[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
September 14, 2007
No. 07-10631 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
BIA Nos.
A79-483-734 & A79-483-735
JORGE ALBERTO RAMIREZ NINO,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(September 14, 2007)
Before DUBINA, CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jorge Alberto Ramirez Nino, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions this
Court for review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals that
affirmed the decision of an Immigration Judge to deny Ramirez’s application for
withholding of removal. We deny the petition.
We review only the decision of the BIA, except to the extent that it expressly
adopts the opinion of the IJ. See Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th
Cir. 2001). We review de novo the legal determinations of the BIA, id., and
review factual findings of the BIA under the substantial evidence test, Sepulveda v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1230 (11th Cir. 2005). “Under this highly
deferential standard of review, the [BIA’s] decision can be reversed only if the
evidence ‘compels’ a reasonable fact finder to find otherwise.” Id.
Ramirez argues that he is entitled to withholding of removal, but to qualify
for withholding of removal, Ramirez had to establish that it is more likely than not
that he would be persecuted if returned to Colombia. Mendoza v. U.S. Att’y Gen.
327 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). To satisfy his
burden, Ramirez was required to present specific and credible evidence (1) of past
persecution on account of a protected ground; or (2) that on account of a protected
ground it “is more likely than not” he will suffer future persecution. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.16(b)(1), (2). Persecution is an “extreme concept, requiring more than a few
isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation,” and “not all exceptional
treatment is persecution.” Zheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 451 F.3d 1287, 1290 (11th
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Cir. 2006).
Substantial evidence supports the decision of the BIA that Ramirez failed to
meet his burden of proof for at least two reasons. First, Ramirez’s evidence of
threats did not compel a finding that he suffered past persecution. Ramirez
received threatening telephone calls from guerrillas and two unidentified men
attempted to block his path in the road one evening, but Ramirez was never
harmed. Ramirez also testified that guerillas demanded money and goods from his
step-father’s company, which employed Ramirez, but the guerillas failed to
retaliate when the company refused their demands. Second, the record supports the
finding that Ramirez would not suffer persecution if returned to Colombia, because
Ramirez’s step-father has remained in Colombia without incident.
We lack jurisdiction to review Ramirez’s remaining argument that the
immigration judge denied him due process, because Ramirez did not raise this
argument before the BIA. Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247,
1250–51 (11th Cir. 2006).
PETITION DENIED.
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