On Saturday, October 28, 1939, at nine-thirty p. m., plaintiff was run over by one of defendant’s trains in the city of
Defendant called nine of its employees. These included the crew of the train. No one of them saw plaintiff struck but testimony of these witnesses as to the operation of the train and as to what was observed prior to and at the time of the occurrence of the accident, together with evidence that blood marks were visible on two wheels of the south of the rear truck of the fourth car from the head end of the train, were offered to show that the accident could not have occurred in the manner described by plaintiff. Defendant frankly concedes that it is unable to explain just how plaintiff received his injury except that he must have been struck by, or that he walked into, one of the cars of the train.
We think that the issue presented in this case was purely a question of fact within the exclusive province of the jury. The court’s charge adequately protected defendant’s rights and vividly brought home to the jury the issue to be decided. There appear to be no errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence nor did either side take any exception or make any requests with respect to the charge of the learned court which covered the issues with completeness and with clarity.
Though the plaintiff produced no witnesses to corroborate Ms story as to how he received his injury, this is readily understandable in view of the time and place of the occurrence. The plaintiff’s story was not inherently improbable and the jury who heard Ms recital and the testimony of all of defendant’s witnesses, chose to believe him. There is no proof that the jury in reaching its conclusion, was influenced by bias, passion or prejudice. In the circumstances, its determination of the issues of fact should not be disturbed.
O’Malley, Townley and Dore, JJ., concur; Martin, P. J., dissents and votes to reverse and grant a new trial.