Plaintiffs motion for vacatur was properly denied by reason of her failure to demonstrate a meritorious cause of action (see Guerre v Trustees of Columbia Univ., 300 AD2d 29 [2002]). The complaint, alleging libel and slander, is premised upon statements made in an e-mail by a vice-president of plaintiffs then-employer, defendant Transmedia, to other Transmedia management personnel respecting an apparently suspicious business transaction in which plaintiff had been involved. Inasmuch as the challenged communication was qualifiedly privileged (see Shapiro v Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 7 NY2d 56 [1959]), the merit of plaintiffs claims was not demonstrable without a prima facie showing that the complained-of statements were maliciously motivated (see id.; and see Cosme v Town of Islip, 63 NY2d 908 [1984]). No such showing was made. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the e-mail is not facially indicative of malice, and the record discloses no other ground supporting an inference of malice. The e-mail’s author, prior to sending the communication, far from acting with reckless disregard for the truth, evidently did take reasonable steps to investigate the assertedly improper transaction (see Sweeney v Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of N.Y., 84 NY2d 786 [1995]).
We have considered plaintiffs remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Saxe, Friedman, Marlow and Gonzalez, JJ.