IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
February 11, 2008
No. 06-60902 Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
JOAN ANDERSON
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
SCHOOL BOARD OF MADISON COUNTY
Defendant-Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and DeMOSS and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
Since 1969, the Madison County School District (“MCSD”) in Mississippi
has been under a federal court order to desegregate its schools. On June 18,
2004, the MCSD filed a motion for full unitary status, claiming it had complied
with the district court’s orders and had “to the extent practicable, eliminated the
vestiges of racial discrimination resulting from the former racially dual system.”1
The United States (“Government”) and a group of private citizens (“Private
Plaintiffs” or “Appellants”) opposed the motion and argued that the MCSD was
1
We use the term “unitary” in this context to refer to a school district that “has done
all that it could to remedy the [prior] segregation caused by official action.” Price v. Austin
Indep. Sch. Dist., 945 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1991).
No. 06-60902
not entitled to full unitary status. After discovery and a hearing, the district
court granted the MCSD’s motion on April 7, 2006, ending more than three
decades of federal court supervision over the school district. Only the Private
Plaintiffs have appealed.
I.
The MCSD is one of many school districts in Mississippi that at one time
practiced de jure raced-based segregation. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s
directive in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19, 20
(1969), we mandated that those school districts could “‘no longer operate a dual
school system based on race or color’ and [that] each district is to operate . . . as
a unitary school system within which no person is ‘effectively excluded from any
school because of race or color.’” United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 423
F.2d 1264, 1267 (5th Cir. 1969) (quoting Alexander, 396 U.S. at 20). The district
court for the Southern District of Mississippi, finding that the MCSD operated
a de jure segregated school system, issued its original desegregation order in
1969, requiring the MCSD to (1) divide the school district into three attendance
zones, (2) implement a transportation scheme that is “non-segregated and
non-discriminatory,” and (3) select locations for school construction and school
consolidation “in a manner which will prevent the recurrence of the dual school
structure once this desegregation plan is implemented.”
Since the issuance of the 1969 order, the district court has supervised the
MCSD’s desegregation efforts and enforced compliance through a series of
consent orders. The most recent consent order, approved by the district court on
April 24, 2000, addressed a number of issues including school construction,
transportation, majority-to-minority transfers, staff recruitment, hiring,
assignment and compensation, and the creation of a bi-racial advisory
committee.
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No. 06-60902
On June 18, 2004, the MCSD filed a motion for declaration of full unitary
status. Following discovery, the Government and Private Plaintiffs stipulated
in a pretrial order that they did not object to a finding of unitary status with
regard to eleven operational areas: (1) student assignment, except as it related
to the magnet program at Velma Jackson High School (“VJHS”), (2) enforcement
of student attendance zones and student transfers, (3) transportation, (4)
extracurricular activities, (5) majority-to-minority transfers, (6) special
education programs, (7) gifted programs, (8) student discipline, (9) the bi-racial
advisory committee, (10) a Title I initiative program, and (11) the MCSD’s
reporting obligations.
However, both the Government and Private Plaintiffs objected to a finding
of unitary status with respect to the magnet program and facilities at VJHS, and
facilities at other schools. The Private Plaintiffs further objected to a finding of
unitary status regarding (1) faculty assignment, (2) employment procedures, (3)
the use of sixteenth section funds2 and contributions from private groups, and
(4) an alternative school. The Private Plaintiffs also argued that the motion
should be denied because the MCSD did not act in good faith to comply with the
court’s orders to remedy problems in these areas.
In February 2006, the district court held a four-day public hearing on the
MCSD’s motion and both sides presented witness testimony. Members of the
public were also invited to comment on the motion. On April 7, 2006, the district
court issued a thorough and well-reasoned Memorandum Opinion and Order
concluding that the MCSD was entitled to full unitary status. Based on that
2
“Both the Northwest Ordinance and the Act of 1802 called for the territory to be
divided into townships having thirty-six numbered sections and required that the sixteenth
section of each township be used for the support of the public schools within each township.”
