[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-15092 June 19, 2007
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 04-10114-CV-KMM
PAUL E. BATES, individually,
PAUL E. BATES, d.b.a Coconut Cove Resort & Marina, Inc.,
COCONUT COVE RESORT & MARINA, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
ISLAMORADA, VILLAGE OF ISLANDS,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(June 19, 2007)
Before DUBINA, CARNES and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Paul E. Bates, individually, Paul E. Bates, d.b.a. Coconut Cove Resort &
Marina, Inc. and Coconut Cove Resort & Marina, Inc. (“Appellants”) appeal
following the grant of summary judgment in favor of Islamorada, Village of
Islands (“Appellee”). The Appellants contend that the district court erred in
denying as moot, without an evidentiary hearing, Appellants’ motion for contempt
and sanctions prior to granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. The
Appellants further argue that the district court erred in granting Appellee’s motion
for summary judgment.
First, we address the denial of Appellants’ motion (R.6-270) for contempt
and sanctions. “We review the district court’s discovery rulings, as well as its
denial of a request for an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion.” Cliff v.
Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1121 (11th Cir. 2004). Appellants
have not shown that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion.
And, while not dispositive, we note that neither the motion nor the memorandum
accompanying it includes any request for an evidentiary hearing.
Appellants’ Amended Complaint (R.3-138) includes three claims: Count I is
a substantive due process claim; Count II is an equal protection claim; and Count
III is a First Amendment retaliation claim. We conclude that summary judgment
was properly granted on all three claims. As to the substantive due process claim,
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a claim based on a violation of a non-legislative act cannot support a substantive
due process claim. Lewis v. Brown, 409 F.3d 1271, 1273 (11th Cir. 2005). But, a
legislative act is analyzed for a violation of substantive due process under the
rational basis standard. Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208, 1214
(11th Cir. 1995). Resolution 00-12-51 was not a legislative act, and Ordinance
05-13 was a legislative act supported by a rational basis. For Appellants to defeat
the presumption that a rational basis exists for Ordinance 05-13, they “have the
burden ‘to negative every conceivable basis which might support it,’” F.C.C. v.
Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2102 (1993) (quoting
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 S. Ct. 1001,
1006 (1973)). They failed to meet this burden.
Addressing the equal protection claim, the district court determined that no
evidence supported the claim that Appellee treated Appellants differently from
other similarly situated comparators or unequally applied facially neutral
ordinances for the purposes of discriminating against Appellants. See Campbell v.
Rainbow City, Ala., 434 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006). That determination is
not shown to be erroneous.
As to Appellants’ First Amendment retaliation claim, there was no evidence
of a causal relationship between protected First Amendment conduct and the
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action complained of. The record fails to show that a majority of the members of
the Islamorada Village Council acted with an unconstitutional, retaliatory motive.
See Matthews v. Columbia County, 294 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002).
AFFIRMED.1
1
Appellee’s Motion for Damages and Costs is DENIED.
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