Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Otsego County (Burns, J.), entered June 5, 2006, which, inter alia, granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 10, to adjudicate respondents’ children to be abused and/or neglected.
Respondents are the parents of two children, Kayla and Richard (born in 1999 and 1996, respectively). Respondent Michael F. (hereinafter the father) was on probation as a result of his conviction of unlawful surveillance in the second degree for secretly photographing girls undressing in the locker room of the high school where he worked. One condition of his probation was that he not be responsible for the care of any child under the age of 17 without prior permission from his probation officer, but he was permitted to continue residing in the family home with his children. School personnel contacted petitioner after Kayla, who was receiving special education services and
Petitioner filed a petition alleging that both children were abused and neglected by respondents. Following a fact-finding hearing, Family Court found that the father abused Kayla and derivatively neglected Richard. The court held that respondent Mindy F. (hereinafter the mother) neglected both children by permitting the father to be alone with them. Respondents now appeal.
A child’s unsworn out-of-court statements relating to abuse or neglect are admissible at a fact-finding hearing, but a finding of abuse or neglect can only be based on those statements if they are sufficiently corroborated (see Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [vi]). While “[a]ny other evidence tending to support the reliability of the previous statements” may constitute sufficient corroboration (Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [vi]), the evidence must still meet a threshold of reliability (see Matter of Stephen GG., 279 AD2d 651, 652 [2001]). One child’s consistent repetition of a statement to multiple persons is not sufficient corroboration (see Matter of Christina F., 74 NY2d 532, 536 [1989]; Matter of Jared XX., 276 AD2d 980, 981 [2000]), but statements of different children regarding the same incidents can cross-corroborate each other (see Matter of Frank Y., 11 AD3d 740, 742 [2004]; Matter of Kelly F., 206 AD2d 227, 229-230 [1994]).
Here, the evidence was insufficient to corroborate Kayla’s statement to her school counselor that her father put his penis between her legs. No medical evidence was presented. The interviews with the caseworker and detective confirmed that Kayla was alone with the father on one occasion, but contradicted any allegations of abuse. Although Kayla’s teacher previously observed her playing with dolls in a possibly sexual manner, petitioner did not present any expert testimony to interpret this play or link it to sexual abuse (compare Matter of Jessica DD., 234 AD2d 785, 786 [1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 812 [1997]). Similarly, no expert validation testimony established a connection between Kayla’s acting-out behavior and possible sexual abuse (see Matter of Kalifa K., 37 AD3d 1180 [2007]; Matter of Sasha R., 24 AD3d 902, 903 [2005]; Matter of Douglas NN., 277
Petitioner’s case against the mother rests on the proposition that she neglected the children by permitting them to be alone with the father. To establish neglect, actual injury is not necessary, but petitioner was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the children’s physical, mental or emotional condition had been harmed or was in imminent danger of injury or impairment (see Family Ct Act § 1012 [fl [i] [B]; Matter of Antonio NN. supra at 827; Matter of Markus MM., 17 AD3d 747, 748 [2005]; Matter of Katie R., 251 AD2d 698, 699 [1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 809 [1998]). While one parent permitting the children to have contact with the other parent in violation of an order of protection may be, but is not automatically, sufficient to establish neglect (see Matter of Shannon ZZ., 8 AD3d 699, 701 [2004]), there was no order of protection here. Unlike a situation with an order of protection, where a court has determined that some adult may pose a threat to the children and the parent is thus given warning of a possible danger (see Matter of Cadejah AA., 25 AD3d 1027, 1028 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 705 [2006]; Matter of Frank Y., supra at 741; Matter of Maryann NN., 244 AD2d 785, 787-788 [1997]), the father’s conditions of probation do not indicate that County Court viewed him as a threat to his own children. The conditions of probation prohibited him from being responsible for the care of children under 17 without permission from his probation officer, but specifically allowed him to have full contact with and live in the
Mercure, J.P., Crew III, Peters and Mugglin, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
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The crime to which the father pleaded guilty is not defined as a sex offense under the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law § 168-a [2] [e]; Penal Law § 250.45 [1]).