[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 3, 2007
No. 06-13796 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-00089-CR-ODE-4-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LASHOVIA GRIER, a.k.a. Lashovia Corvette Grier,
PERTHENIA JORDAN,
a.k.a. Perthenia Renee Jordan,
a.k.a. Perthenia Renne Jordan,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(August 3, 2007)
Before PRYOR, KRAVITCH and ALARCÓN,* Circuit Judges.
*
Honorable Arthur L. Alarcün, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
ALARCÓN, Circuit Judge:
Perthenia Jordan has appealed from the judgment of conviction for
conspiracy to obtain money by defrauding several banks in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1349, and seven counts of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2.
She contends that the District Court violated her Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. She also maintains that it erred in concluding that the evidence was
sufficient to support her conviction for conspiracy to commit bank fraud and bank
fraud, in denying her motion for a mistrial, in admitting evidence of extrinsic acts
contrary to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and in enhancing her
sentence because of her role as a supervisor. She also argues that the District Court
erred in concluding that the Sentencing Guidelines are mandatory.
In her notice of appeal, Lashovia Grier asserted that she was appealing
“from the Sentence only.” In her opening brief, however, Ms. Grier has challenged
the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction for conspiracy to commit
bank fraud and bank fraud, and the District Court’s admission of extrinsic
evidence. She did not claim that the District Court erred in its sentencing decision.
We affirm because we conclude that the District Court did not violate
Perthenia Jordan’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of her choice. We also hold
that the evidence was sufficient to persuade a trier of fact that each of the
2
Appellants was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, we are persuaded
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings, and that
its application of the Sentencing Guidelines was not unreasonable.
I
A
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government as the
prevailing party, demonstrates that from August 1, 2001 to October 25, 2004,
Perthenia Jordan conspired with Lashovia Grier, Cynthia Starr and others to
defraud Wachovia Bank, Washington Mutual Bank, the Georgia Telco Credit
Union, and the Atlanta Postal Credit Union of their money. The conspirators
deposited counterfeit and stolen checks, as well as checks drawn on closed
accounts, into accounts opened at these financial institutions and then withdrew
funds from these accounts.
Three co-conspirators testified at trial that under the direction of Perthenia
Jordan they defrauded the four financial institutions named in the indictment.
Debbie Jordan, Perthenia Jordan’s cousin, testified that Perthenia Jordan instructed
her to open an account, obtain a debit card, and deposit checks in the account that
Perthenia Jordan would furnish. Debbie Jordan was directed to buy postal money
orders using a debit card for the account. Perthenia Jordan explained to Debbie
3
Jordan that once the fraud was discovered, she should file a police report falsely
claiming that her identification and debit card had been stolen.
Following Perthenia Jordan’s instructions, Debbie Jordan opened an account
at Wachovia Bank. She gave the debit card for the bank account to Perthenia
Jordan. After counterfeit checks were deposited into the account, money orders
were purchased with the debit card. Perthenia Jordan paid Debbie Jordan $1,500
for her participation in this scheme.
Takeyla Hollie, Debbie Jordan’s sister-in-law, testified that she was told by
Debbie Jordan that if she wanted to make money, she should contact Perthenia
Jordan. Debbie Jordan drove Ms. Hollie to Perthenia Jordan’s residence.
Perthenia Jordan told Ms. Hollie that she would be paid to allow fraudulent checks
to be deposited in her checking account. She instructed Ms. Hollie that she should
withdraw funds after the fraudulent checks were deposited. She was also told to
report to the police that her debit card and personal identification number had been
stolen as soon as she withdrew the funds in the checking account.
Perthenia Jordan introduced Ms. Hollie to Lashovia Grier and provided Ms.
Hollie with forged payroll checks. She instructed Ms. Hollie to take Ms. Grier to
Columbus, Georgia to cash the checks. Ms. Hollie did so six times a month. Ms.
Hollie and Ms. Grier were not employed at the firms on whose accounts the checks
4
were drawn. Perthenia Jordan paid Ms. Hollie and Ms. Grier $200 for each
counterfeit check they cashed.
