Mrs. Haley instituted an action for divorce against her husband, Salisbury Haley. She alleged and proved that, in a former action for divorce instituted by him against her, he had, in his pleading and affidavits filed in the cause, charged her falsely and maliciously, and for the purpose of grieving her, with having been pregnant at the time of their marriage by a man other than himself, and that she had concealed her condition from him, and by such concealment induced him to marry her. The averments of the complaint were found to be true.
We think that such a charge tends to cause “grievous mental suffering, ’ ’ and comes within the rule laid down in Powelson v. Powelson, 22 Cal. 358. The plaintiff testified that it did in fact cause her grievous mental suffering. It is contended, however, that, inasmuch as no other witness gave evidence as to what her feelings were, her testimony on' this point is uncorroborated. But the court finds that the charges were false, and there is nothing in the record to negative the fact that Mrs. Haley was a pure and virtuous woman. This being the case, we think the presumption is that the charge had its natural and usual consequence, and that it is no more necessary to prove that it induces suffering than to prove that bodily injury is followed by pain. The court was entirely justified in its finding on that point.
The judgment made and entered in a former action between these same parties was not such an adjudication of the matters set up by the cross-complaint in the present action as would bar the plaintiff’s right of recovery; for, although Mr. Haley’s charges against his wife of a want of chastity, etc., had been previously passed upon by the trial court in the former action, yet that court found adversely to him on the point, and repudiated the charge as being untrue. Therefore it would be a violation of Mrs. Haley’s legal right to say that because her husband had in that first action made groundless and cruel charges against her, on which the court had fixed the seal of disbelief, that she, in this action, may not, by her complaint, make such charges so made the proper basis of present judicial inquiry, with a view to determine whether such conduct on his part did or not entitle her to seek for and obtain a divorce from him.
*768We perceive no error in the trial court’s assigning to her the judgment for fifteen hundred dollars, which her husband had formerly obtained against her; for to enforce that judgment would have been inequitable, since the money, which was the basis of the action wherein that judgment was recovered, had been voluntarily given to her by him on the settlement of a former suit, and he had no just right to recover it back.
Upon the whole record, we observe no prejudicial error, and the judgment and order should be affirmed.
We concur: Belcher, C. C.; Hayne, C.
By the COURT.—For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the judgment and order are affirmed.