[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 14, 2007
No. 07-12614 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00914-CV-F-S
JEARLDEAN THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UTILITY TRAILER MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
d.b.a. Utility Trailer Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(December 14, 2007)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jearldean Thomas appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Utility Trailer Manufacturing Company in this Title VII sex
discrimination suit. Thomas, a black female, is proceeding pro se.
This appeal arises from an application Thomas filled out for one of several
open welding jobs at Utility Trailer. The company did not hire her. Instead, its
human resources manager selected seven male applicants who applied after
Thomas did. Thomas contends that Utility Trailer’s stated reasons for refusing to
hire her, unexplained gaps in her work history and a lack of recent welding
experience, are pretextual.1 She argues that she was as qualified as, or more
qualified than, the candidates Utility Trailer ultimately hired.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Chapman v. AI
Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Summary judgment is
appropriate if the evidence before the court shows that there is “no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Although we read pro se filings liberally, “a pro se litigant
does not escape the essential burden under summary judgment standards of
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The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation on Utility Trailer’s summary
judgment motion, which the district court adopted as its order, also addressed race discrimination
and retaliation claims brought by Thomas. Thomas makes no mention of those claims in the
papers she filed with this Court. We therefore limit our review to her sex discrimination claim.
See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A]
legal claim or argument that has not been briefed before the court is deemed abandoned and its
merits will not be addressed.”).
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establishing that there is a genuine issue as to a fact material to [her] case in order
to avert summary judgment.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir.
1990).
Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Where, as is the case
here, a plaintiff relies on circumstantial proof to establish unlawful discrimination,
we apply the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973). Under that framework, if the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the
defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.
E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2002). If the
defendant proffers a non-discriminatory explanation for an adverse employment
action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the proffered explanation
was not the real reason for the employer’s actions. Combs v. Plantations Patterns,
106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997). If “the proffered reason is one that might
motivate a reasonable employer, an employee must meet that reason head on and
rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of
that reason.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. To show pretext by asserting superior
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qualifications, a “plaintiff must show that the disparities between the successful
applicant’s and her own qualifications were of such weight and significance that no
reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the
candidate selected over the plaintiff.” Brooks v. County Comm’n, 446 F.3d 1160,
1163 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Utility Trailer did not dispute the existence of a prima facie case. See Joe’s
Stone Crabs, 296 F.3d at 1273. Instead, it proffered two non-discriminatory
reasons for not hiring Thomas: (1) the significant unexplained gaps in her
employment history; and (2) the absence of recent welding experience (she had not
worked as a welder since 1997).
The burden shifted to Thomas to show that the reasons Utility Trailer
proffered for making its decision are pretextual. She did not carry that burden.
The evidence before the district court demonstrated that the other welders hired by
Utility Trailer, with one exception, had the recent welding experience that Thomas
lacks. The only male candidate Utility Trailer hired who lacked recent welding
experience (he last worked as a welder in 1998) indicated on his application that he
had experience welding aluminum, a qualification Utility Trailer values highly.
Thomas did not list experience with aluminum welding on her application.
Moreover, none of the male candidates’ applications revealed multiple,
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unexplained, and lengthy periods of unemployment. Thomas’ only response is a
critique of the other candidates’ applications. Even accepting those criticisms as
true, they do not rebut the non-discriminatory reasons Utility Trailer has given for
declining to hire Thomas. She produced no evidence that any of the candidates
Utility Trailer hired lacked both recent welding experience and a documented,
stable work history. Absent such evidence, Thomas cannot show that Utility
Trailer’s proffered reasons for refusing to hire her are pretextual. Accordingly, we
conclude that the district court correctly granted Utility Trailer summary judgment
on Thomas’ sex discrimination claim.
AFFIRMED.
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