[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 3, 2007
No. 06-16058 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00070-CV-CDL-3
JOHN GARRETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(July 3, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
John Garrett appeals the judgment of the district court that affirmed the
denial of Garrett’s application for supplemental security income benefits. Garrett
argues that the administrative law judge erred when he rejected Garrett’s IQ score,
failed to follow the sequential evaluation of disability, and failed to invoke the
rebuttable presumption that an IQ score represents a claimant’s lifelong intellectual
capacity, as explicated in Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2001).
Because the denial of Garrett’s supplemental security income was supported by
substantial evidence and the ALJ applied the correct legal standards, we affirm.
We review a social security appeal to determine whether the decision of the
ALJ is supported by substantial evidence and whether the ALJ applied the correct
legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363
F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence
as the reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Walden
v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982). We review de novo the decision
of the district court regarding whether substantial evidence supports the findings of
the ALJ. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002).
Because the ALJ did not reject Garrett’s IQ score, Garrett’s first argument
fails. The ALJ recognized that Garrett’s IQ score was low, but found that Garrett’s
impairments did not meet any condition in the listing category for mental
retardation. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. p, app. 1, § 12.05. Specifically, the ALJ
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found that Garrett did not have the required deficits in adaptive functioning.
Garrett contends that the ALJ erroneously evaluated Garrett’s alleged
disability when the ALJ considered whether Garrett was capable of performing
work he had done in the past. The ALJ was required to follow five sequential steps
in the evaluation of Garrett, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), but Garrett argues that
the ALJ erroneously skipped step three of that evaluation. Garrett’s argument fails.
The record establishes that the ALJ did not omit any steps in his evaluation
of Garrett’s alleged disability. The ALJ considered Garrett’s work history and
ability to perform past work, factors considered during step four of the sequence,
only after the ALJ had decided that Garrett did not qualify as disabled under step
three. Contrary to Garrett’s argument, the ALJ correctly followed the sequential
process.
Garrett argues that the ALJ erred when he failed to employ the Hodges
presumption that an IQ score represents a claimant’s lifelong intellectual capacity.
Hodges, 276 F.3d at 1268-1269. It was not error for the ALJ not to mention the
Hodges presumption because the ALJ did not challenge that Garrett’s low IQ
began before age twenty-two.
Substantial evidence supports the denial by the ALJ of Garrett’s claim for
social security disability benefits. The record supports the finding by the ALJ that
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the required limitations to adaptive functioning were not present, despite Garrett’s
low IQ score. Garrett is able to cook simple meals; perform chores such as
dishwashing and yard work; and build model cars. Garrett’s daily activities
include church attendance, television viewing, card playing, and walking in the
mall. Garrett also testified that, with orientation and instruction, he believed he
could return to a job as a stock assistant.
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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