It is very evident that this court cannot assume jurisdiction of the case presented by the complainant’s bill, or of any other case of the like nature, without infringing upon the liberty of the press, and attempting to exercise a power of preventive justice which, as the legislature has decided, cannot safely be entrusted to any tribunal consistently with the principles of a free government. (2 R. S. 737, § 1, and Revisers’ note.) This bill presents the simple case of an application to the court of chancery to restrain the publication of a pamphlet which purports to be a literary work, undoubtedly a tale of fiction, on the ground that it is intended as a libel upon the complainant. The court of star chamber in England, once exercised the power of cutting off the ears, branding the foreheads, and slitting the noses of the libellers of important personages. (Hudson’s Star Chamber, 2 Collect. Jurid. 224.) And, as an incident to such a jurisdiction, that court was undoubtedly in the habit of restraining the publication of such libels by injunction. Since that court was abolished, however, I believe there is but one case up*27on record in which any court, either in this country or in England, has attempted, by an injunction or order of the court, to prohibit or restrain the publication of a libel, as such, in anticipation. In the case to which I allude the notorious Scroggs, chief justice of the court of king’s bench, and his associates, decided that they might be safely entrusted with the power of prohibiting and suppressing such publications as they might deem to be libellous. They accordingly made an order of the court prohibiting any person from printing or publishing a periodical, entitled “ The Weekly Packet of Advice from Rome, or the History of Popery.” The house of commons, however, considered this extraordinary exercise of power on the part of Scroggs as a proper subject of impeachment. (8 Howell’s State Trials, 198.) And I believe no judge or chancellor from that time to the present has attempted to follow that precedent. There is, indeed, in the reported case of Du Bost v. Beresford, (2 Camp. Rep. 511,) which was an action of trespass against the defendant for destroying a libellous picture, a most extraordinary declaration of Lord Ellenborough, that the Lord Chancellor, upon an application to him, would have granted an injunction against the exhibition of the libellous painting. It is said, however, in a note to Horne’s case, in the state trials, that this declaration of Lord Ellenborough, in relation to the power of the Lord Chancellor to restrain the publication of a libel by injunction, excited great astonishment in the minds of all the practitioners in the courts of equity. (20 Howell’s St. Tr. 799.) It must unquestionably be considered as a hasty declaration, made without reflection during the progress of a trial at nisi prius ; and as such it is not entitled to any weight whatever.
The utmost extent to which the court of chancery has ever gone in restraining any publication by injunction, has been upon the principle of protecting the rights of property. Upon this principle alone Lord Eldon placed his decision, in the case of Gee v. Pritchard, (2 Swanst. Rep. 403,) continuing the injunction which restrained the de*28fendant from publishing copies of certain letters written to him by the complainant. But it may, perhaps, be doubted whether his lordship in that case did not, to some extent, endanger the freedom of the press by assuming jurisdiction of the case as a matter of property merely, when in fact the object of the complainant’s bill was not to prevent the publication of her letters on account of any supposed interest she had in them as literary property, but to restrain the publication of a private correspondence, as a matter of feeling only. His decision in that case has, however, as 1 see, received the unqualified approbation of the learned American commentator on equity jurisprudence. (See 2 Story’s Eq. 222, § 948.)
In this case the complainant does not claim the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court on the ground of any violation of the rights of literary property, or because a work is improperly attributed to him which will be likely to injure his reputation as an author, or even as a manufacturer of pills. For although his counsel insist that it must necessarily have the effect to injure the sale of his pills, he has not alleged in his bill that he even believes it will have any such effect. And in the absence of such an allegation, I am, as a matter of opinion, inclined to the belief that with that class of persons who would be likely to buy and take his "universal pills,” as a general remedy for any and every disease to which the human body is subject, the supposition that he was the author of the publication in question, and was also the extraordinary personage which this table of the contents of the work indicates, would be very likely to induce them to purchase and use his medicine the more readily.
As the publication of the work, therefore, which is sought to be restrained, cannot be considered as an invasion of the rights either of literary or medical property, although it is unquestionably intended as a gross libel upon the complainant personally, this court has no jurisdiction or authority to interfere for his protection. And if the defendants persist in their intention of giving this libellous pro*29duction to the public, he must seek his remedy by a civil suit in a court of law ; or by instituting a criminal prosecution, to the end that the libellers, upon conviction, may receive their appropriate punishment, in the penitentiary or otherwise.
The demurrers must be allowed, and the complainant’s bill dismissed, as to these defendants, with costs.(a)
See 1 Chitty’s General Practice, 697.