[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 07-10065 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 23, 2007
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 06-01890-CV-LSC-W
ALBERT W. MAY, III,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BOYD BROS. TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(July 23, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Albert W. May, III appeals following the district court's dismissal of his federal
claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and the
dismissal without prejudice of his state-law negligence and wantonness claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
May presents several issues on this appeal. First, he contends that his First
Amended Complaint was timely, and that he was entitled to file this amendment
without leave of court because no responsive pleading had been served by the
Defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). This is a non-issue; the district court's
Memorandum of Opinion (R.1-8) and Order (R.1-9), as amended (R.1-11), address
May's First Amended Complaint, and neither the Memorandum of Opinion nor the
Order suggests that the First Amended Complaint was not properly filed.
Next, May argues that all claims contained in the First Amended Complaint
relate back to the time the original complaint was filed. The district court's orders,
however, do not address the "relation back" issue. While the Defendant’s memo in
support of its motion to dismiss raised the “relation back” issue, the court decided to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law negligence and
wantonness claims, and dismissed them without prejudice. Thus, we have no district
court order on the "relation back" issue to review.
Lastly, May contends that the negligence and wantonness claims should have
been remanded to state court rather than dismissed without prejudice. We review this
claim under an abuse of discretion standard. Thomas v. Farmville Mfg. Co., Inc., 705
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F.2d 1307, 1307 (11th Cir. 1983). In determining whether to continue to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction for state-law claims after all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction have been dismissed, a district court should “‘take into account
concerns of comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and the like.’” Crosby
v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Roche v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 257 (1st Cir. 1996)). Under the circumstances at hand,
where the case was originally filed in state court and subsequently removed to federal
court, precedent dictates that the district court should have remanded the remaining
claims to state court. See, e.g., Cook v. Sheriff of Monroe County, 402 F.3d 1092,
1123 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining “[b]ecause this case was originally filed in state
court and removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1441, if the district court
declines to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, [plaintiff’s] remaining
claim should be remanded to state court”); Lewis v. City of St. Petersburg, 260 F.3d
1260, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that after all federal claims had been dismissed,
“[i]f the district court does decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, these [state]
claims shall be remanded to state court, rather than dismissed, because this case was
originally filed in state court and removed to federal court”). Accordingly, we find
that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing, rather than remanding,
May’s state-law claims. The district court’s judgment is vacated and the action is
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remanded with instructions to remand the negligence and wantonness claims to state
court.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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