Perthenia Jordan also recruited Justin Johnson to open checking accounts.
Mr. Johnson agreed to work for Perthenia Jordan and he asked her for counterfeit
identification. She instructed him to obtain a passport photograph. After he did so,
she gave him a Georgia driver’s license in the name of Orondo Johnson.
Mr. Johnson opened an account at the Washington Mutual Bank. Perthenia
Jordan gave him a check for $4,800 and another in the amount of $3,650 to deposit
in the account. He was instructed to use the debit card to make cash withdrawals at
ATMs, and to purchase postal money orders. He did so and split the proceeds with
Perthenia Jordan.
Perthenia Jordan drove Mr. Johnson and Artis Williams to Macon, Georgia
to cash counterfeit checks. Mr. Johnson and Mr. Williams were arrested when they
attempted to cash those checks. Perthenia Jordan remained in the car while Mr.
Johnson and Mr. Williams entered the bank. A Macon Police Department officer
encountered Perthenia Jordan outside the bank.
The Government presented the following evidence regarding the substantive
offenses charged in Counts Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, Nine and Ten. On April
24, 2001, Perthenia Jordan opened an account at the Wachovia Bank in the name
5
of “Your Best Friend Cleaning Service.” She requested that a debit ATM card be
issued for the account. On August 13, 2001, the balance in the account was $1.17.
Two days later a check for $24,000, drawn on an account held by Honda and
Suzuki of Rome, was deposited into her account at an ATM. The next day $300
was withdrawn from the account. Thereafter, the debit card was used to purchase
postal money orders. A few days later a check for $12,000, drawn on the same
Honda and Suzuki account, was deposited into Perthenia Jordan’s account. Both
of the Honda and Suzuki checks were fraudulent. After the second deposit, more
withdrawals from ATMs occurred, and debit card purchases of money orders were
made.
The Wachovia Bank’s surveillance camera photographed the deposit of the
$24,000 check purportedly drawn on the Honda and Suzuki of Rome account.
Debbie Jordan identified the person depicted in the surveillance photographs as
Kenyatta Bostic. Debbie Jordan testified that Ms. Bostic was acquainted with
Perthenia Jordan. On September 7, 2001, Perthenia Jordan reported to the police
that her “work pouch [was] lost with: wallet containing SS cards (4), checkcard,
checkbook, VISA credit card, birth certificate, work ID and BellSouth cell phone.”
The Government presented the following evidence in support of Counts
Three, Four, and Five. On November 19, 2001, Perthenia Jordan drove Debbie
6
Jordan and another person to the Atlanta Postal Credit Union to open accounts.
Accounts were opened in the name of Perthenia Jordan, Debbie Jordan, and Marcia
Johnson. On the same date, an account was opened at the Wachovia Bank in the
name of Ms. Johnson.
In December 2001, Perthenia Jordan gave Debbie Jordan a fraudulent check
and requested that she deposit it at the Atlanta Postal Credit Union. The next day,
Perthenia Jordan took Debbie Jordan to two different banks. Perthenia Jordan told
her to purchase a cashier’s check at each bank using her debit card. After these
purchases, Perthenia Jordan drove Debbie Jordan to two branches of the Sun Trust
Bank to cash the cashier’s checks. Debbie Johnson was paid approximately $1,800
for these transactions.
On December 12, 2001, a counterfeit check was deposited into the Marcia
Johnson account at the Atlanta Postal Credit Union. A $500 withdrawal was made
from the account.
The record pertaining to the allegations in Count Six shows that an account
in the name of Quartarrio Hill was opened at the Wachovia Bank in the same way
described above, i.e., a minimal deposit made to open the Quartarrio Hill account.
On April 25, 2002, a check drawn on a closed account was deposited into the
account at an ATM. At trial, Debbie Jordan and Ms. Hollie identified Perthenia
7
Jordan as the person depicted in the ATM surveillance photograph at the time this
fraudulent deposit was made.
