By the principles of the common law the responsibility of common carriers was very severe. They were liable for all losses, except those occurring by the act of G-od, or the enemies of the country. Possessing in some respects a public character or employment, they were held incapable, so long as they acted in that capacity, of divesting themselves of their common law responsibilities. After a time the rule was to some extent relaxed, and they were allowed by public notice brought home to their customers, to lessen, in some respects, the degree of their responsibility. But this was
Nevertheless it was felt that the rule, in many cases, operated harshly, and was not altogether adapted to the demands of an expanded commerce. Common carriers finding themselves foiled by the courts in attempting to restrict their liability by a public notice, resorted to another expedient—that of making a special contract with the owner or shipper of the goods for a diminished risk. The right to do this was for a time disputed, but it gradually obtained a foothold in the courts, and may be .now regarded as firmly established. (1 Kern. 490. 14 Barb. 524. 13 id. 353.) ■
But even this right has been held, on principles of public policy, not to be without qualification. A carrier of goods cannot stipulate for absolute exemption from all liability. He cannot covenant against his own fraud or willful misconduct. (4 Seld. 375. 13 Barb. 360.) And it is said, in some cases, that he cannot covenant against his own gross negligence. (13 Barb. 360. 7 Hill, 533.) The principle is, that undertaking to carry, he must do all that common prudence requires' to carry safely. He undertakes a task, and he must perform it. He is not to be permitted to lay aside that degree of care and precaution which good faith and a proper sense of the importance of his trust, and the value of the property committed to his charge, require at his hands. (4 Seld. 375.)
And yet it is possible that as respects the carriage of goods, where no principle of public policy is violated, and where it may be rationally supposed that a keen sense of self interest will protect parties from improvident contracts, a common carrier may be regarded as authorized to make any special agreement he can fairly succeed in making with his customer, for a qualified risk, always excepting agreements for indemnity against his own fraud or willful misconduct.
A somewhat different rule obtains in regard to carriers of human beings. They are not in the strict sense, perhaps not in any just sense, of the term denominated common carriers. (15 N. Y. Rep. 446. Story on Bailm. § 498.)
Very slight negligence will make them liable to an action. They are charged with the care of human life, and it is right that they should be held to a most rigid responsibility. Nevertheless it is quite certain, under the modern decisions, that as in the case-of carriage of goods, this responsibility may be restricted; not by a public notice posted or published; not by a notice brought home to the knowledge of the passenger himself, for that is still regarded as only the act of one party; but by a special agreement. (6 How. U. S. R. 344. 26 Barb. 641.) It seems to be settled, in deference to the great principle of allowing parties to make their own contracts, where no rule of public policy or of positive law is violated, that parties may contract for a less burdensome obligation upon the carrier of passengers than is imposed by the principles of the common law. (26 Barb. 641. 1 Kern. 490. 14 Barb. 524.)
It does not seem to be expressly settled how far this restriction may be carried. It is generally conceded that it cannot be carried to the extent of relieving the carrier against the consequences of his own fraud or willful misconduct. (Cases before cited.) And I do not think it ought to be permitted to relieve him against the fraud or misconduct of his servants or employees. It has been suggested by an eminent judge, that it might be permitted to cover this latter ground. (Per Gardiner, J., in Wells v. St’m Nav. Co., 4 Seld. 381.) But I think the argument unsound. It would be trifling with human life. Principles of public policy—a proper regard for the safety of the subject and the citizen—in my opinion, forbid the application of such a rule, or the concession of such a power. Perhaps, also, a party should not be allowed to bargain for absolving a carrier of passengers from gross negligence ; and by that, in this connexion, I mean a degree of negligence which
■ Making these exceptions, I am not prepared to say that parties may not, if they do it understandingly, stipulate to relieve the carrier to any extent upon which they may deliberately agree, from the common law obligations of his contract, and from any degree of negligence to which the passenger, with a full consciousness of his rights, may consent.
