[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 21, 2007
No. 07-12485 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-01873-CV-JEO-W
LINDA CASHMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
LYNDA GILBERT,
BILL MCREYNOLDS,
CHARLOTTE HARRIS,
DR. ROBERT E. WITT,
in their official and individual capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(December 21, 2007)
Before TJOFLAT, ANDERSON and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Linda Cashman appeals the district court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of her former employer, the University of Alabama, on her
claims of gender discrimination, retaliation, and violation of her Fourteenth
Amendment right to procedural due process, brought pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 3(a) (“Title VII”), and 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
The district court denied her gender discrimination claim because she failed
to make out a prima facie case, and, alternatively, because she could not show that
the University of Alabama’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her
termination was a pretext for discrimination. The district court denied Cashman’s
retaliation claim because she could not show that the University of Alabama’s
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for failing to hire her for the position of
Associate Director of Housing Operations was a pretext for discrimination. The
district court denied Cashman’s due process claim because she was an at-will
employee and, thus, had no property interest in her continued employment. We
affirm.
We need not address the question of whether Cashman established a prima
2
facie case of gender discrimination because the district court did not err in
concluding that she did not establish that the reason for her termination was a
pretext for gender discrimination. Here, the defendants proffered a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for terminating Cashman, namely, that they wanted to
outsource her interior design duties to an outside contractor in order to save costs
and achieve standardization across the campus. Cashman did not provide evidence
showing that this reason was a pretext for gender discrimination. The fact that
Cashman’s immediate supervisor initially supported an upgrade in her position
does not show that the University’s ultimate decision to outsource Cashman’s
duties was a pretext for gender discrimination.
We also find no error in the Summary Judgment granted to the defendants
on Cashman’s retaliation claim. The defendants provided several legitimate
reasons for not hiring Cashman for the ADHO position at issue which included the
fact that the individual ultimately hired had participated in a large construction
project, while Cashman did not demonstrate knowledge of the construction aspects
of new residence halls. Cashman’s applicant history sheet indicated that she was
not hired because she had “less relevant experience” than the other candidate and
Cashman did not produce evidence that the proffered reason was a pretext for
retaliation. Although Cashman was more experienced in interior design than the
3
person who was hired, the ADHO position did not involve significant interior
design functions. Instead, the ADHO position required (1) knowledge of
mechanical systems and construction codes; (2) knowledge of furniture types and
standards for adherence to federal fire safety codes; (3) knowledge of cleaning
techniques and chemical applications; (4) proficiency in data base management and
inventory system management; and (5) excellent communication skills. Cashman
did not show that she was more qualified as to her knowledge of mechanical
systems and construction codes, cleaning techniques and chemical applications,
and data base management and inventory system management.
Finally, we find no error in the disposition of Cashman’s due process claims.
Cashman did not establish that she was a “permanent” employee and thus
possessed a property interest in her employment under Alabama law. The
University of Alabama Staff Handbook contains the following provision:
The State of Alabama is an employment at-will state.
This handbook should not be construed as, and does not
constitute an offer of employment for any specific
duration, nor is it intended to state any terms of
employment. Although it is desirable for employees to
have a long term employment relationship with the
University, either the employee or the University may
terminate the relationship at any time, for any reason,
with or without notice.
Accordingly, upon review of the record on appeal and consideration of the
4
parties’ briefs, we discern no reversible error, and we affirm the district court’s
grant of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
5