In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so .much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Prus, J.), dated December 23, 2008, as, upon a decision dated October 8, 2008, made after a nonjury trial, awarded her zero percent of the marital residence and certain other marital assets.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
“While the distribution of marital property must be equitable, there is no requirement that the assets be split evenly” (Giokas v Giokas, 73 AD3d 688, 689 [2010]; see DeSouza-Brown v Brown, 71 AD3d 946 [2010]; Arrigo v Arrigo, 38 AD3d 807 [2007]). “A trial court is vested with broad discretion in making an equitable distribution of marital property, and ‘unless it can be shown that the court improvidently exercised that discretion,
As the record supports the Supreme Court’s determination that, although both parties worked throughout the marriage, the plaintiff contributed “little, if any, financial support to the marriage,” and did not contribute at all to the purchase, and only minimally to the maintenance, of the marital home, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying her any interest in the marital residence (see Moody v Moody, 172 AD2d 730 [1991]; Mahlab v Mahlab, 143 AD2d 116, 116-117 [1988]; Barnes v Barnes, 106 AD2d 535 [1984]).
Likewise, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in rejecting the plaintiffs claim that she was entitled to equitable distribution of the appreciation in value of the marital residence and the defendant’s country home, bought prior to the marriage. “[I]n order to obtain equitable distribution of the appreciation in value of the [defendant’s] interest in the propertty], the [plaintiff] was required to demonstrate the manner in which [her] contributions resulted in the increase in value and the amount of the increase which was attributable to [her] efforts” (Elmaleh v Elmaleh, 184 AD2d 544, 545 [1992]; see Embury v Embury, 49 AD3d 802, 804 [2008]). The parties’ conflicting testimony as to the plaintiffs “direct contribution of . . . time and labor toward the improvements made to [these assets] presented a question of credibility which [the] Supreme Court resolved in favor of [the defendant]” (Guarnier v Guarnier, 155 AD2d 744, 745 [1989]). Such a credibility determination “is afforded great weight on appeal” (Schwartz v Schwartz, 67 AD3d at 990; see Jones-Bertrand v Bertrand, 59 AD3d 391 [2009]; Grasso v Grasso, 47 AD3d at 764; Antes v Antes, 304 AD2d at 597-598).
With regard to the defendant’s cash and securities, the Supreme Court properly found that the plaintiff had failed to proffer any documentary or testimonial proof regarding whether these assets were separate or marital. In any event, the Supreme
With regard to the vacant land in Greene County, while it is undisputedly marital property, the plaintiff, as the nontitled spouse, “had the burden of proving the asset’s value so as to afford the court a sufficient basis upon which to make a distributive award” (Iwahara v Iwahara, 226 AD2d 346, 347 [1996]; see Antoian v Antoian, 215 AD2d 421, 422 [1995]; Gredel v Gredel, 128 AD2d 834 [1987]). As the plaintiff failed to meet her burden, the Supreme Court properly declined to make a distributive award regarding the property. Mastro, J.P., Chambers, Roman and Sgroi, JJ., concur.