I was at first inclined to the opinion that this case fell under the fourth clause of the seventeenth section of the Statute of Limitations, under which “ an action for relief on the ground of fraud ” is barred in three years; but upon further reflection I think it does not. The deeds in question, it is true, had their origin in fraud. The first in order was made with intent to defraud a creditor. The creditor proceeded to obtain his judgment, sell the land and obtain a Sheriff’s deed, regardless of the deed made for the purpose of defrauding him. The fraudulent deed was void as to him—an absolute nullity—and for this reason was not in his way. After obtaining his Sheriff’s deed he was in a position to recover possession of the land, notwithstanding the fraudulent conveyance without first procuring its cancellation in equity. It was only necessary to prove the fraud when the fraudulent deed should be set up in the action at law to recover the possession. (Jackson v. Myers, 18 John. 426.) It might be inconvenient to be at all times ready to make the proof, but in contemplation of law the deed was, as to him, absolutely void. The creditor could protect himself against it at law, and there was no necessity for going into equity for a remedy. The only substantial remedy to him, requiring relief in equity, therefore is, that being upon the record, the void deed is a cloud upon the title of the cred*265itor and those claiming under him, and this is the real ground of the relief sought in this action. The object sought is only to remove the cloud which casts its shadow upon the title. For these reasons I think the case not within the bar of three years.
As to the creditor, the fraudulent conveyance was void. Notwithstanding this conveyance, therefore, so far as the rights of the creditor are concerned, the title never passed to the grantee of the debtor until the sale under execution and the making of the Sheriff’s deed under which plaintiff claims. Until that time, as to the creditor, the title must be regarded as remaining in the debtor; and his grantee, who participated in the fraud, must be regarded as being in possession with the debtor’s assent, and not adversely to the creditor, his right being subject to be divested by a sale under execution against his grantor in favor of the creditor defrauded. For this reason a right of action did not accrue to the purchaser under the execution sale as against either till the execution of the Sheriff’s deed. I think, therefore, that the action is not barred, and concur in the views expressed in the leading opinion and in the judgment.