Madison County Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.,728 F. Supp. 423, 425 (S.D. Miss. 1989).
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conclusion, the court granted the MCSD’s motion and dissolved all existing
desegregation and consent orders. The Private Plaintiffs timely appealed.
A basic description of the MCSD’s geography is helpful in understanding
the present dispute over whether the district court erred in finding that the
MCSD is entitled to full unitary status. The MCSD serves all of Madison County,
except for an area served by the Canton Public School District. In 1969 the
MCSD served approximately 4,500 students, 75% of whom were African-
American. By contrast, in the fall of 2005, the MCSD served almost 11,000
students, approximately 38% of whom were African-American and 58% were
white. Pursuant to the 1969 desegregation order, the MCSD is divided into three
zones. Zone I, located in the northeast part of Madison County, covers a
geographically large but rural and sparsely populated area. Student enrollment
at Zone I schools is more than 96% African-American. Zone II accounts for 85%
of the MCSD’s total enrollment, and encompasses the cities of Ridgeland and
Madison in the southern part of Madison County. Zone III covers a rural area
and only serves about 5% of the MCSD’s students.
II.
A. Standards of Review
The district court’s finding that the MCSD is unitary is a factual finding
that we review for clear error. See Flax v. Potts, 915 F.2d 155, 157 (5th Cir.
1990). “[A] finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, if the district court’s factual findings are “plausible in light of the
record viewed in its entirety, we must accept them, even though we might have
weighed the evidence differently if we had been sitting as a trier of fact.” Price
v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 945 F.2d 1307, 1312 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal
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No. 06-60902
quotation marks omitted). We have also recognized that, given the unique
factual circumstances present in school desegregation cases, the district court’s
factual findings are entitled to “great deference.” Flax, 915 F.2d at 158. This is
particularly true when, as here, the district judge has “supervised the case for
many years.” Id. We review de novo whether an issue is ripe for judicial review.
See Groome Res., Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 198-99 (5th Cir. 2000).
B. Ripeness
As an initial matter, Appellants argue that several issues decided by the
district court were not ripe for review. In determining whether a matter is ripe
for judicial review we consider “the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and
the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Orix Credit
Alliance, Inc. v. Wolfe, 212 F.3d 891, 895 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see United Transp. Union v. Foster, 205 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir.
2000) (“Ripeness separates those matters that are premature because the injury
is speculative and may never occur from those that are appropriate for judicial
review.”). Generally, issues are not ripe if “further factual development is
required.” Wolfe, 212 F.3d at 895.
First, Appellants point out that in 2005 the parties agreed to a create a
committee to evaluate and recommend changes to the magnet program at VJHS.
It is undisputed that the committee had not completed its evaluation by the time
the district court granted the MCSD’s motion. Appellants argue that the district
court should have postponed its ruling until the committee completed its
evaluation. Second, Appellants contend that the district court did not wait long
enough following renovations and repairs at VJHS in 2005 to be able to
adequately judge whether the magnet program could attain its goal of attracting
white students. Lastly, Appellants argue that because of the MCSD’s poor track
record in honoring construction commitments, the court erred by ruling on the
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No. 06-60902
MCSD’s motion while construction projects remained pending throughout the
district.
We find these arguments unavailing. The factual record in this case has
been extensively developed over more than thirty years of district court
supervision. Further, prior to ruling on the MCSD’s motion, the court conducted
a lengthy public hearing where both sides presented evidence. Appellants cite
no authority, and we have found none, requiring district courts to consider
motions for unitary status only upon the completion of all school district
construction projects and committee evaluations. Given the unique nature of
desegregation litigation, such a requirement would be impractical, and as the
MCSD points out, would likely result in the MCSD remaining forever under
federal court supervision. Also, the current magnet program at VJHS had been
in full operation since the 2000-2001 school year, long enough to allow the
district court to make informed findings concerning its
effectiveness—nothwithstanding Appellants’ argument that the 2005
renovations could possibly have some future effect that was not observable to the
court in 2006. Thus, we find that no further factual development was required,
and the issues decided by the district court were ripe for review.
