The defendant has been convicted of murder in the first degree for killing Peter McCormick, and has appealed to this court from the judgment of conviction. There was no dispute about the commission of the deed, but the claim is that the crime was not murder in the first degree. But two witnesses speak of the transaction. One was an Italian, called by the public prosecutor, who seemed to understand our language imperfectly. He testified that he was at the house of McCormick on Sunday morning when defendant came and asked if McCormick was in, and witness said he was. Then the witness told McCormick that a gentleman wanted to see him, and he went into the dining-room and told the defendant to come in. The witness did not go in, but the defendant did, and as he entered the room he asked McCormick, “ What are yon going to do with me ?” McCormick said, “ I am going to put you out to-morrow morning.” Between those words that were passed, he heard the report of a pistol. “He (defendant) said, ‘You or me going to die,’ and I heard the report of a pistol.” He also testified that soon after, McCormick ran in the dining-room and kitchen way back again, and came alongside of the feet of the witness and said, “ Ralph, I shot,” and fell back as soon as he said the words at the side of the kitchen door and hallway, and did not speak after that. He further said that the defendant was not in the house more than two or three minutes. Mr. McCormick was arguing about the rent with the man. “ I no understand what he said.” There was argument about rent. Then the defendant left the house and was arrested soon after. On his person was found a pistol containing one loaded cartridge, three discharged chambers, and one chamber with no cartridge.
The other witness who speaks of the fatal event was the defendant himself, called in his own behalf. He testified that he owed McCormick some rent and offered to pay him Saturday night, but McCormick requested him to come to his house the next day, and that he went there thinking of no disturbance. Then he testified as follows: “ I counted the money right out on the table, and he says, ‘ I won’t take your rent now.’ I said, ‘ How is that, Mr. McCormick, what is the matterV ‘Well,’ he says, ‘I won’t take your money now, I am going to put you out in the morning.’
The Italian witness was recalled, and denied what the de fend ant said respecting his entry into a room with a weapon of some kind, and denied that he saw any conflict between the men.
There was testimony respecting the previous good character of the defendant, which was not contradicted, and the case was submitted to the jury by a charge from the trial judge which fully and fairly explained the law, and the jury rendered a verdict of murder in the first degree.
From this small cluster of facts the crime is to be deduced and its grade determined. The foundation of the offense is established, but the intent of the defendant in its commission is the paramount question for determination.
On this subject it seems fair to infer from the portentous words of the defendant, that the intention to slay his victim was not formed under sudden impulse, for they indicate a deliberate design to take his life. They also indicate a determined purpose as the result of consideration.
How long such design held sway in the mind of the defendant is not material. The human mind acts with great celerity, and is capable of deliberation and meditation and the foundation of a purpose in the shortest space of time.
Deliberate is the opposite of sudden, and, as used in the statute under consideration, means well considered. Premeditation implies meditation beforehand, or previous deliberation, and while all this must transpire before the fatal act, by some appreciable space of time, yet no particular length of time is required. If there be time for choice as the result of reflection that is sufficient.
On the whole, the evidence was sufficient to bring the case within the statutory definition of murder in the first degree, and to justify the conviction so far as that question is involved.
Complaint is made of the severity of the remark of the trial judge to the jury that the defendant had every interest to falsify if that would secure immunity to him; but the remark was true, and gave the jury no information. Every member of the jury knew the fact as well as the judge, and the defendant was not injured by the remark.
After the deliberation which the importance of the case requires, we reach the conclusion that there was no error committed on the trial, or in the denial of the motions for a new trial and for arrest of judgment.
When the defendant was arraigned for trial there was an objection raised to the extra panel of one hundred and fifty trial jurors, on the ground that the names of such jurors were not drawn from the box or boxes by the court directed as by law required, and thereupon the county clerk, who was also clerk of the court, testified that there was only the one box to bring in and draw from ; that, as the jurymen did their service, he placed their names in another box, but the box for drawing was only one box. Without stopping to inquire whether there was a complete technical compliance with the law in respect to .the number of boxes provided by the clerk for the reception of the names of trial jurors, we conclude that there was a substantial compliance with the law in the organization of the jury, and if there were any irregularities they could not and did not affect the rights of the defendant, and were not prejudicial errors and must be disregarded. Ferris v. People, 35 N. Y. 125.
The' conviction should be affirmed.
Baenabd, P. J., and Pbatt, J., concur.