Justin Johnson’s testimony set forth above demonstrated that Perthenia
Jordan participated in defrauding the Washington Mutual Bank, as alleged in
Count Nine. The record also shows that one of the money orders purchased with
the Orondo Johnson account debit card had Perthenia Jordan’s fingerprints on it.
In Count Ten, the superseding indictment alleges that Ms. Grier, Perthenia
Jordan, and Ms. Starr aided and abetted each other in defrauding the Georgia Telco
Credit Union. Lynnisha Jeffries opened a checking account at the Georgia Telco
Credit Union on August 6, 2004. A debit card was issued for the account. On
September 11, 2004, debit card transactions put the accounts in a negative balance.
On September 14, 2004, deposits were made into the account. Ms. Hollie
identified Ms. Grier as the person who made these deposits. On September 15,
2004, a counterfeit check was deposited into the account. On September 21, 2004,
and September 22, 2004, cash withdrawals were made at ATMs. Ms. Hollie
identified Ms. Grier as the person depicted in the surveillance photographs making
the debit card withdrawals. Her finger prints were on four of the money orders
purchased with the debit card issued on the Jeffries account. Three of the money
orders were made payable to Ms. Grier. Perthenia Jordan’s right thumb print was
8
on one of the money orders.
After the Government rested its case-in-chief, Perthenia Jordan and Ms.
Grier each moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The District Court denied the motions.
B
Perthenia Jordan and Ms. Grier did not testify on their own behalf.
Perthenia Jordan presented four witnesses. Laytika Jordan, Perthenia Jordan’s
cousin, testified that she “would not” believe Debbie Jordan’s testimony under
oath. She testified that Debbie Jordan had a reputation in the community for “[n]ot
telling the truth.” She also testified that she and Debbie Jordan “did marijuana . . .
[and] crack cocaine” together. Jeffery Jordan, Debbie Jordan’s husband, was
separated from his wife at the time of trial. He testified that Debbie Jordan’s
testimony should not be believed because “[s]he’s a liar.” He further testified that
he also would not believe Ms. Hollie’s testimony under oath because “[s]he’s a
liar.” Otis Jordan, Perthenia Jordan’s father, testified that during the first part of
July 2001, her grandmother was hospitalized which caused his daughter to appear
to be distraught. Johnnie Herrington testified that he worked for Perthenia
Jordan’s company between 2001 and 2002. His job involved cleaning libraries and
police stations. He generally worked a few hours a night and three to four nights a
9
week. Perthenia Jordan paid Mr. Herrington $150, in cash, every two weeks.
Ms. Grier called Inspector Carmen Reese of the United States Postal
Service as a defense witness pursuant to Rule 611(c) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Inspector Reese testified that no handwriting exemplar was taken from
Ms. Grier.
The jury found Perthenia Jordan guilty of Counts One, Two, Three, Four,
Five, Six, Nine and Ten. Ms. Grier was found guilty as charged in Count One and
Count Ten 1.
C
A probation officer prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) for
each defendant. The PSR recommended a four-level enhancement for Perthenia
Jordan’s leadership role in the offense. The resulting total adjusted offense level
was 23. Her criminal history category was I. These calculations resulted in a
Sentencing Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months of imprisonment.
During the sentencing proceedings, Perthenia Jordan asserted that the PSR’s
proposed enhancement for a leadership role was not supported by the evidence.
She also contended that she was entitled to an adjustment for acceptance of
1
The grand jury returned a superseding indictment on October 26, 2006. It charged Perthenia
Jordan with conspiracy to commit bank fraud in Count One, and bank fraud in Count Two through
Ten. Ms. Grier was charged as a co-defendant in Count One and Count Ten. At the Government’s
request, the District Court dismissed Count Seven and Count Eight.
10
responsibility. The District Court rejected each of these contentions.
The District Court sentenced Perthenia Jordan to serve fifty-two months of
imprisonment. This sentence was within the Sentencing Guidelines range. The
District Court also ordered restitution in the amount of $119,832.51. Ms. Grier has
not raised any issue concerning her sentence.