C. Motion for Unitary Status
The district court granted the MCSD’s motion for declaration of unitary
status. The ultimate inquiry in determining whether a school district is unitary
is whether (1) the school district has complied in good faith with desegregation
orders for a reasonable amount of time,3 and (2) the school district has
eliminated the vestiges of prior de jure segregation to the extent practicable. See
3
This prong has alternately been stated as requiring good faith compliance with the
desegregation decree “since it was entered.” See Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell,
498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991). However, in Freeman v. Pitts, the Supreme Court cited to this
language in Dowell and construed it as requiring “good-faith compliance . . . over a reasonable
period of time.” 503 U.S. 467, 498 (1992) (emphasis added).
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No. 06-60902
Hull v. Quitman County Bd. of Educ., 1 F.3d 1450, 1454 (5th Cir. 1993); see also
Freman, 503 U.S. at 492, 498.
1. Good faith compliance with the district court’s orders
A school district seeking the termination of federal court supervision must
first show that it has “consistently complied with a court decree in good faith.”
Hull, 1 F.3d at 1454; see also Freeman, 503 U.S. at 498 (“A history of good-faith
compliance is evidence that any current racial imbalance is not the product of
a new de jure violation. . . .”). To meet this obligation, “[f]or at least three years,
the school board must report to the district court.” Monteilh v. St. Landry Parish
Sch. Bd., 848 F.2d 625, 629 (5th Cir. 1988). Further, “the district in question
must have for several years operated as a unitary system.” Lemon v. Bossier
Parish Sch. Bd., 444 F.2d 1400, 1401 (5th Cir. 1971).
Appellants make two related arguments concerning this prong. First,
Appellants assert that the MCSD has not complied in good faith with the district
court’s orders, as evidenced by the MCSD’s alleged failure to, inter alia,
adequately support the magnet program and facilities at VJHS, construct an
adequate music facility at Northeast Madison Middle School (“NMMS”), and to
monitor minority hiring throughout the district. Second, Appellants argue that
the district court erred in finding the MCSD unitary without first finding that
it had been in compliance with desegregation orders for at least three years.
According to Appellants, at the time the district court issued its Order, the
MCSD had not yet completed several facilities projects, and had only recently
completed others, indicating that the MCSD had not been in compliance for a
reasonable amount of time.
Appellants correctly observe that the district court did not expressly state
that the MCSD had been in compliance with its desegregation orders for at least
three years. However, following its thorough review of the evidence, the district
court found that the MCSD worked in good faith to comply with the 2000
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No. 06-60902
consent order since its adoption in April 2000. The district court’s finding that
the MCSD has complied in good faith with the 2000 consent decree is “plausible
in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” See Price, 945 F.2d at 1312 (internal
quotation marks omitted). For example, the MCSD’s good faith compliance is
illustrated by the fact it has devoted a considerable amount of resources to
renovating VJHS and implementing a new magnet program there. It has also
implemented procedures to recruit minority teachers, established a bi-racial
advisory committee, and fulfilled its reporting obligation to the district court.
Further, the MCSD’s compliance with the 2000 consent order since its adoption
constitutes compliance for a reasonable amount of time. See Lemon, 444 F.2d at
1401. Thus, we find no error in the district court’s analysis of the first prong.
2. Elimination of the vestiges of prior de jure segregation to the extent
practicable
Regarding the requirement that a school district eliminate the vestiges of
prior de jure segregation to the extent practicable, “every reasonable effort
[must] be made to eradicate segregation and its insidious residue,” although
complete racial balance is not required. Ross v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 699
F.2d 218, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1983). Rather, the emphasis is on whether “the school
district has done all that it could to remedy the segregation caused by official
action.” Price, 945 F.2d at 1314; see also United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717,
728 (1992) (“[W]e have consistently asked whether existing racial identifiability
is attributable to the State. . . .”). To guide courts in determining whether the
vestiges of de jure segregation have been eliminated as far as practicable, the
Supreme Court has identified several aspects of school operations that must be
considered, commonly referred to as the Green factors: student assignment,
faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities.4 See Bd.
