[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
November 28, 2007
No. 06-15271 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00094-CV-1-SPM-AK
WATSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CITY OF GAINESVILLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(November 28, 2007)
Before BLACK, HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The City of Gainesville appeals following the district court’s denial of its
motions for fees and sanctions against Watson Construction Company. The City
argues the district court abused its discretion in two respects, first, in denying
attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and second, in denying
sanctions against Watson and its attorneys under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11. After review and oral argument, we affirm the district court’s order.
First, as the prevailing party on summary judgment, the City argues the
district court should not have denied attorney’s fees and costs. We review rulings
on fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for abuse of discretion. Reeves v.
Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481, 1483 (11th Cir. 1986).
A district court has the discretion to award fees to a prevailing defendant in a
§ 1983 action upon finding the lawsuit was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation.” Sullivan v. Sch. Bd. of Pinellas County, 773 F.2d 1182, 1188 (11th
Cir. 1985) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 101 S. Ct. 173, 178–79 (1980); Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 98 S. Ct. 694, 700 (1978)). The standard is objective:
an action may be deemed frivolous “even though not brought in subjective bad
faith.” Christiansburg, 98 S. Ct. at 700.
The central question is “whether the case is so lacking in arguable merit as to
be groundless or without foundation rather than whether the claim was ultimately
unsuccessful.” Sullivan, 773 F.2d at 1189 (quoting Jones v. Texas Tech Univ., 656
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F.2d 1137, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981)). This Circuit has identified three non-exhaustive
factors it considers important in determining whether a claim is frivolous: “(1)
whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant
offered to settle; and (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or
held a full-blown trial on the merits.” Id. “While these general guidelines can be
discerned from the case law, they are general guidelines only, not hard and fast
rules. Determinations regarding frivolity are to be made on a case-by-case basis.”
Id.
We are convinced the district court did not abuse its discretion because it
applied the appropriate objective standard, considered relevant facts, and
concluded Watson’s case, while weak, was not groundless. In considering the
factual underpinning of Watson’s claim, the district court first cited, as an example,
findings in an earlier state court proceeding that Watson had a reasonable
likelihood of success in showing the moratorium at issue in the instant case
targeted Watson’s proposed plant. The district court also considered its own
findings, weighing the validity of Watson’s asserted property right, the
circumstances surrounding Watson’s contract negotiations with Yelvington, and
noting Watson lost out on the property that was subject to the moratorium.
Further, the district court made general reference to the findings from its earlier
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summary judgment order, and it made specific reference to evidence it considered
indicative of the City’s hostility toward the Watson project. Viewing these
findings in light of land-use issues that the district court considered legally
sophisticated, it concluded Watson’s weak claims were not “groundless or without
foundation.” See Sullivan, 773 F.2d 1189.
Although the parties dispute the extent to which the Sullivan factors were
satisfied, these factors are intended only as guidelines. We are satisfied the district
court properly conducted its analysis and did not abuse its discretion by choosing
to deny the City’s motion for fees and costs.
Second, the City argues Rule 11 sanctions should have been imposed against
Watson and its attorneys. We review rulings on Rule 11 sanctions for abuse of
discretion. Turner v. Sungard Bus. Sys., Inc., 91 F.3d 1418, 1421 (11th Cir. 1996).
A district court may impose Rule 11 sanctions when a party submits a paper
that (1) has no reasonable factual basis; (2) is based on a legal theory that has no
reasonable chance of success and that cannot be advanced as a reasonable
argument to change existing law; or (3) is filed in bad faith for an improper
purpose. Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir.
1996). “Although sanctions are warranted when the claimant exhibits a deliberate
indifference to obvious facts, they are not warranted when the claimant’s evidence
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is merely weak but appears sufficient, after a reasonable inquiry, to support a claim
under existing law.” Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 524 (11th Cir. 1998)
(citations omitted).
In this case, the district court did not find Watson’s claims lacked a factual
basis or were based on a legal theory with no chance of success. A review of the
underlying finding of facts from the district court’s summary judgment order
reveals some support for this conclusion. Specifically, the district court did find
that Watson possessed a contract right that expired during the moratorium. A
review of the legal claims asserted by Watson throughout the proceedings does
reveal unsupported and weak arguments. Sanctions, however, are a matter that
rests soundly in the district court’s discretion. Thus, we cannot conclude the
district court abused that discretion by deciding not to impose sanctions.
Ultimately, the district court concluded Watson did not exhibit a deliberate
indifference to obvious facts, and sanctions were not warranted merely because
Watson’s claims were weak. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the motion for Rule 11 sanctions.
AFFIRMED 1
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All pending motions are denied.
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