II
A
Perthenia Jordan and Ms. Grier have filed timely notices of appeal. We have
appellate jurisdiction over Perthenia Jordan’s appeal from the judgment of
conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we are empowered by 18 U.S.C. §
3742(a)(1)-(2) to review her claim that the District Court erred in its sentencing
decision.
In her notice of appeal, Ms. Grier did not appeal from the final judgment of
conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Instead, she stated that “Defendant above-
named, hereby appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit from the Sentencing only (18 U.S.C. § 3742) (Sentence imposed 18
months) entered in this proceeding on the 28th day of June, 2006.” In the opening
brief she filed in this Court, however, she did not challenge the District Court’s
sentencing decision. The two issues raised in her brief deal with alleged errors
11
relating solely to the judgment of conviction.
To resolve this jurisdictional paradox, this Court directed the parties to file
letter briefs addressing the question whether “this Court has jurisdiction over the
appeal of Lashovia Grier in light of her Notice of Appeal dated June 28, 2006,
which references only her sentence, and the arguments made in her opening brief
on appeal, which do not reference her sentence.”
In a commendable response to this Court’s question, the Government stated
that under this Circuit’s precedent “the Court should find that Grier’s notice of
appeal of her sentence is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Court to consider
the enumerations of trial error raised in Grier’s opening brief.”
The Government first notes that Ms. Grier stated in her notice of appeal that
“a transcript of all pretrial, trial, and sentencing proceedings is required to
prosecute this appeal.” The Government reasons that “Grier demonstrated her
intention to appeal her conviction by stating in her notice of appeal that all pretrial
and trial transcripts were necessary to prosecute her appeal, by ordering the trial
transcript and by raising trial error in her opening brief.”
In its brief, the Government responded to each of the issues raised in Ms.
Grier’s opening brief. It conceded that it would not be prejudiced if this Court
reviews the merits of the issues raised in Ms. Grier’s opening brief.
12
Ms. Grier’s counsel also maintains that under this Circuit’s precedent, we
have jurisdiction over this appeal. We agree. In Comfort Trane Air Conditioning
Co. v. Trane Co., 592 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1979), the Court rejected the appellees’
contention that the appellants could not raise an issue on appeal because the notice
of appeal did not specify the district court’s order relating to the question presented
in the opening brief. Id. at 1390 n.15. The Court held that it is “entirely contrary
to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to
be avoided on the basis of such mere technicalities.” Id. The Court also noted that
the appellees could show no prejudice because “[b]oth sides also briefed the issue
before this court.” Id.2 In C. A. May Marine Supply Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 649
F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1981), the Court stated: “The party who makes a simple
mistake in designating the judgment appealed from does not forfeit his right of
appeal where the intent to pursue it is clear.” Id. at 1056.
In United States v. Rothseiden, 680 F.2d 96 (11th Cir. 1982), this Court held
that where the notice of appeal does not mislead or cause prejudice, it would
overlook any failure to designate properly the order appealed. Id. at 97.
In a more recent case with strikingly similar facts, the Fifth Circuit held that
2
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, ALA., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this
Court adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down
prior to October 1, 1981.
13
a notice of appeal that stated that the appeal was from the “sentence entered in this
matter” was sufficient to allow the defendant to appeal both his conviction and
sentence where the defendant demonstrated an intent to appeal his conviction in his
brief, and the Government was not misled or prejudiced by the notice of appeal.
United States v. Knowles, 29 F.3d 947, 948-50 (5th Cir. 1994).
Because of the Government’s forthright concession that it has not been
prejudiced by the misleading notice of appeal, we are persuaded that we have
jurisdiction over Ms. Grier’s appeal.
B
Perthenia Jordan contends that she was deprived of her Sixth Amendment
right to be represented by counsel of her choice. She argues that under the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557
(2006), we must reverse.
