In October, 1976, conservation rangers of the Department of Natural Resources, Game and Fish Division, seized from James Padgett shrimp contended to be possessed by him in violation of wildlife regulations found in Chapter 391-4-3, Rules & Regulations of the State of Georgia. The alleged breach of these regulations had two ramifications — he was charged in the State Court
While these two proceedings were thus pending the Supreme Court decided Howell v. State, 238 Ga. 95 (230 SE2d 853) (1976), which held unconstitutional Ga. L. 1955, pp. 483, 491, supra, making it a misdemeanor offense to violate the commission’s regulations. As a result the misdemeanor charges against Padgett were dismissed, and the motion herein for summary judgment was filed by him in this claim case contending that "Accusations [in the misdemeanor cases], relying on Chapter 391-4-3, Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, were declared unconstitutional.” The trial court, citing Howell, sustained the motion, and the department appeals.
We reverse. The following issue was posed by Padgett in his brief in support of the motion: "Was Chapter 391-4-3 of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, 1976, ruled unconstitutional?”1 The answer is no. Howell did not declare unconstitutional all regulations of the Department of Natural Resources — the defendant there "attacked the constitutionality of the Act of the General Assembly which provided that 'Any person
It is thus clear that only that part of the Act of 1955 formerly found in Code Ann. § 45-116 and relating to misdemeanors was declared unconstitutional, and left unaffected were the seizure and sale statute, Ga. L. 1975, p. 1288, supra, the legislative grant of general regulatory authority, Ga. L. 1955, pp. 483, 489, § 14, and the regulations issued pursuant to it in question here. While, after Howell, violations of the regulations could no longer be punished criminally under former Code Ann. § 45-116, the regulations themselves were left unaffected and may properly be the subject of administrative and civil enforcement measures such as found under the seizure statute, Ga. L. 1975, p. 1288, supra. Greaser v. Durant, 197 Ga. 531 (29 SE2d 776) (1944) and cits.
Judgment reversed.
1.
Padgett seemed also to be asserting a theory of collateral estoppel, but the trial court apparently ignored it, and properly so. Keating v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 140 Ga. App. 796, 798 (2) (232 SE2d 84) (1976), affd. 238 Ga. 605 (234 SE2d 519) (1977).