[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 5, 2007
No. 07-12582 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-01469-CV-TCB-1
FELICIA A. POPE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PILGRIMS PRIDE CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(October 5, 2007)
Before BLACK, CARNES and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is Felicia Pope’s appeal of an order finding that the Pilgrim’s Pride
Corporation timely filed its bill of costs after the district court granted summary
judgment in the company’s favor.
It is undisputed that Pilgrim’s Pride filed the bill of costs thirty-three days
after the entry of the judgment. Although the district court’s local rules require
that “[a] bill of costs must be filed by the prevailing party within thirty (30) days
after the entry of judgment,” N.D. Ga. R. 54.1, the district court found that the bill
was timely filed by relying on its Local Rule 6.1. That rule provides that:
For time periods greater than eleven (11) days, the three (3) day mail
extension of [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 6(e) is added to the stated response time
to create a lengthened time period. For example, a response time of
thirty (30) days becomes a response time of thirty-three (33) days.
N.D. Ga. R. 6.1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e), in turn, gives parties an
additional three days “[w]henever a party must or may act within a prescribed
period after service,” as long as service is made in certain ways that are not here
relevant.
On appeal, Pope contends that the district court misinterpreted Local Rule
6.1. She emphasizes that the three-day extension provided under Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(e) and referenced in Local Rule 6.1 applies only to time periods in which “a
party must or may act within a prescribed period after service.” And since the
thirty-day time period for filing a bill of costs is a period that begins to run “after
the entry of judgment,” N.D. Ga. R. 54.1 (emphasis added), the three-day
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extension is unavailable. In other words, she says, since judgments are not subject
to “service,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) and (accordingly) Local Rule 6.1 do not apply.
Pope’s interpretation of these rules seems reasonable to us, and it may even
be the interpretation we would follow were we to decide the issue in the first
instance. See, e.g., Cavaliere v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 1111, 1113–14 (11th
Cir. 1993) (holding that the three-day grace period in Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) does not
apply to motions for a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, in part because the time
period for filing those motions begins to run from “entry of judgment”).
The problem with her argument, however, is that it doesn’t explain why the
district court’s reading of Local Rule 6.1 is unreasonable. By its terms, that rule
applies to “time periods greater than eleven (11) days.” The district court very
well could have read that phrase to mean all “time periods greater than eleven (11)
days.” The rule’s grant of extensions to “response time[s]” is similarly subject to
multiple, reasonable interpretations. Although one plausibly could read that phrase
as referring only to time periods triggered by some sort of service, we think the
district court also could have reasonably read it as referring to any time period
within which a party must act.
All these details aside, we must remember that we are to give “great
deference to a district court’s interpretation of its local rules.” Clark v. Housing
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Authority, 971 F.2d 723,727 (11th Cir. 1992). “A district court is the best judge of
its own rules,” id. (citing United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Lawrenson, 334 F.2d
464, 467 (4th Cir. 1964) (internal quotation marks omitted)), and all that is
required is that the interpretation be reasonable, see id. at 728. Because that is the
case here, we must affirm the district court’s order.
AFFIRMED.
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