OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.Judgment modified by reducing the amount of the award to the principal sum of $2,627.90 and by providing that plaintiffs claim for $228.55 for services rendered on February 22, 2006 is severed, so much of the order entered January 23, 2008 as granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the claim for $228.55 is vacated, and the branch of plaintiffs motion which sought summary judgment on that claim is denied; as so modified, judgment affirmed without costs, and matter remanded to the Civil Court for all further proceedings.
In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, the court granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the ground that defendant’s verification requests failed to toll the 30-day claim determination periods. With the exception of the claim for $228.55 for medical services provided on February 22, 2006, we agree.
A provider generally establishes its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by proof of the submission of a statutory claim form, setting forth the fact and the amount of the loss sustained, and that payment of no-fault benefits was *60overdue (see Insurance Law § 5106 [a]; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 5 AD3d 742 [2004]). In the instant case, any deficiency in plaintiffs moving papers regarding proof of mailing of the claim forms was cured by defendant’s claim denial forms, and the affidavit of defendant’s claims representative in which receipt of the claims in question was conceded (see East Acupuncture, P.C. v Electric Ins. Co., 16 Misc 3d 128[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51281[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]; Oleg Barshay, D.C., P.C. v State Farm Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 74 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). In addition, a review of the record indicates that plaintiffs affidavit sufficed to establish that the annexed claim forms constituted evidence in admissible form (see CPLR 4518; Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]). Consequently, the record establishes plaintiffs prima facie entitlement to summary judgment.
In opposition, defendant argued that it timely denied plaintiffs claim seeking to recover the sum of $228.55 for services rendered on February 22, 2006 on the ground that the fee sought was in excess of the amount permitted by the workers’ compensation fee schedule because the services for which payment was sought were part of another service and, thus, were not separately reimbursable. Defendant established that it timely denied this claim (see Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 [2001]; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). Accordingly, plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment upon this claim.
Defendant also opposed plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the ground that its verification and follow-up verification requests tolled defendant’s claim determination periods. However, since defendant mailed its follow-up requests for verification on the 30th calendar day after it mailed its verification requests, the follow-up requests were premature and without effect (see General Construction Law § 20; Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.6 [b]; Infinity Health Prods., Ltd. v Eveready Ins. Co., 21 Misc 3d 1 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]). Accordingly, as to the remaining claims, defendant failed to timely deny same and is precluded from raising most defenses, with exceptions not here relevant (see Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y. v Maryland Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 274, 282 [1997]). Thus, plaintiff was properly granted summary judgment as to the remaining claims. For the forego*61ing reason, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment was properly denied.