[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
_____________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-11087 JAN 31, 2008
_____________ THOMAS K. KAHN
D.C. Docket No. 05-00472-CV-WDO-5 CLERK
SILVIA BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PULASKI COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
d.b.a. Pulaski County Schools,
d.b.a. Pulaski County School District,
RONALD E. QUICK, Individually and in
His Official Capacity as Member of
the Pulaski County Board of Education,
JOHN W. BEMBRY, Individually and in His
Official Capacity as Member of the
Pulaski County Board of Education,
JERRY A. DAVIS, Individually and in His
Official Capacity as Member of the
Pulaski County Board of Education,
BONNY C. DIXON, Individually and in Her
Official Capacity as Member of the
Pulaski County Board of Education, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
____________
(January 31, 2008)
Before ANDERSON, BLACK and HILL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal by Silvia Brown, an African-American former employee of
the Pulaski County School District, from a grant of summary judgment by the
district court in favor of the Pulaski County Board of Education, et al. (the
appellees), on Brown’s Title VII employment discrimination claim of wrongful
termination on the basis of race, her First Amendment claims, and her breach of
contract claim. Based upon the following analysis, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
We discuss only Brown’s Title VII claim.1 We agree that, under the rubric
of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973), Brown established
her prima facie case of discrimination: that she is an African-American; that she
was qualified for her job; that she was terminated; and that she was replaced by an
individual who was not a member of a protected class. See Denney v. City of
Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1183 (11th Cir. 2001). However, we find that the
appellees met their burden of providing legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for
her termination: that Brown was unprofessional in her interactions with school
personnel and supervisors; that she exhibited inappropriate behavior in the
1
All other claims alleged by Brown are without merit and affirmed without opinion.
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workplace, i.e., her demeanor, attitude and manner were discourteous, rude,
disrespectful, and unacceptable; that she was insubordinate; that she was unwilling
to follow the instructions of her supervisors; and that she was unwilling to change
or improve in any of these areas. See, e.g., Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564
(11th Cir. 1997).
Brown has not met her ultimate burden. She has failed to rebut that the
stated reasons for her termination are a pretext for discrimination. See Combs v.
Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997). Neither has she
persuaded us that the appellees’ reasons are unworthy of belief. Id.
The decision maker was Dr. Linda Hayden, superintendent of the school
district, who recommended to the members of the board of education that Brown
be terminated for lack of professionalism, insubordination, poor attitude, and an
unwillingness to correct poor behavior. It is not our place to determine whether or
not Dr. Hayden was correct in her assessment of Brown’s performance. See
Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1318 n. 6 (11th Cir. 2003).
We conclude that Dr. Hayden in good faith believed Brown’s performance to be
unsatisfactory. Id.; see also Moore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 683 F.2d 1321, 1323
n.4 (11th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
The asserted reasons for Brown’s discharge were not a pretext for
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discrimination. The record amply reflects that Dr. Hayden was a “by the book”
administrator who expected both Caucasian and African-American employees to
“tow the line.” She may not have been a popular administrator, but the record
evidence reflects that was because she “didn’t cut any slack left or right.” See
Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The law is clear that,
even if a Title VII claimant did not in fact commit the violation with which he is
charged, an employer successfully rebuts any prima facie case of disparate
treatment by showing that it honestly believed the employee committed the
violation.”). Under de novo review, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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