The facts on which Perthenia Jordan bases her Sixth Amendment claim are
that, in an ex parte conference in chambers on the morning set for trial, she
requested permission from the District Court to allow her “to hire another attorney
with Mr. Citronberg to proceed with my case.” The District Court denied her
request to hire another attorney because it would take him or her “weeks and most
often months to get a case ready for trial.”
14
The issue presented in Gonzalez-Lopez is readily distinguishable from the
question we must decide in this matter. In Gonzalez-Lopez, the defendant, in a
criminal matter filed in the Eastern District of Missouri, retained a California
lawyer to represent him. 126 S. Ct. at 2560. His retained counsel filed an
application for admission pro hac vice. Id. The District Court denied the
application without comment. Id. Gonzalez-Lopez then retained local counsel and
the case proceeded to trial. Id. Gonzalez-Lopez appealed from his conviction. Id.
at 2561. The Eighth Circuit vacated the conviction, holding that the District Court
had violated the defendant’s right to paid counsel of his choosing. United States v.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 2005). It also held that this violation
was not subject to harmless-error review. Id. at 932-35. The Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 126 S. Ct. at 2566. It held:
We have recognized a trial court’s wide latitude in
balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs
of fairness, and against the demands of its calendar. The
court has, moreover, an independent interest in ensuring
that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical
standards of the profession and that legal proceedings
appear fair to all who observe them. None of these
limitations on the right to choose one’s counsel is
relevant here. This is not a case about a court's power to
enforce rules or adhere to practices that determine which
attorneys may appear before it, or to make scheduling
and other decisions that effectively exclude a defendant's
first choice of counsel. However broad a court’s
discretion may be, the Government has conceded that the
15
District Court here erred when it denied respondent his
choice of counsel. Accepting that premise, we hold that
the error violated respondent's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel of choice and that this violation is not subject to
harmless-error analysis.
Id. at 2565-66 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court instructed in Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983), that
Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in
scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems is that of
assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same
place at the same time, and this burden counsels against
continuances except for compelling reasons.
Consequently, broad discretion must be granted trial
courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning
and arbitrary “insistence upon expeditiousness in the face
of a justifiable request for delay” violates the right to the
assistance of counsel.
Id. at 11-12 (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)).
Here, the District Court denied the motion to permit Perthenia Jordan to hire
additional counsel because it would inconvenience the prospective jurors who had
been summoned to the courtroom. The District court also noted that the
Government and the co-defendant were ready to proceed with the trial on that day.
We conclude that the District Court did not err in denying the request to appoint
additional counsel because it would have required a continuance to permit such
counsel to prepare for trial. Perthenia Jordan was represented at trial by the
counsel she had initially selected. The denial of her untimely request to retain
16
additional counsel did not deprive her of the protection provided by the Sixth
Amendment because granting it would have disrupted the District Court’s
calendar.
C
Perthenia Jordan and Ms. Grier contend that the evidence was insufficient to
convict them of conspiracy to defraud financial institutions or of fraud in obtaining
money orders from them.
“Whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
verdict is a question of law subject to de novo review.” United States v. To, 144
F.3d 737, 743 (11th Cir. 1998). “When conducting the review of the record, [this
Court] view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and
resolve[s] all reasonable inferences and credibility evaluations in favor of the
jury’s verdict.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he jury’s verdict
[should be upheld] whenever a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the
evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 743-44.
In this case, the jury was presented with direct evidence of Perthenia
Jordan’s involvement in the bank fraud conspiracy charged in Count One, and the
substantive bank fraud offenses charged in counts Two through Six and Nine and
Ten through the testimony of cooperating co-conspirators Debbie Jordan, Mr.
17
Johnson, and Ms. Hollie. The Government also presented bank surveillance
photographs showing Perthenia Jordan depositing a counterfeit check, and money
orders purchased with fraudulently obtained funds containing her fingerprints.
The record also shows that Ms. Grier was involved in the bank fraud
conspiracy charged in Count One and the substantive bank fraud offense charged
in Count Ten. The Government introduced into evidence surveillance photographs
showing Ms. Grier making fraudulent deposits into an account that was used by
Perthenia Jordan to perpetrate bank fraud, and money orders purchased with
fraudulently obtained funds containing Ms. Grier’s fingerprints.