4
Appellants conceded below that the MCSD has satisfied its obligations with regard to
transportation and extracurricular activities.
8
No. 06-60902
of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991) (discussing
Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968)).
a. Student assignment
Student assignment within a school district is relevant to determining
whether a school district has remedied, to the extent possible, the vestiges of
prior de jure segregation. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250. While racial imbalance in a
particular school is relevant for that purpose, racial imbalance, without more,
does not violate the Constitution. Cavalier ex rel. Cavalier v. Caddo Parish Sch.
Bd., 403 F.3d 246, 260 (5th Cir. 2005). “Once the racial imbalance [in student
assignment] due to the de jure violation has been remedied, the school district
is under no duty to remedy imbalance that is caused by demographic factors.”
Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494; Price, 945 F.2d at 1314 (“‘[I]mmutable geographic
factors and post-desegregation demographic changes that prevent the
homogenation of all student bodies do not bar judicial recognition that the school
system is unitary.’” (quoting Ross, 699 F.2d at 225)).
We note that the only objection Appellants appear to assert on appeal
regarding student assignment is that the MCSD has allegedly failed to comply
with court orders regarding the magnet program at VJHS and, as a result, the
magnet program has failed to attract white students whose attendance would
diversify that school and further eliminate the vestiges of prior segregation.5
5
To the extent that Appellants may object to other aspects of student assignment
within the MCSD, the record contains evidence sufficient to support a finding that the MCSD
is unitary with respect to all aspects of student assignment. For example, the MCSD’s expert,
Dr. Rossell, noted that the MCSD “met or surpassed the original plan on all measures of racial
balance and complies with the 1999 and 2000 court orders,” and thus “has met the standard
for unitary status on student assignment.” We also note that none of the district court’s orders
established a racial quota for student assignment at each school and the presence of several
schools in a district with a high percentage of students of a particular race does not preclude
a finding of unitary status. See, e.g., Ross, 699 F.2d at 226-228 (upholding a declaration of
unitary status when 55 of the school district’s 226 schools had 90% or more African-American
students).
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No. 06-60902
VJHS, located in Zone I, traditionally has been a “one-race” school, and
had a 98.5% African-American student population in 2005. To encourage white
students living in different zones to attend VJHS, and to enhance VJHS’s
educational curriculum, the parties agreed in 1990 to implement a magnet
program at the school. In the 2000-2001 school year, the MCSD implemented a
new magnet program at VJHS, called Eco-Journeys. Despite the MCSD’s efforts
to develop and promote the magnet program, the parties agree that the program
failed to draw a significant number of white students to VJHS. The Government
and Private Plaintiffs argued below that the failure to attract white students to
the magnet program at VJHS is attributable to the MCSD’s lack of a good faith
commitment to the magnet program. Thus, they argued, the MCSD was not
entitled to a finding of unitary status on this aspect of student assignment. The
district court disagreed and held that the MCSD complied in good faith with the
2000 consent order and that the program failed to attract white students
primarily because of demographic and cultural factors.
On appeal, Appellants disagree with that conclusion and challenge the
district court’s findings that: (1) the implementation of the magnet program
strengthened the curriculum at VJHS, (2) the magnet program had been
adequately funded, (3) teacher inexperience at VJHS was not indicative of the
MCSD’s lack of good faith and did not affect the magnet program’s success in
attracting white students, (4) restructuring the administration at VJHS did not
affect the magnet success in attracting white students, (5) the MCSD did not
disregard known facilities deficiencies, and (6) no magnet program could attract
white students to VJHS. In sum, Appellants claim that the district court erred
by holding that the magnet program’s inability to attract white students was
attributable to demographic and cultural factors, as opposed to the deficiencies
they alleged exist in the magnet program itself.
