IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
December 21, 2007
No. 06-41733 Charles R. Fulbruge III
Summary Calendar Clerk
RONALD L. HUTCHINS
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
OFFICER JOHNNY B. MCDANIELS
Defendant - Appellee
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
Before WIENER, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Hutchins (“Hutchins”), Texas prisoner # 1067348, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Hutchins alleges that
Johnny B. McDaniels (“McDaniels”), a prison officer, violated his Fourth
Amendment rights when he conducted a strip and cavity search of Hutchins.
The district court dismissed Hutchins claim as frivolous and for failure to state
a claim under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), and for
not meeting the physical injury requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). On appeal,
Hutchins argues that: (1) the district judge erred in dismissing his Fourth
Amendment claim under § 1915A(b); (2) the physical injury requirement of §
1997e(e) does not apply to Fourth Amendment claims; and (3) even if § 1997e(e)
No. 06-41733
does apply, it does not limit a prisoner’s ability to pursue nominal and punitive
damages based on violations of the Fourth Amendment. For the following
reasons, we reverse and remand the district court’s dismissal.
I
While incarcerated in a Texas prison on December 20, 2005, Hutchins
waited for his scheduled law library session. Officer McDaniels told several
inmates that he smelled marijuana and asked that Hutchins’s cell door be left
open. McDaniels went upstairs and returned thirty minutes later after
searching Hutchins’s cell. Hutchins approached McDaniels and told him that
it was understandable that McDaniels search Hutchins’s cell because “illegal
smells” were coming through the vents. McDaniels ordered Hutchins to step out
of the dayroom and under a staircase. McDaniels ordered Hutchins to remove
his clothing. McDaniels threatened to lock Hutchins away if he did not obey.
McDaniels then ordered Hutchins to lean against a wall and stick his
buttocks out as far as possible and spread his legs wide. McDaniels next told
Hutchins to step back, lift one leg up, hop on one foot, switch legs and go in the
opposite direction for a total distance of about thirty feet. Hutchins protested
that he could not do this because of a back injury and bad ankle, but McDaniels
again threatened to lock him away if Hutchins did not comply with his orders.
According to Hutchins, McDaniels carried out this strip and cavity search while
wearing a “lewd smile.” The search occurred in view of a number of prisoners
and a female prison guard. During the search, McDaniels never accused
Hutchins of possessing any contraband.
Based on these facts Hutchins filed a § 1983 claim alleging that
McDaniels’s actions violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Hutchins does not
allege that he suffered any physical injuries. The Magistrate Judge (“MJ”)
recommended that Hutchins’s claims be dismissed as frivolous and for failure to
state a claim under § 1915A(b). The MJ also noted that § 1997e(e) prevents
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Hutchins’s recovery because he did not allege any physical injury. The district
court adopted the MJ’s recommendation.
II
A prisoner’s civil rights complaint should be dismissed if it is “frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1). We review a district court’s dismissal under § 1915A de novo.
Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005). Section 1997e(e) bars a
prisoner from recovering any compensatory damages in any federal civil action
absent a showing of physical injury. Id. at 375. We review a dismissal under §
1997e de novo. Id. at 373. To determine whether the district court’s dismissal
was proper we assume that all of Hutchins’s allegations are true. Moore v.
Carwell, 168 F.3d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1999).
III
A
Hutchins first claims that the district judge erred in dismissing his
complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b). A dismissal for failure to state a claim will be affirmed only if it
appears that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that might be
proved consistent with the complaint’s allegations. McGrew v. Texas Bd. of
Pardons & Paroles, 47 F.3d 158, 160 (5th Cir. 1995). A complaint is frivolous if
it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 734 (5th
Cir. 1998). “A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation
of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Geiger, 404 F.3d at 373
(citations omitted).
Hutchins alleges that McDaniels violated his Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable searches. “A prisoner’s rights are diminished by the
needs and exigencies of the institution in which he is incarcerated. He thus loses
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those rights that are necessarily sacrificed to legitimate penological needs.”