Perthenia Jordan and Ms. Grier contend that the Government failed to show
that an agreement existed between the co-conspirators to form the alleged
conspiracy. This Court has held that the Government could prove a conspiracy by
“show[ing] an agreement on an overall objective.” To, 144 F.3d at 744. However,
“the government does not have to establish that each conspirator explicitly agreed
with every other conspirator to commit the substantive [] crime described in the
indictment, or knew his fellow conspirators, or was aware of all the details of the
conspiracy.” Id. Here, testimony from the defendants’ co-conspirators clearly
satisfies the Government’s burden of proof on this issue.
Ms. Grier cites Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), and its
18
progeny to suggest that this was a “hub and spoke” conspiracy, thus she should not
be charged with conspiring with the other spokes. This Court has held that when
“there was no connection whatsoever between the various spokes [co-conspirators]
of [the] scheme,” the entire scheme could not be charged as a single conspiracy.
United States v. Chandler, 388 F.3d 796, 808 (11th Cir. 2004). Here, however, the
evidence shows that Ms. Grier and Perthenia Jordan entered in an agreement with
other persons to defraud financial institutions.
D
Perthenia Jordan also contends that the District Court erred by failing to
grant her motion for a mistrial after Mr. Johnson testified that he saw Perthenia
Jordan in custody at the bank after he and Mr. Williams were arrested in Macon.
“The district court’s evidentiary rulings are not subject to disturbance on appeal
absent a clear abuse of discretion.” United States v. Mendez, 117 F.3d 480, 484
(11th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Moreover, [t]he decision to
grant a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge since he [or she]
is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial effect of a statement or evidence
on the jury.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When
a court gives a direct and explicit curative instruction regarding improper
testimony, it supports the court’s decision not to grant a mistrial by decreasing the
19
possibility of undue prejudice.” United States v. Perez, 30 F.3d 1407, 1411 (11th
Cir. 1994). Finally, “prejudicial testimony will not mandate a mistrial when there
is other significant evidence of guilt which reduces the likelihood that the
otherwise improper testimony had a substantial impact on the verdict of the jury.”
United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 708 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Immediately following Mr. Johnson’s challenged testimony, the District
Court struck it from the record and gave an explicit curative instruction. The Court
informed the jury that Perthenia Jordan being in custody in Macon was “not
relevant” and “direct[ed] [the jury] to disregard that.” The Court further indicated
to the jury that “there is no evidence that [Perthenia Jordan] was convicted of
anything relating to the Macon situation,” and that “the charge was dismissed in
Macon.” These admonitions went beyond a standard curative instruction. By
informing the jury of the dismissal of the charges at Macon, the District Court
erased any possible undue prejudice that may have occurred. The District Court
did not err by refusing to grant Perthenia Jordan’s motion for a mistrial.
E
Perthenia Jordan and Ms. Grier both contend that the District Court erred in
permitting Ms. Hollie to testify about their involvement in other crimes not
20
charged in the indictment. They argue that the Government violated the Magistrate
Judge’s order requiring pretrial disclosure of such testimony to be completed
twenty-one days prior to trial. “This court reviews the decision to admit extrinsic
act evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) for clear abuse of discretion.” United
States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1291 (11th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides as follows:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that
upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a
criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance
of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice
on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such
evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
In United States v. Miller, 959 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1992), this Court
concluded that a three-part test should be used to evaluate the admissibility of Rule
404(b) evidence. Id. at 1538. “First, the evidence must be relevant to an issue
other than the defendant’s character.” Id. “Second, as part of the relevance
analysis, there must be sufficient proof so that a jury could find that the defendant
committed the extrinsic act.” Id. “Third, the evidence must possess probative
21
value that is not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice, and the evidence
must meet the other requirements of Rule 403.” Id. Whether the probative value is
not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice is a “determination [that] lies
within the discretion of the district court and calls for a common sense assessment
of all the circumstances surrounding the extrinsic offense, including prosecutorial
need, overall similarity between the extrinsic act and the charged offense, as well
as temporal remoteness.” United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 780 (11th Cir.
