This appeal involves the pension rights of a sergeant in the municipal police force, who was formerly assigned to the detective bureau as a detective of the first grade. At the time of his service as a detective, however, the petitioner held the rank of first grade patrolman. When promoted to sergeant in 1946, his designation as a detective was revoked and he was assigned to the uniformed force. This resulted in a reduction in pay.
Detectives of the first grade, pursuant to statute (Administrative Code of City of New York, § 434a-3.0, subd. b), are required to be paid the same salary as lieutenants. Under the present salary schedules first grade patrolmen receive annual salaries of $4,150, sergeants $4,650, and lieutenants $5,150. Therefore, the extra pay of a patrolman assigned as a first grade detective is now $1,000 a year and that of a sergeant so designated is $500 a year. The designation, however, is a mere police detail subject to revocation by the police commissioner at any time.
The provisions of law creating the police pension fund and providing for its administration are found in section B18-1.0 et seq. of the Administrative Code. In 1940, the police pension fund was placed on an actuarial basis, and members are presently required to contribute up to 6% of their salaries toward the fund. Prior to 1940, one in the position of the petitioner, although he might have been designated as a first grade detective and receiving the pay of a lieutenant for many years, could only be pensioned on the basis of his salary as a patrolman. (Matter of Roddy v. McLaughlin, 219 App. Div. 490, affd. 245 N. Y. 639.)
The petitioner contributed from his salary and extra compensation or upon a total of $5,150 for more than five years prior to 1946. During this time his rank was patrolman. He then became a sergeant in the uniformed ranks, and his pay became $4,650. He continued to contribute to the pension fund upon the basis of $5,150 or the equivalent of a lieutenant’s pay. He seeks in this proceeding to have his contributions increased as if his pay was $5,650 or $1,000 greater than a sergeant’s pay. He does so because he claims the right to be retired upon the basis of a salary of $5,650. It is contended that paragraph c gives him this right, although he never received pay in excess of $5,150.
To illustrate the discrimination that the proposed construction of this pension statute would afford, we might take a supposititious case of two first grade detectives who had served as such during the period served by the petitioner, one of whom was a sergeant and the other a patrolman. Both of these officers would contribute to the pension fund on the basis of total compensation of $5,150. The only difference would be that a larger percentage of the patrolman’s contributions would come from his extra pay of $1,000 as compared to the sergeant who contributed on extra pay of $500. Nevertheless, the sergeant, though he had held such rank for a longer period, would have to retire on the basis of a salary of $5,150, whereas the patrolman under the construction contended for would be able to retire on the basis of a salary of $5,650 immediately after becoming a sergeant. This would be based on the mere accident that a larger part of the patrolman’s contributions during the five-year period mentioned in the statute came from extra pay.
Similar inequality between the petitioner and others of equal rank would continue if he became a lieutenant or attained higher rank. I do not construe the statute to permit this discrimination.
It is true that a patrolman designated a first grade detective and subsequently promoted to lieutenant obtains no greater pension rights thereafter than would be afforded to lieutenants who came up from the uniformed force without ever having served in the detective bureau. This does no injustice to the detective, who contributed on the basis of extra pay. For such contributor meanwhile enjoyed the right to retire on lieutenant’s pay long before he had acquired lieutenant’s rank. Furthermore, the law protects the contributor against loss of any
The order appealed from should be reversed, with $20 costs and disbursements to the appellants, and the petition dismissed.