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No. 06-60902
The evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that location and
demographic factors outside the MCSD’s control, as opposed to the alleged
inadequacies cited by Appellants, were responsible for the magnet program’s
failure to attract white students. With that in mind, we briefly review the
Appellants’ arguments regarding the magnet program.
First, Appellants argue that the magnet program weakened the
curriculum at VJHS, contrary to the district court’s assertion. Appellants cite
nothing in the record, and we have found nothing, to support their contention.
The magnet program at VJHS has received good reviews and the fact that VJHS
may be rated lower than other schools, without more, simply does not lead to the
conclusion that the magnet program has weakened the curriculum.6
Additionally, evidence in the record supports the finding that, given VJHS’s
location, even an improved curriculum would not have made it successful in
attracting white students.
Second, Appellants argue that the magnet program was inadequately
funded, in large part because the MCSD sought no outside funds after receiving
a federal grant in 1998. The record shows that the new magnet program was
initially funded by a federal grant of over $2.3 million and that the MCSD spent
an additional $1.5 million from 2000-2006, not counting general operational
funding or funding for instructional supplies. Appellants fail to explain why the
MCSD was required to seek further outside funding, and have presented no
evidence that additional funds would have made a significant difference in the
number of white students enrolling in the magnet program.
Appellants next argue that the inexperience of the teachers at VJHS
demonstrates the MCSD’s lack of good faith commitment to the magnet program
and contributed to its failure to attract white students. The district court held
6
We note that VJHS was rated a level three (successful) school in the No Child Left
Behind report.
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No. 06-60902
that the MCSD made reasonable efforts to attract more experienced teachers to
VJHS, and that it did not act in bad faith by refusing to exercise its authority to
force more experienced teachers from other schools in the district to transfer to
VJHS, because such a measure would have been counterproductive. Appellants
have not shown that the MCSD’s decision to not implement forced transfers was
motivated by anything other than practical concerns about losing teachers to
other districts. Further, Appellants have not shown that more experienced
teachers at VJHS would have attracted more white students, and given the
geographic challenges facing the magnet program, such a proposition would be
doubtful at best. Thus, we find no clear error on this point.
Relatedly, Appellants assert that the MCSD’s restructuring of the
administrative staff at VJHS affected the magnet program’s success, contrary
to the district court’s finding. The restructuring at issue involved elimination of
an administrative position located at the MCSD’s central office and assigning
control of the entire magnet program to VJHS’s principal. The district court held
that the restructuring reasonably consolidated several functions in one on-site
position, and that this action did not affect the magnet program’s success. Again,
we find no clear error in this conclusion.7
Appellants next argue that an important factor contributing to the magnet
program’s failure to attract white students was the poor condition its facilities,
at least prior to renovations in 2005.8 The Government’s expert, Dr. Gordon,
reported that in January 2005 the physical facilities at VJHS were ill-equipped
and in a state of general disrepair. Dr. Gordon conceded, however, that by the
7
We note that Appellants’ argument that this conclusion is erroneous because three
VJHS principals were removed for incompetence is unpersuasive because it fails to establish
any relationship between the removals and the implementation of the restructuring plan.
8
To the extent that the condition of VJHS’s facilities affected the success of the magnet
program, it is relevant to the present discussion of the “student assignment” factor. We note
that the condition of facilities is also its own Green factor, discussed infra.
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No. 06-60902
time of the district court’s hearing on the MCSD’s motion, the MCSD had fixed
many of the problems he previously noted and that VJHS’s classrooms were
comparable to those at other high schools in the district. Appellants do not
appear to object to the current state of VJHS’s classrooms. Instead, they argue
that the MCSD disregarded known deficiencies in facilities prior to 2005 because
it did not begin renovations until after Dr. Gordon issued his report in January
2005. They also contend that the athletic facilities at VJHS are substandard.
The district court acknowledged that, if the evidence showed that the
MCSD disregarded known facilities’ deficiencies, it likely would have failed in
its duty to act in good faith to establish and maintain the magnet program.