Moore, 168 F.3d. at 236-37 (citations omitted). However, we have recognized
that the Fourth Amendment protects prisoners from searches and seizures that
go beyond legitimate penological interests. See id. Searches of prisoners must
be conducted in a manner that is reasonable under the facts and circumstances
in which they are performed. Id. at 237. The test for a Fourth Amendment
violation requires the balancing of the need for the particular search and the
invasion of rights that are a result of the search. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
559 (1979); Moore, 168 F.3d at 237.
In dismissing based on § 1915A, the MJ relied entirely on an unpublished
case from the Southern District of Texas, Dickens v. Rodriguez, 2006 WL 696579,
at * 3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2006). Dickens is inapposite to Hutchins’s Fourth
Amendment claims because, in Dickens, the district court dismissed as frivolous
a claim that a strip search had violated a prisoner’s Eight Amendment rights.
In Moore, we reiterated that the Fourth and not the Eight Amendment governs
searches of prisoners, and recognized that a strip search by a prison guard can
rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation. Moore, 168 F.3d at 237; see
also Elliot v. Lynn, 38 F.3d 188, 191 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1994). The strip and cavity
search alleged by Hutchins, if proven true, could entitle him to relief under the
Fourth Amendment. See Moore, 168 F.3d at 235-37 (recognizing that strip and
cavity search of male prisoner, carried out in non-emergency situation by female
guard, could give rise to Fourth Amendment violation). Therefore, the district
court improperly dismissed Hutchins’s complaint for failure to state a claim
under § 1915A. The above analysis also establishes that Hutchins’s complaint
is not frivolous. See Geiger, 404 F.3d at 373 (describing frivolous complaints as
those based on a “meritless legal theory.”).
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No. 06-41733
B
The MJ also relied upon § 1997e(e) in dismissing Hutchins’s claim.
Section 1997e(e) states, “No federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner...
for mental or emotional injury... without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Hutchins contends that the physical injury requirement of §
1997e does not apply to Fourth Amendment claims for compensatory damages.
We have held that, “Section 1997e(e) applies to all federal civil actions in which
a prisoner alleges a constitutional violation, making compensatory damages for
mental or emotional injuries non-recoverable, absent physical injury.” Geiger,
404 F.3d at 375 (emphasis added). Regardless of Hutchins’s invocation of the
Fourth Amendment, his failure to allege any physical injury precludes his
recovery of any compensatory damages for emotional or mental injuries suffered.
See id.
C
Hutchins alleges that even if § 1997e(e) applies to Fourth Amendment
claims, it should not preclude a prisoner’s recovery of nominal or punitive
damages. We have not yet addressed, in a published opinion, whether § 1997e(e)
bars the recovery of punitive or nominal damages in prisoners’ civil rights
actions.1 However, we have recognized that non-prisoners may recover punitive
and nominal damages when their Fourth Amendment rights are violated even
if they are unable to show physical injury. Williams v. Kaufman County, 352
F.3d 994, 1014-15 (5th Cir. 2003). We also have noted that § 1997e(e) turns on
the relief sought, Geiger, 404 F.3d at 375, and that the physical injury
requirement does not bar declaratory or injunctive relief for violations of a
1
See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 747 n. 20 (5th Cir. 2002) (refusing to address the
issue under §1997e,when the court lacked “helpful circuit precedent or thorough briefing” and
the issue was unnecessary to resolve the case).
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No. 06-41733
prisoner’s Constitutional rights. See Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th
Cir. 1999).
In several unpublished opinions we have relied on Williams to hold that
§ 1997e(e) does not bar a prisoner’s ability to recover nominal damages for a
Constitutional violation. See e.g., Alex v. Stalder, 225 F. App’x. 313, 314 (5th Cir.
