[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
June 22, 2007
No. 06-16663 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00179-CV-5-RS-WCS
JOHN KENNEY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
JOSE BARRON, JR.,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(June 22, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BLACK and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Federal prisoner John Kenney, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition challenging a prison
disciplinary proceeding in which he was found guilty of fighting another inmate.
The hearing resulted in a 27-day disallowance of good time credit and a 20-day
period of disciplinary segregation. Kenney argues that his due process rights were
violated when prison officials refused to provide him with a document that he
requested before the hearing, and he contends that he was entitled to this document
under the principles of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d
215 (1963). Kenney also argues that the hearing officer violated his due process
rights by using a “some evidence” standard for the initial factfinding in his
proceeding.
We conduct a de novo review of a district court’s denial of habeas corpus
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Skinner v. Wiley, 355 F.3d 1293, 1294 (11th Cir.
2004). The Supreme Court has held that when a prison disciplinary proceeding
may result in the loss of good time credits, a prisoner is entitled to the following
three procedural protections: (1) advance, written notice of the charges against him
and at least 24 hours to prepare a defense; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with
institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in his own behalf; and (3) a written statement by the
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factfinder of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-80, 41 L.Ed.2d
935 (1974). Here, Kenney claims that his second due process right, to present
documentary evidence, was violated when prison officials did not turn over an
investigation report that concluded that Kenney acted in self-defense.
We have never held that the principles of Brady extend to prison disciplinary
hearings, and we need not decide that issue in this case. To establish a Brady
violation, a defendant must prove that: (1) the government possessed evidence
favorable to the defense; (2) the defendant did not possess the evidence and could
not obtain it with any reasonable diligence; (3) the prosecution suppressed the
evidence; and (4) a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense. Moon v. Head, 285 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2002). “[T]he materiality
standard for Brady claims is met when the favorable evidence could reasonably be
taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in
the verdict.” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 698, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 1276, 157
L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004) (citation and internal quotation omitted).
Here, the conclusion in the investigation report that Kenney acted in self-
defense was based on information that the hearing officer also considered. The
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hearing officer considered additional information, however, and was persuaded by
an eyewitness account from a member of the prison staff who observed the
altercation via a television monitoring system. Thus, assuming that the hearing
officer did not consider the investigation report, there is no reasonable probability
that consideration of the investigator’s conclusion, which appears to have been
based on less information than the hearing officer had, would have changed the
outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, even if Brady applies, Kenney has not
shown that there was a due process or Brady violation.
The Supreme Court clarified that the revocation of good time credits
satisfies the minimal requirements of due process if the findings of the disciplinary
officer are supported by “some evidence.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v.
Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2774, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). In
ascertaining whether this standard has been met, courts are not required to examine
the entire record, independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence.
Id. Rather, “the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record
that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at
455-56, 105 S.Ct. at 2774.
Although Kenney contends that the hearing officer applied the “some
evidence” standard, this argument is without merit because it was the district court
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that applied the “some evidence” standard and the hearing report reflects that the
hearing officer considered all of the evidence presented. To the extent that Kenney
challenges the use of the “some evidence” standard by reviewing courts, his
argument is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, 105
S.Ct. at 2774. Moreover, a review of the evidence in this case reveals satisfaction
of the “some evidence” standard.
Accordingly, the minimal requirements of due process that are applicable to
prison disciplinary proceedings have been satisfied in this case. Therefore, upon
careful review of the record on appeal and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
discern no reversible error.
AFFIRMED.
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