We come now to the consideration of the contract itself, its nature and effect. Having ascertained what the parties might lawfully do, let us see what in point of fact they did do. I think the judge at the creuit was right in saying that Ward was not, in the strict sense of the term, a gratuitous passenger. If .the compensation paid was professedly for the transportation of the stock, it involved the condition that a person was to be permitted to ride along to take care of them.' This was indispensable, and a convenience to both parties. It was a part of the contract. The agreement was, that the “ persons riding free, to take charge of the stock, do so at their own risk of personal injury, from whatever cause.” This language, it must be confessed, is very broad and comprehensive, and yet, by the argument of the defendants’ counsel, it is conceded that it has limitations. It is admitted that it does not cover injuries arising from the fraud or the willful misconduct of the defendants. But this, it will be said, is a limitation imposed by law, and not by the agreement .of the parties. I think it is by both; for the law will neither suffer it to be done, nor presume that the parties intended it. We must put ourselves in the place of the parties, and see what ¡they really intended. Was this clause designed to cover any risk arising from the misconduct of the carrier, either from his willfulness or his negligence ? Negligence is the omission of care. Did the parties mean to say that if the carrier omitted the ordinary precautions which a man observes in taking care .of himself or of his own property, he should be exempt from liability ? Did the parties contemplate a license to be guilty of negligence ? If such a clause had been expressly incorporated into the contract, so that the passenger might have read it, would he have signed it P There are risks incident to the
We are not without authority on this point. In the case of the N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. The Merchants’ Bank, (6 How. U. S. R. 383,) which was an action against a common carrier for the loss of goods by fire, the clause on which the carrier relied for exemption was, “ at the risk of the master and owners.” The court say, “ The language is general and comprehensive, and might very well comprehend every description of risk incident to the shipment. But we think it would be going further than the intention of the parties, upon any fair and reasonable construction of the agreement, were we to regard it as stipulating for willfxd misconduct, gross negligence or want of ordinary care, either in the seaworthiness of the vessel, her proper equipments and furniture, or in her management by the master and hands.”
A similar conclusion was arrived at, where the question arose upon the liability of the carrier for the loss of live stock by an accident upon a rail road, in the case of Sager v. The Portsmouth Rail Road Co., 1 Amer. Railway Cases, 172.) In that case the language of the contract was, “We take upon ourselves the risk of all and any damages that may happen to our horses, cattle, &c., and that we will not call upon said rail road company, or any of their agents, for any damages whatsoever.”
In the case of Moore v. Evans, (14 Barb. 524,) the question arose upon a contract to transport goods from Buffalo to Milwaukie, at the risk of the owner. The circuit judge had held that the defendant could not by special agreement restrict his liability as a carrier, and his decision was reversed. Judge Wright, who delivered the opinion of the court, principally discussed the question whether a carrier might by express contract restrict his common law liability, and I think he successfully maintained and demonstrated the affirmative of that proposition. In remarking upon the effect of the contract, he uses this language, (p. 530,) “ The goods were to be transported at the risk of the owner. The agreement exempted the defendant from losses arising out of events and accidents against which he was a sort of insurer. As he had
In some of these cases, it will be observed that -the degree of negligence which is held not to be covered or protected by language nearly similar to that in the case at bar, is not accurately defined. For my part, I think not only gross negligence is not protected by the terms of the contract, but what is termed ordinary negligence, or the withholding of ordinary care, is not so protected. I think, notwithstanding the contract, the carrier is liable for what, independent of any peculiar responsibility attached to his calling or employment, would be regai'ded as fault or misconduct on his part. He must, like a person casually or temporarily, or for a single occasion, engaged in the employment in question, observe reasonable care and precaution, employ persons of requisite skill, and possess vehicles fit for use and adapted to the nature of the service required. I do not believe this contract exempts him from any such responsibility. He may, I think, by positive stipulation relieve himself, to a limited degree, from the consequences of his own negligence or that of his servants.
But to accomplish that object, the contract must, in my opinion, and as is. said in several of’the cases above cited, be clear and specific in its terms, and plainly covering such a cáse. *■
I am aware of the difficulty of defining in terms the difference between slight, ordinary and gross negligence, and of the confusion that sometimes arises in their application. In truth it is impossible, by any general definition, to convey to the
The view here taken of the contract in question does not conflict, I think, with the decision of a co-ordinate branch of this court, in the case of Welles v. The N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., (26 Barb. 641.) The contract (if such it was) in that case was, “ That the company shall not be liable, under any circumstances, whether of negligence by their agents or otherwise, for any injury to the person, or for any loss or injury to the property of the passenger using this ticket.” In that case neligence was expressly stipulated for, (if stipulated at all,) and no degrees being mentioned, I think it covered all degrees of mere negligence. .It was conceded that even under such a contract the defendants were liable for injuries which were the result of fraudulent, willful or reckless misconduct. But for this decision, I should have had some doubt within the principle of Dorr v. The New Jersey Steam Navigation Co., (1 Kern. 485,) and other adjudged cases, whether the mere acceptance of a passage ticket, with a notice like the one above mentioned indorsed thereon, would amount to such a special contract, signified by the mutual and intelligent assent of both parties, as would alter their ordinary legal relations towards each other. It is enough, however, to say that the facts of that case withdraw it from the operation of the rule established in the case at bar.
It only remains to consider whether the instructions given by the circuit judge to the jury violate the rules of law above laid down, for the interpretation of the contract in
In regard to one clause of the charge, I have entertained some doubt. The judge charged, in substance, that the fail
Wright, Gould and Hogeboom, Justices.]
Hew trial denied.