2007) (stating that a prisoner, although not entitled to compensatory damages
under § 1997e(e), might still be able to recover nominal damages); Whitman v.
Washington, 113 F. App’x 605, 606 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that, although
prisoner could not recover actual damages, he might still be able to recover
nominal damages for an Eight Amendment claim); Herron v. Patrolman #1, 111
F. App’x 710, 713 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that the physical injury requirement
“does not necessarily preclude recovery of... nominal damages for constitutional
injuries”). Other circuits to consider whether § 1997e(e) bars a prisoner from
seeking nominal damages when a Constitutional violation occurs consistently
conclude that it does not. See Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir.
2003) (violation of Fourth Amendment); Calhoun v. Detella, 319 F.3d 936, 941
(7th Cir. 2003) (violation of Eight Amendment); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623,
630 (9th Cir. 2002) (violation of Fourteenth Amendment); Thompson v. Carter,
284 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2002) (violation of Fifth and Eighth Amendments);
Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 879 (10th Cir. 2001) (violation of First
Amendment); Doe v. Delis, 257 F.3d 309, 314 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) (violation of
Fourteenth Amendment).
In Williams, we held that, in a non-prison setting, punitive damages “may
stand in the absence of actual damages where there has been a constitutional
violation.” Williams, 352 F.3d at 1015. As with nominal damages, we have
relied on Williams, in unpublished opinions, to hold that a prisoner may be
entitled to punitive damages in spite of § 1997e(e). See e.g, Alex, 225 F. App’x at
314 (noting that prisoner could be entitled to punitive damages despite §
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1997e(e)); Allen v. Stalder, 201 F. App’x 276, 276-77 (5th Cir. 2006) (implying
that prisoner could obtain punitive damages but had not met the “evil intent”
required to obtain them). The vast majority of circuits to consider the issue have
reached the same conclusion as our unpublished opinions, allowing a prisoner’s
claim for punitive damages to proceed despite § 1997e(e). See e.g., Calhoun, 319
F.3d at 941 (stating that punitive damages are not barred because they serve a
different purpose than compensatory damages, which are the focus of §
1997e(e)); Oliver, 289 F.3d at 629-30 (allowing punitive damages for a violation
of a the Fourteenth Amendment); Thompson, 284 F.3d at 419 (noting that §
1997e(e) bars compensatory but not punitive damages); Searles, 251 F.3d at 880
(“[A]s a general rule, punitive damages may be recovered for Constitutional
violations without a showing of compensable injury.”) Allah v. Al-Highways,
226 F.3d 247, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2000) (allowing punitive damages to the extent
that they extend from a Constitutional violation separate from mental or
emotional injury suffered); but see, Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342,
1349 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (observing that Congressional intent would be thwarted
if prisoners could avoid the limitations of § 1997e(e) by asserting that the
defendant acted maliciously).
Our existing precedent is only a small step removed from the conclusion
that prisoners may recover punitive or nominal damages for a Constitutional
violation. See Williams, 352 F.3d at 1015 (allowing punitive and nominal
damages in non-prison setting); Geiger, 404 F.3d at 375 (noting that application
of § 1997e(e) turns on type of relief sought); Harper, 174 F.3d at 719 (allowing
injunctive and declaratory relief in spite of § 1997e(e)). In a series of
unpublished opinions we have recognized that § 1997e(e) does not bar recovery
of nominal and punitive damages, and the vast majority of our sister circuits
have held the same. For these reasons we recognize that § 1997e(e) does not bar
Hutchins’s recovery of nominal or punitive damages. Therefore, the district
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court erred in dismissing Hutchins’s § 1983 claim in its entirety. While
Hutchins is certainly barred from recovering any compensatory damages in the
absence of physical injury, we hold today that Hutchins may recover nominal or
punitive damages, despite § 1997e(e), if he can successfully prove that
McDaniels violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
IV
For the foregoing reasons we REVERSE and REMAND to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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