However, the court found that the evidence indicated that the facility was
generally in good repair, and that no evidence supported the claim that the
MCSD was aware or should have been aware of the problems cited by Dr.
Gordon in his report. Further, the district court found that the alleged state of
disrepair of the athletic facilities at VJHS did not play a significant role in the
failure of the magnet program. We find that the evidence relied upon by the
district court supports this conclusion.
Lastly, and most fundamentally, Appellants take issue with the district
court’s ultimate conclusion that “no matter the quality of the program, the
facilities, the teachers, [and] regardless of how much money is spent, no magnet
program is going to draw white students to [VJHS], at least not in numbers
sufficient to affect the racial imbalance of the school.” The district court
thoroughly documented the MCSD’s efforts to develop a successful magnet
program, and based on its review, found that the failure of the program to
attract white students was not attributable to the MCSD’s actions or lack of good
faith. Instead, the court found that the magnet program’s goal of attracting
white students was doomed because of location and cultural factors that were
not attributable to the MCSD.
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We find no error in these findings. The evidence confirms that the MCSD
devoted considerable time and resources in a good faith effort to establish the
magnet program. Moreover, the record also supports the conclusion that the
magnet program’s inability to attract white students resulted from VJHS’s very
inconvenient location.9 Testimony confirmed that VJHS is geographically distant
from the large number of students in Zone II, as well as from businesses and
cultural opportunities. For example, the MCSD’s superintendent testified that
it is approximately forty miles between the schools in the south end of the MCSD
and VJHS. Dr. Rossell, an expert for the MCSD, opined that while the magnet
program may have succeeded at a different location, “I don’t think there’s any
magnet program that could be designed that would overcome those issues,
location, distance, and the difference in socioeconomic status.”
In sum, the district court did not err in finding that the MCSD acted in
good faith and that its efforts to implement a successful magnet at VJHS were
reasonable. Moreover, any evidence that additional resources might have
improved the alleged deficiencies in the magnet program must yield to the
reality that the school’s location presented an apparently insurmountable
challenge to attracting white students. Given the evidence documenting this
challenge and the evidence confirming the MCSD’s substantial efforts to
implement a successful magnet program, the district court’s findings concerning
the magnet program and student assignment are “plausible in light of the record
9
In response to the district court’s conclusion that the magnet failed because of location
and demographic factors, Appellants argue that “accommodating the racial animus of white[s]
is not a legitimate basis” to excuse the MCSD’s duty to properly support the magnet program.
This argument misses the mark. First, the district court held that the MCSD undertook good
faith efforts to support the magnet program—not that it was excusing the MCSD’s failure to
support the magnet program. Second, the evidence indicates that the failure of the magnet
program to attract white students was not about racial animus, it was about distance and a
lack of nearby opportunities. Dr. Rossell acknowledged as much when she stated that the
“magnet may have succeeded if it was located in a cosmopolitan area that provided cultural
and work opportunities.”
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No. 06-60902
viewed in its entirety” and are not clearly erroneous. See Price, 945 F.2d at 1312
(internal quotation marks omitted).
b. Facilities
Another consideration in determining whether a school district has
eliminated the vestiges of prior de jure segregation to the extent practicable is
whether school facilities are adequate. Green, 391 U.S. at 435. Appellants argue
that (1) facilities at VJHS were substandard prior to 2005, (2) that the baseball
field and football stadium at VJHS do not compare favorably with others in the
district, and (3) it is unacceptable that the music program at one primarily
African-American middle school, Northeast Madison Middle School (“NMMS”),
is housed in a portable building.10
The district court held that the challenged school facilities are adequate.
The court noted that, of the four schools in Zone I, where VJHS is located, two
are new and two have been renovated. Regarding athletic facilities, the district
court noted that the MCSD was making improvements to VJHS’s football
stadium, and that while the VJHS baseball field was not as nice as others in the
district, there was less interest in baseball at VJHS compared to other sports.
