[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 7, 2007
No. 07-11923 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 04-02063-CV-TCB-1
JOHN K. ERIGHA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
THOMAS SCRUGGS,
in his official and individual capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(December 7, 2007)
Before BIRCH, CARNES, and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Although this job discrimination case started out with many more claims and
issues, it has been narrowed down to whether the district court properly granted
summary judgment against the plaintiff, John K. Erigha, on one of his race-based
Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the defendants, the Georgia
Department of Transportation and one of its officials. The claim that Erigha is still
pressing involves the 2004 promotion of Sidney Johnson, a white male, instead of
Erigha, a black male, to the position of Materials and Branch Supervisor.
Erigha contends that the district court erred in concluding that he had failed
to proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether the defendants’ proffered reason for promoting Sidney Johnson, which is
that they believed Johnson to be more qualified for the position than Erigha, is
pretextual. The primary argument the plaintiff makes is that his evidence shows
that Johnson did not meet one of the listed minimum qualifications posted for the
job, and for that reason Johnson should never have been considered for the position
(even if he turned out to be the best qualified applicant for it). See generally Carter
v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 644 (11th Cir. 1998). To
support this argument, Erigha relies on the application and resume that Johnson
filed, which do not clearly show that he satisfied the minimum qualifications
concerning “a well-developed knowledge of construction practices” and “a
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thorough knowledge of procedures for material acceptance testing and/or materials
specification requirements.” The failure of Johnson’s application papers to clearly
show that he met those requirements ought to have ended the defendants’
consideration of him for the position, Erigha insists, and the willingness of the
defendants to overlook that shortcoming in Johnson’s application ought to be
enough to create an issue of pretext under the Carter decision.
As we pointed out at oral argument, however, Erigha’s application also
failed to show that he met the minimum qualifications for the job because it did not
indicate that he had the required management experience (described in the
minimum qualifications as a “[d]emonstrated competency . . . to manage,
technically direct, evaluate work of subordinates; to train, develop and coach
subordinates; to encourage and facilitate cooperation”). Yet, despite that obvious
shortcoming, the defendants allowed Erigha to move to the next step in the
process, which was the interview stage, just as they allowed Johnson to do. This
undisputed fact proves that the defendants applied the minimum qualifications
requirements charitably for all, or at least that they did not treat Erigha, a black,
less generously in regard to those qualifications than they treated Johnson, a white.
For this reason, no jury reasonably could find from the way the defendants applied
the minimum qualifications that their decision to promote Johnson, the better
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qualified candidate, was based on race.
AFFIRMED.
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