IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
November 12, 2007
No. 05-20639 Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ERIC JERROD BOLDEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Eric Bolden was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine,
possession with intent to distribute a mixture containing more than five grams
of cocaine base, and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug traffick-
ing crime. He moved to suppress certain evidence that he claimed was seized in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court concluded that his
rights were not violated. We affirm.
No. 05-20639
I.
Police officers Pat Siddons and Preston Moore were leaving an apartment
when they heard nearby gunshots. Within seconds, a vehicle passed by, and the
driver yelled to the officers that people were shooting guns around the corner;
neither Simmons nor Moore stopped that vehicle to ask questions; instead they
split up to find the shooters. Siddons drove his patrol car around the corner from
which he believed the gunshots had come; he encountered a silver Jeep Cherokee
that was “coming at [him]” at a “relatively fast pace.”1 He stopped the Jeep. Bol-
den was the driver. The time between the stop and the shots was less than one
minute.
When Siddons exited his car, he observed four people in the Jeep. Not
knowing whether they were the perpetrators, Siddons took a defensive position,
drew his weapon, and ordered the occupants to hold their hands where he could
see them. The occupants did not comply, so, unsure if they were hiding some-
thing or reaching for a weapon, Siddons called for back-up.
Moore, during that time, had gone the other way around the block. Some-
one yelled to him that people were shooting out of a green Jeep. Moore did not
stop to ask questions. He turned the corner and observed Siddons’ position; saw
that there were no vehicles but the Jeep in the area; exited his vehicle; drew his
gun; and supported Siddons.
Additional officers arrived. Siddons and Moore approached the Jeep.
Moore repeatedlySShe says eight timesSStold Bolden to keep his hands on the
steering wheel, but Bolden kept “dip[ping] his hands between his legs.” Moore
believed that Bolden was “going for a gun.”
The Jeep’s passengers were ordered out of the vehicle. The officers ob-
served a semi-automatic pistol on the driver’s side floorboard in plain view. Co-
1
Siddons did not testify, however, that the Jeep was speeding.
2
No. 05-20639
caine was also found on the driver’s side floorboard. Four pistols, at least three
of which were loaded, were found. Contending that it violated his Fourth
Amendment rights for Siddons to stop the Jeep, Bolden moved to suppress the
evidence.
II.
A.
“When this court reviews a district court’s denial of a suppression motion,
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and findings of fact for clear error. The
court views the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.’”
United States v. Rojas Alvarez, 451 F.3d 320, 329 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Gibbs, 421 F.3d 352, 356-57 (5th Cir. 2005)).
B.
The only question is whether Siddons, “in the context of the totality of cir-
cumstances confronting” him, had “a reasonable suspicion supported by articula-
ble facts that criminal activity may be afoot” when he stopped the Jeep, or
whether he merely had a “hunch or unparticularized suspicion . . . .” United
States v. Jaquez, 421 F.3d 338, 340-41 (5th Cir. 2006). If the former, the stop
was constitutional under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); if the latter, it was
not. The district court concluded that Siddons’ conduct was reasonable, finding
that “rounding the corner and finding only one vehicle and that one apparently
making an abrupt departure is sufficient [reason] to stop that vehicle to investi-
gate whether they are witnesses, participants, or victims.” We agree.
Bolden puts great weight on Jaquez, 421 F.3d at 340, in which this court
held that there was not reasonable suspicion to conduct a warrantless stop
where an officer received a report that “a red vehicle” was involved in gunshots.
About fifteen minutes after receiving the report, the officer stopped a red car in
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No. 05-20639
the vicinity of the shooting, an area known for its high crime rate. Id. We held
that such scanty information was insufficient to justify a stop. Id. at 341.
From this, Bolden contends that Siddons violated the Fourth Amendment,
because Siddons “had even less information supporting a determination of rea-
sonable suspicion than did the officer in Jaquez,” given that Siddons did not even
know that a vehicle, much less a Jeep, was involved in the shooting, and the
shooting was in the early evening, not late at night as in Jaquez.
This reliance on Jaquez is misplaced. The key difference from this case is
the amount of time between learning of the shootings and responding, coupled
with the proximity between the stop and where the shootings occurred. In
Jaquez, more than fifteen minutes had passed. In that amount of time, a car can
take a shooter many miles away from the scene of violence, so merely driving a
red car in the relative vicinity of the shooting was not enough.
The situation is different where the amount of time is less than a minute.
Then, it is reasonable to believe that the shooters are close, maybe very close.
And when an officer sees a solitary vehicle containing more than one person
leaving the precise spot where that officer has good reason2 to believe that multi-
ple persons were shooting less than a minute before, it is more than a “hunch”
that those in the vehicle may be involved in the shooting. Granted, Siddons did
not know that the shooters were in a Jeep or even a vehicle, but the law does not
require that, before stopping the vehicle, Siddons knew with absolute certainty
2
An anonymous tip, such as the driver’s statement to the officers that people were
shooting around the corner, can provide the reasonable suspicion necessary constitutionally
to justify stopping a car, as long as it is reasonable in light of the “totality of the particular cir-
cumstances.” See United States v. Hernandez, 477 F.3d 210, 214 (5th Cir. 2007). “Factors to
be considered are: ‘(1) the credibility and reliability of the informant; (2) the specificity of the
information contained in the tip . . . ; (3) the ability of the officers in the field to verify the infor-
mation . . . ; and (4) whether the tip deals with active or recent activity.’” Id. (quoting Alabama
v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 327-29 (1990)). Here, the tip was specific as to location of the shooting
and dealt with “recent” or even ongoing “activity,” and the officers could “verify the in-
formation,” because they personally heard the gunshots.
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No. 05-20639
that those in the Jeep were involved in the shooting. His belief need be only
“reasonable,” and it was.
Bolden argues that because the stop was justified, at least in part, as an
attempt to identify witnesses, there was not a reasonable basis for stopping the
Jeep. For this proposition he cites Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004), where
the Court actually upheld a suspicionless stop of an automobile to look for wit-
nesses to a crime. Bolden reasons, however, that the Lidster stop was constitu-
tional only because it was akin to the common practice of officers’ approaching
pedestrians to request voluntary cooperation with an investigation. See id. at
426-28. Because Siddons stopped the Jeep by drawing his weapon, Bolden ar-
gues that it was nothing like a request for voluntary cooperation.
Bolden misses the point. Even if Lidster stands for the proposition that
Bolden ascribes to itSSa question we need not answerSSthere was sufficient “rea-
sonable suspicion” to believe that those in the Jeep were actually the shooters,
and thus Siddons was constitutionally authorized to stop the vehicle.3 Just be-
cause it was also possible that the Jeep contained witnesses or victims does not
negate the very real possibility that the lawbreakers were in the vehicle, espe-
cially given the timing and location and the Jeep’s, its “relatively fast pace,” and
the nearly contemporaneous warning that Siddons received that the shooters
were around the corner.
AFFIRMED.
3
Reasonableness for Fourth Amendment purposes is analyzed under an objective stan-
dard. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-13 (1996). Therefore, even if Sid-
dons subjectively was unsure whether the Jeep contained witnesses, victims, or the perpetra-
tors, it was objectively reasonable to stop the Jeep based on “reasonable suspicion” that the
shooters were inside.
5