This is an appeal from the final decree of the vice chancellor of the eighth circuit, in the same cause which was formerly before me, on appeal from the equity court of that circuit, to reverse an order in relation to the injunction. (1 Paige’s Rep. 391.) The case is substantially *373the same as it then appeared on the bill and answer. And upon a careful examination of the case, and the voluminous briefs of the counsel for the respective parties, I see no reason to change the opinion I then entertained. The error into which the plaintiff’s counsel appears to have fallen, is in supposing that an answer responsive to the charging part of the bill is not evidence, in favor of the defendants. The charging part of a bill is as necessary to be answered as the stating part. So far as the charges are material to anticipate and defeat a defence which may be set up by the defendant, they may be considered in the nature of a special replication. But the complainant has the same right to the defendants’ answer to the charging part of the bill, to prove the truth of his special replication, as he has to an answer to the stating part, to prove the truth of that. If he does not waive an answer on oath from the defendant, he makes him a witness in favor of the complainant, against himself, and interrogates him as to every statement and charge in the bill. His answer, therefore, which is responsive to any such statement, or charge, in whatever part of the bill it is contained, is evidence in his own favor as well as in favor of the complainant. I know it has been supposed by many that the charging part of a bill is mere form; and that they might therefore put any thing they pleased in that part, by way of charge, even in a sworn bill. It is frequently, however, as material a part of the bill as the stating part; and the decision of the cause frequently turns upon the issue formed by the denial of some averment in the charging part of the bill. It is therefore perjury for a complainant to make a false charge, or averment, in the charging part of a sworn bill, in the same manner as it would be for him to make a false statement in the stating part.
The answer, as to the assignment and the consideration thereof, being evidence in favor of the defendants, the prior equity of Clark, to the extent of his debt, is undoubted; and as the complainant claims a mere equitable right of set off, which accrued after the defendant Clark had an equitable right to the assignment, it is perfectly immaterial whether the complainant ever had notice of the assignment, or of Clark’s equity or not. If he had paid the bond and mortgage, to the *374original bolder, or bad discharged any security which he held against him, under an actual agreement for a set off, and without notice, it would have been a very different case from that which is now presented. I have no doubt as to the correctness of the vice chancellor’s decision upon the equity of this case. / He was also right as to the costs. If the complainant wished to exempt himself from costs, and to put the defendants in the wrong, he should have offered to pay the amount justly due to Clark, and have requested him to re-assign the mortgage to Ambrose Smith, so that a set off between him and the complainant could be made. It is a general rule that a mortgagor who comes into this court and is permitted to redeem, must pay the costs of the adverse party.
The decree of the vice chancellor must be affirmed, with costs; and the proceedings are to be remitted.