2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Ms. Hollie testified regarding Perthenia Jordan’s and Ms. Grier’s prior
involvement in intentionally defrauding other banks. The prior crimes in question
were very similar to the bank fraud scheme involved in this case. Since Perthenia
Jordan and Ms. Grier pled not guilty to the bank fraud charges at issue, proof of
similar prior crimes was relevant to show that Perthenia Jordan and Ms. Grier
intentionally participated in defrauding the banks named in the superseding
indictment. See United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1311-12 (11th Cir.
2005) (similar crime committed eight years prior could be introduced at trial to
show intent to commit the current charged crime). Ms. Hollie, as a co-conspirator,
offered first-hand accounts of the prior crimes, thus providing sufficient proof that
Perthenia Jordan and Ms. Grier committed the extrinsic acts.
22
The balancing test further supports the District Court’s conclusion. As
discussed above, the intent element of the bank fraud charges for each defendant
was contested at trial. Thus, evidence of the other crimes was admissible to prove
the intent element beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, the prior crimes are
factually similar to the charged offenses, and they are not temporally remote as the
time span difference is only a matter of a few years. Finally, the District Court
gave a limiting instruction informing the jury that the evidence of other crimes
could only be considered for a “limited purpose,” and that those crimes “are not
themselves charged as crimes in the indictment.” Thus, the totality of the
circumstances suggests that the District Court was well within its discretion in
permitting such prior crimes testimony.
Perthenia Jordan and Ms. Grier further maintain that the Government’s
violation of the Magistrate Judge’s twenty-one-day rule constitutes reversible
error. As the District Court properly held, however, Appellants failed to
demonstrate that they were prejudiced as a result of the Government’s disclosure of
Ms. Hollie’s testimony seven days prior to trial. The District Court did not abuse
its discretion in permitting Ms. Hollie to testify about Perthenia Jordan’s and Ms.
Grier’s involvement in other crimes not charged in the indictment.
III
23
A
Perthenia Jordan next argues that the District Court erred by enhancing her
sentence based on a leadership role because there was no evidence that she
managed others or that she supervised at least five people. “A district court’s
upward adjustment of a defendant’s Guidelines offense level due to his status as a
leader or organizer under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 is a finding of fact reviewed only for
clear error.” United States v. Phillips, 287 F.3d 1053, 1055 (11th Cir. 2002). “The
government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant had [such] an aggravating role in the offense.” United States v.
Yeager, 331 F.3d 1216, 1226 (11th Cir. 2003).
The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a four-level increase in the
Guidelines range if the defendant “was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity
that involved five or more participants.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). In making the
aggravating-role determination, the District Court should consider several factors,
including “the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in
the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to
a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or
organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree
of control and authority exercised over others.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, Application
24
Note 4. Section 3B1.1 defines a participant to be “a person who is criminally
responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted.”
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, Application Note 1. An enhancement under 3B1.1 “requires the
exercise of some authority in the organization, the exertion of some degree of
control, influence, or leadership.” United States v. Yates, 990 F.2d 1179, 1182
(11th Cir. 1993).
Here, the evidence established that Perthenia Jordan recruited and
supervised at least five people. The testimony at trial and the PSR identified
twelve people involved in the scheme that lasted over three years.3 Perthenia
Jordan obtained counterfeit checks on closed accounts and directed others to
deposit them in checking accounts, and to withdraw funds or purchase money
orders. She kept a portion of the money obtained by her recruits. As the District
Court noted, the group would not have existed without Perthenia Jordan’s
organizing skills. Accordingly, the District Court’s application of the enhancement
was not clear error.
