’s refusal to give his

requested instruction, pointed to Pursley’s testimony that Reed

had robbed her and that Wadle’s purse was lying on the couch with

its contents spilled when Pursley entered the apartment. Reed

argues that to move from this evidence to the conclusion that he

committed murder “in the course of committing a robbery” requires

52
an inference by the jury. Reed relies on Cordova, where we held

that the Texas court had erred by refusing a lesser included

offense instruction. There, the state presented circumstantial

evidence that the defendant was guilty of robbery as a party--the

defendant was “the leader of the gang,” he “did the talking,” and

he robbed another victim--and argued that this evidence showed

that the defendant had a prior agreement to rob the decedent. 838

F.2d at 769. We responded that “[t]he problem is that the jury

could reject that inference.” Id. Reed proposes that Cordova

holds that “where the jury was required to draw an inference of

an intent to commit robbery, the evidence was such that the jury

might rationally have rejected the inference.”

Reed may be taking Cordova too far. Cordova does not state

that in any case where the jury must draw any kind of inference,

a lesser included offense instruction is required. Rather, the

court repeatedly emphasized that the evidence of an agreement to

rob in that case was “circumstantial and ambiguous.” Id. at 770.

Harmonizing Cardova with our earlier caselaw interpreting Beck,

we can conclude that if a rational jury could reject the

inference that the murder was in the course of committing or

attempting to commit the felony in question, then the defendant

is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction.

Thus interpreted, however, Cordova still lends support to

Reed’s position. If Reed is correct that the evidence against him

reached a level of ambiguity that a rational jury might reject
53
the inference that he committed murder “in the course of

committing robbery or attempted robbery,” then Cordova supports

Reed’s conclusion that a lesser included offense instruction was

warranted.

To the extent that the state court, in denying Reed’s

appeal, relied on the fact that Reed did not specifically argue

at trial that he committed murder but not murder “in the course

of committing or attempting to commit” robbery or aggravated rape

and did not present evidence to that effect, we hold that

reasonable jurists could debate whether this reliance was an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The

Supreme Court’s and this court’s precedent does not clearly

indicate that a defendant who denies any involvement in the crime

of which he is accused is not entitled to a lesser included

offense instruction. While the defendant in Beck did admit to

robbery, while denying the murder charge against him, this fact

was not essential to the Court’s reasoning or holding. Beck holds

that the jury must be permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of

a noncapital offense “in every case” in which “the evidence would

have supported such a verdict.” Hopper, 456 U.S. at 610. Thus,

Beck focuses on the trial evidence, not the defendant’s theories.

Moreover, Beck does not state that the evidence must be supplied

by the defendant to warrant consideration.

Our decision in Cordova is consistent with the conclusion

that a defendant who protests his complete innocence may receive

54
a lesser included offense instruction. In Cordova, we held that

the defendant was wrongfully denied a lesser included offense

instruction without any discussion of the theories or evidence

that the defendant presented at trial. Allowing a lesser included

offense instruction where the evidence provided by the

prosecution permits it is also consistent with the normal

allocation of burdens in a criminal trial. A contrary approach,

which would require the defendant to admit to the commission of

crime to obtain the benefit of the lesser included offense

instruction, could raise serious due process concerns.10

10
The Tenth Circuit has held that a district court cannot
deny a defendant’s request for a lesser included offense
instruction on the basis that the defendant claims he is
innocent. Hooker v. Mullin, 293 F.3d 1232, 1238 (10th Cir. 2002);
Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1050 (10th Cir. 2001). The
Tenth Circuit further held that a state court’s refusal to give a
lesser included offense instruction on account of the defendant’s
claim of innocence was “contrary to or involve[d] an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law as determined by
the Supreme Court.” Mitchell, 262 F.3d at 1050.
Citing Hopper, the Tenth Circuit has explained that “[t]he
Supreme Court requires courts to look at all evidence in the
record to determine whether a lesser included offense instruction
should have been given” and that “[a]lthough an inconsistent
trial theory may indicate a lack of evidence for a Beck
instruction, it does not definitively establish that fact.”
Robedeaux v. Gibson, No. 98-6021, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15790 at
*17-18 (10th Cir. July 8, 1999) (unpublished). The Tenth Circuit
further proposed that “Schad v. Arizona implicitly affirmed the
idea that a lesser included instruction that is supported by the
evidence can satisfy Beck, even if it is inconsistent with the
defendant’s theory of the case.” Id. at *18 n.4 (internal
citations omitted). In Schad, the Court upheld a defendant’s
conviction after the trial court gave a lesser included
instruction on second degree murder that was inconsistent with
defendant’s trial theory. 501 U.S. 624, 645-48 (1991).
We note that the Eighth Circuit takes a different view,
having held that “where ‘the defendant claimed complete innocence
55
 Because reasonable jurists could debate whether the state

court decision is “based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts” and whether the state court decision “involved an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,” we

grant Reed a COA on this claim.

III. REED’S BATSON CLAIM

The district court granted Reed a COA on his claim that the

prosecution violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments by the racially discriminatory use of its peremptory

challenges. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The

parties have briefed this claim on the merits. Because we are

granting three of Reed’s additional requests for a COA, however,

we have decided to defer consideration of Reed’s Batson claim

until both parties have had the opportunity to brief on the

merits the additional habeas claims for which we have herein

granted a COA.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Reed’s Application for a

Certificate of Appealability is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART. The Clerk of the Court will set out a briefing schedule for

the issues on which we have granted a COA.

throughout the trial’ . . . there is no rational basis for a
lesser included offense instruction.” United States v. De Noyer,
811 F.2d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Elk,
658 F.2d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 1981)).
56