Regarding the music program at NMMS, the district court pointed out that the
school has a music room in the main building, but due to excessive noise, the
principal moved the music program to portable buildings away from classrooms
in order to avoid disturbance. The court acknowledged that the school’s design
10
Appellants also appear to argue that the facilities at the MCSD’s Alternative School
are inadequate because the school has no kitchen, it has no “real” classrooms, and elementary
students are taught in a trailer. However, MCSD’s superintendent, Michael Kent, testified that
while the Alternative School has no kitchen, there is a dining hall and the school provides food
prepared off-site for the students. Further, he testified that the Alternative School conducts
classes in rooms that were once district offices, and that those rooms “lend themselves fairly
well to [being] classrooms because of the size of a typical class.” This unchallenged testimony
permits a finding that the Alternative School facilities are adequate in those areas. Also,
Appellants do not explain why a trailer is inadequate to conduct an elementary class at the
Alternative School.
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No. 06-60902
may have been flawed, but pointed out that the MCSD relied upon assurances
from the architect that the same configuration had been used successfully at
other schools. The court held that “[i]ndisputably, the alleged inadequacy of the
music facility at [NMMS] is not a vestige of former segregation practices, nor a
result of the District’s inattention to the needs of the students at the school, and
certainly not the product of intentional discrimination.”
The court concluded: “The proof unequivocally shows that the [MCSD] has
undertaken to address known relevant deficiencies at all its schools, and to
provide adequate and proper educational facilities for all its students, both black
and white.” We find no error in these conclusions. First, it is undisputed that the
MCSD was in the process of making improvements to the football facilities at
VJHS prior to the district court’s ruling. Additionally, although the record
supports Appellants’ claim that the VJHS baseball field pales in comparison to
the one at Ridgeland High School, which is also in the MCSD, the record does
not show that the baseball field at VJHS is inadequate. Further, a number of
improvements to the Ridgeland High School baseball field were the result of
private fund-raising efforts. Regarding the allegedly inadequate music facilities
at NMMS, Appellants have failed to establish that the decision to move the
music program from the main building to portables is a vestige of past
discrimination.11
c. Faculty and staff assignment and pay
Faculty and staff issues are also relevant under Green. Dowell, 498 U.S.
at 250. In Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, we
announced several requirements for hiring and assigning faculty and staff in
11
Relatedly, Appellants argue that the MCSD has discriminated in its use of sixteenth
section loan funds. The district court held that in 2005, the MCSD approved a $630,000 loan,
$400,000 of which went to fund improvements to the track and stadium at VJHS—a use
selected by a parent group at VJHS. Based on our review, we simply find no clear error in the
court’s conclusion that the sixteenth section loan funds have not been used in a discriminatory
manner.
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schools under desegregation orders. See 419 F.2d 1211, 1217-18 (5th Cir. 1969)
(en banc), rev’d in part sub. nom., Carter v. West Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 396
U.S. 290 (1969). Only two of the Singleton requirements are relevant here. First,
a school must show that faculty and staff who work directly with children are
assigned in such a manner that the racial composition of the faculty and staff
would not indicate that the school is intended for either African-American or
white students. Id. Second, “discrimination on the basis of race, color or national
origin in the hiring, assignment, promotion, pay, demotion or dismissal of faculty
members and administrative staff” is prohibited. Fort Bend Ind. Sch. Dist. v.
Stafford, 651 F.2d 1133, 1138 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing Singleton, 419 F.2d at
1217-18). We have made clear that these requirements do not establish an
arbitrary racial quota. See id. at 1139.
