Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Donna M. Siwek, J.), entered September 13, 2006 in a personal injury action. The order granted the motion of defendant Stephen Juszczyk to dismiss the claim for punitive damages against him.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is denied and the claim for punitive damages against defendant Stephen Juszczyk is reinstated.
Memorandum: Flaintiff commenced this action seeking compensatory and punitive damages for injuries she sustained when the motor vehicle she was operating was struck by a vehicle operated by Stephen Juszczyk (defendant) and owned by defendant GMAC Leasing Corporation. We agree with plaintiff that Supreme Court erred in granting the motion of defendant to dismiss plaintiffs claim for punitive damages against him. We conclude on the record before us that plaintiff raised “a triable issue of fact whether defendant’s conduct was ‘so reckless or wantonly negligent as to be the equivalent of a conscious disregard of the rights of others’ ” (Arumugam v Smith, 277 AD2d 979 [2000]). Although the fact that defendant pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]) “is insufficient by itself to justify the imposition of punitive damages” (Boykin v Mora, 274 AD2d 441, 442 [2000]; see Parkhill v Cleary, 305 AD2d 1088, 1090 [2003]; Taylor v Dyer, 190 AD2d 902, 903 [1993]; Sweeney v McCormick, 159 AD2d 832, 834 [1990]), in this case plaintiff raised an issue of fact whether defendant engaged in the requisite wanton and reckless conduct in addition to intoxication to warrant the imposi