[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 13, 2007
No. 06-14275 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-20170-CR-KMM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
QUIANA RIGGINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(November 13, 2007)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Quiana Riggins appeals her sentence of imprisonment for 60 months
following the revocation of her probation. Riggins argues that the district court
failed to consider the section 3553(a) factors and imposed an unreasonable
sentence. We affirm.
Riggins’s argument that the district court failed to consider the sentencing
factors of section 3553(a) is unavailing. The district court is not required “to state
on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the [section] 3553(a) factors
or to discuss each of the [section] 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Scott, 426
F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005). It is clear from the sentencing transcript that the
district court considered the section 3553(a) factors when it determined Riggins’s
sentence for violating her probation. The district court heard argument from
Riggins’s counsel about Riggins’s history and characteristics and why a sentence
within the Guidelines would provide adequate deterrence. The district court
acknowledged the recommended Guidelines range and stated that it had considered
the statements of the parties and the information contained in the violation report.
The district court also had before it the presentence investigation report (“PSI”) for
Riggins’s underlying offense. The PSI contained details of Riggins’s offense
conduct, criminal history, personal and family history, and financial condition.
Based on our review of the entire sentencing transcript, we conclude that the
district court adequately considered the section 3553(a) factors.
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Riggins’s argument that her sentence of 60 months of imprisonment, which
was above the recommended range of 4 to 10 months of imprisonment, see United
States Sentencing Guidelines § 7B1.4 (Nov. 2005), was unreasonable also fails.
Riggins contends that the district court gave no explanation for the significant
increase and that the resulting sentence was excessive. We disagree.
We review a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release for
reasonableness. United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106–07 (11th Cir.
2006). We have also stated that we review the decision of a district court to exceed
the recommended range for a sentence imposed following the revocation of
probation for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 798
(11th Cir. 2006). Applying either standard of review, we affirm Riggins’s
sentence.
When we review a sentence for reasonableness, that review is deferential.
United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). “[T]he party who
challenges the sentence bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is
unreasonable in the light of both [the] record and the factors in section 3553(a).”
Id. “When we review a sentence for reasonableness, we do not, as the district
court did, determine the exact sentence to be imposed.” Id. “We must evaluate
whether the sentence imposed by the district court fails to achieve the purposes of
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sentencing as stated in section 3553(a).” Id. “When reviewing the length of a
sentence for reasonableness, we will remand for resentencing if we are left with the
definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
judgment in weighing the [section] 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that
lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.”
United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 2006).
Riggins’s sentence is reasonable. The district court varied from the advisory
Guidelines range after Riggins committed the underlying offense, credit card fraud
totaling over $10,000, on the heel of receiving leniency from the court when it
sentenced her to probation and below the advisory Guidelines range of 4 to 10
months for her original offense. Riggins’s original offense of wire fraud based on
a fraudulent claim to FEMA for disaster relief was similar in nature. The district
court stated that “the problem with [a low-end sentence]” was “that what we’re
seeing here is somebody that we gave a break to originally by giving them
probation and it didn’t work.” Riggins engaged in the credit card fraud only three
weeks after her term of probation began and while on home detention. Given the
flagrant violation of the terms of her probation less than a month after receiving
leniency from the district court in imposing the original sentence, we cannot say
that we are left with a “definite and firm conviction that the district court
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committed a clear error of judgment” when it imposed a sentence above the
recommended Guidelines range. The decision to vary upward was not an abuse of
discretion.
Riggins’s sentence of 60 months of imprisonment is
AFFIRMED.
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