B
Perthenia Jordan argues that the District Court erred by refusing to apply a
3
Perthenia Jordan’s co-conspirators identified at trial and in the PSR of Perthenia Jordan and
the PSR of Lashovia Grier include Justin Johnson, Alecia Gillins, Debbie Jordan, Vernon Thorne,
Corlis Gail Smith, John Smith, Latyka Jordan, Takeyla Davis, Lashovia Grier, Carl Johnson, and
Cynthia Starr.
25
reduction for acceptance of responsibility because, even though she proceeded to
trial, she provided a statement of remorse and apologized. “We review the district
court's determination of acceptance of responsibility only for clear error.” United
States v. Singh, 291 F.3d 756, 764 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A district court's determination that a defendant is not entitled to
acceptance of responsibility will not be set aside unless the facts in the record
clearly establish that a defendant has accepted personal responsibility.” Id.
Under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), a defendant may receive a two-level reduction in
his offense level “[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense.” Application Note 2 to § 3E1.1 explains that
This adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant
who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by
denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is
convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses
remorse. Conviction by trial, however, does not
automatically preclude a defendant from consideration
for such a reduction. In rare situations a defendant may
clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for
his criminal conduct even though he exercises his
constitutional right to a trial. This may occur, for
example, where a defendant goes to trial to assert and
preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to
make a constitutional challenge to a statute or a challenge
to the applicability of a statute to his conduct). In each
such instance, however, a determination that a defendant
has accepted responsibility will be based primarily upon
pre-trial statements and conduct.
26
Perthenia Jordan made the following brief written statement to the probation
officer: “This advises that I am remorseful for the events that led to my conviction.
I apologize to the Court, to the Government, and to my family.” During the
sentencing proceedings, she again apologized to the Court, the Government, and
her family for “everything that . . . led up to [her] conviction.” The District Court
concluded that Perthenia Jordan had not affirmatively accepted responsibility. The
Court explained that “with respect to acceptance of responsibility, under the
Guidelines there must be some affirmative indication in the evidence of acceptance
of responsibility. And that simply does not exist in this case.”
The District Court did not clearly err in this decision. Perthenia Jordan went
to trial to contest her guilt and not to preserve a challenge to the statute or the
applicability of the statute to her conduct. Rather, she only made a statement of
remorse after her conviction and only apologized for the “events that led to” the
conviction. Because she went to trial on issues relating to her factual guilt, she
failed to “clearly demonstrate[] acceptance of responsibility.”
C
Finally, Perthenia Jordan argues that the District Court improperly applied
the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion by stating, during her sentencing
proceeding, that: “So I think the court is required to impose a prison sentence and
27
I think it has to be a guideline sentence because of the evidence that came in at
trial.” When a defendant fails to object to an error before the District Court, this
Court reviews the argument for plain error. United States v. Hall, 314 F.3d 565,
566 (11th Cir. 2002). “Plain error occurs where (1) there is an error; (2) that is
plain or obvious; (3) affecting the defendant's substantial rights in that it was
prejudicial and not harmless; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id.
Perthenia Jordan did not object to the imposition of her sentence under a
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines scheme. Thus, we review Perthenia Jordan’s
contention that the District Court improperly applied the Guidelines in a mandatory
fashion for plain error.
In United States v. Dowd, 451 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2006), this Court held
that the “district court, in determining a reasonable sentence, must consider the
correctly calculated sentencing range under the advisory guidelines and the factors
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. at 1256. “[N]othing in Booker or elsewhere
requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered
each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.” United
States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005).
Here, the District Court did not err because it did not impose a sentence
28
under a mandatory Guidelines scheme. During sentencing, the District Court
correctly indicated that “of course, we all know that the Guidelines are no longer
binding in Federal Court.” The Court further indicated that “the Court is required
in this Circuit . . . to determine the Guideline range as a beginning point for the
analysis.” The Court also noted that in determining a “reasonable sentence,” it
would “take into account all of the [submitted] evidence . . . and . . . presentation
made by counsel.” The Court ultimately concluded that facts of the case made a
sentence within the Guidelines range appropriate and necessary.
AFFIRMED.
29