UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 93-2293
(Summary Calendar)
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THOMAS H. BARANOWSKI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
CA H 92 2979
________________________________________________
July 16, 1993
Before GARWOOD, JONES, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Thomas Baranowski,1 proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
appeals the district court's dismissal of his civil rights suit as
frivolous. He alleged that J. Bates, a TDCJ-ID mailroom
supervisor, diverted his legal mail to the Mail Systems
Coordinating Panel ("MSCP") at TDCJ-ID, rather than sending it to
the district court. Baranowski further alleged that MSCP held his
*
Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of opinions that have
no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-
settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on
the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published.
1
Baranowski is currently an inmate at the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice))Institutional Division ("TDCJ-ID") at Huntsville, Texas.
mail for 38 days, and that such delay caused his pending petition
for habeas corpus relief to be dismissed. Baranowski claimed that:
(1) Bates had denied him access to the courts2 by deliberately
withholding his legal mail;3 and (2) the named-defendants4 had
conspired to deny him access to the courts. Finding that
Baranowski's conclusory allegations failed to state a
constitutional violation, the district court dismissed his civil
rights suit as frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
Baranowski filed a timely notice of appeal.5
We review a dismissal of an IFP complaint under § 1915(d) for
abuse of discretion. Denton v. Hernandez, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct.
1728, 1734, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992). An IFP complaint may be
dismissed under § 1915(d) as frivolous if it lacks an arguable
basis in either law or fact. Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1831, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). A court may
2
See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 1494, 52 L.
Ed. 2d 72 (5th Cir. 1977) ("It is now established beyond doubt that prisoners
have a constitutional right of [adequate, effective, and meaningful] access to
the courts.").
3
See Richardson v. McDonnell, 841 F.2d 120, 122 (5th Cir. 1988)
(stating that a "cause of action may be stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for prison
officials' intentional withholding of mail destined for the courts, where it is
also alleged that the intentional delay damaged the prisoner's legal position").
4
Baranowski brought suit against the State of Texas, James Collins
(Director of TDCJ-ID), MSCP, and Bates.
5
Construing Baranowski's complaint to challenge the constitutionality
of TDCJ-ID correspondence rule 3.9.1.1, the district court determined that such
a challenge would fall "within the purview of the remedial decree in the class
suit establishing the correspondence rules for the Texas prison." Record on
Appeal at 62 (citing Guajardo v. Estelle, 71-H-570). The court therefore held
that Baranowski's claim had to be urged through the class representative or by
means of intervention in that action to avoid inconsistent adjudications, see
Gillespie v. Crawford, 858 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc), and
accordingly dismissed the claim without prejudice. Baranowski does not challenge
this holding on appeal.
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dismiss as frivolous a § 1983 action supported by only conclusory
allegations. See Wilson v. Budney, 976 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir.
1992) (decided after Denton); see also Moody v. Baker, 857 F.2d
256, 258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 985, 109 S. Ct. 540,
102 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1988); Brinkmann v. Johnston, 793 F.2d 111, 112-
13 (5th Cir. 1986).
After reviewing the record, we agree with the district court's
finding that Baranowski did not state any factual basis to support
his charges of denial of access to the courts, and conspiracy to
commit the same. In fact, a grievance form that Baranowski
attached to his complaint indicates that his mail was sent to MSCP
because he failed to put his name, number, and address on the
envelope, as is required by TDCJ-ID correspondence rule 3.9.1.1.6
See Record on Appeal at 23. Responsibility for his own failure to
utilize such access effectively cannot be placed upon Bates. See
Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 814 (5th Cir. 1989), limited on
other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct.
2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990). Moreover, to the extent that
Baranowski's complaint can be read to state separately claims
against TDCJ-ID (through MSCP) and the State of Texas, we hold that
such claims are legally frivolous. See Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.
Ed. 2d 67 (1984) ("It is clear, of course, that in the absence of
consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or
6
Baranowski does not dispute that Bates acted in accordance with such
rule.
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departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment."); see also Loya v. Texas Dep't of Corrections, 878 F.2d
860, 861-62 (5th Cir. 1989). We therefore hold that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the suit as
frivolous.7 Accordingly, the district court's judgment is
AFFIRMED.
7
We further need not decide Baranowski's request for appointed
counsel.
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