The 2000 consent order required the MCSD to meet its Singleton
obligation by ensuring that the faculty composition at each school in the district
is within a 15% range of the district-wide ratio of African-American to white
teachers. Appellants claim the MCSD has failed to satisfy its obligation and that
this failure is due, in large part, the MCSD’s unwillingness to exercise is power
to force teachers to transfer. Appellants further contend that the MCSD’s hiring
is not centralized, making it difficult to monitor how many minorities apply for,
and are considered, for teaching positions district-wide. Lastly, Appellants
accuse the MCSD of paying minority administrators inequitably. The MCSD
admits that it has failed to satisfy the required faculty ratio at VJHS, but claims
it has expended its best efforts to bring more white teachers to the school. The
MCSD explains that it has not forced teachers to transfer because that effort
would be counterproductive and would lead to teachers leaving the district
entirely. Further, the MCSD points out that in the 2005-2006 school year, the
faculty at VJHS was 44% white, 47% African-American, and 8% other, a
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No. 06-60902
composition that would not indicate that VJHS is intended for either African-
American or white students.
The district court, having heard testimony from the MCSD’s
superintendent and its personnel director, concluded that “every principal is
keenly” aware of Singleton’s requirements and the requirements of the 2000
consent order as it relates to faculty hiring. The court also found that the only
options to remedy the faculty assignment problem are forced faculty transfers
or increased pay for faculty who agree to transfer. Regarding the first option, the
court found the that MCSD’s decision not to force teachers to transfer was
reasonable, given the risk that the district would likely lose teachers to other
districts under such a policy. Regarding the second option, the court noted that
increased pay, beyond what is authorized by statute, is apparently prohibited by
state law. Further, the district court concluded that the MCSD’s method for
determining administrator pay, including consideration of such factors as the
size of the school, grade levels taught at the school, and experience, was rational
and non-discriminatory.
The MCSD has not satisfied its requirement to ensure that the faculty
composition at each school in the district is within a 15% range of the district-
wide ratio of African-American to white teachers. However, the MCSD provided
the district court with considerable evidence that each school is aware of its
Singleton obligation and that it has worked aggressively to ensure that each of
its schools is staffed with a diverse faculty. As to VJHS, we note that while
falling short of the requirement of the 2000 consent decree, the faculty
composition is, in fact, quite diverse. Furthermore, the MCSD has documented
its extensive minority recruitment efforts, which includes recruiting at
predominantly African-American colleges and universities in Mississippi. And
there is no evidence that the MCSD’s faculty and staff employment and
assignment practices, or its compensation scheme for administrators, is
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No. 06-60902
currently discriminatory or that the district did not adequately remedy the
adverse effects of prior de jure segregation. See Stafford, 651 F.2d at 1140
(holding that Singleton requirements are satisfied if the district’s current
employment practices are non-discriminatory and in compliance with the
Constitution and the adverse effects of any prior unlawful employment practices
have been adequately remedied). Lastly, the MCSD’s expert, Dr. Rossell,
evaluated the available information and opined that the MCSD has met the
standard for unitary status on this factor “because it has racially balanced its
staff to the extent practicable and [is] comparable to the level of other districts
that have attained unitary status.” Based on the evidence in the record, the
district court did not clearly err in finding the MCSD unitary regarding faculty
and staff policies.
III.
After its thorough review of the evidence, the district court ultimately
concluded that the MCSD:
[H]as met its constitutional obligation to eliminate the vestiges de
jure segregation to the extent practicable and that it has shown a
good faith commitment to and compliance with its desegregation
orders and to the rights that were the impetus for the court’s orders.
The court thus concludes that unitary status has been achieved in
all of the District’s operations, so that further judicial oversight is
neither required nor desirable.
Based on our review of the record, we find no clear error in these findings.
We are also cognizant of the important interest in “[r]eturning schools to the
control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date” in order to “restore
their true accountability . . . . to the citizenry [and] to the political process.”
Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490; see Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247 (“From the very first,
federal supervision of local school systems was intended as a temporary measure
to remedy past discrimination.”).
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No. 06-60902
Lastly, we would like to recognize those who have contributed their
substantial efforts—teachers, administrators, parents, citizens, and others—to
the difficult task of transforming the MCSD from a district practicing de jure
segregation to one that has remedied the adverse affects thereof to the extent
practicable. With our compliments to those involved in bringing about this
accomplishment, and having found no clear error in the district court’s findings,
we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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No. 06-60902
CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion and its affirmance of the district court’s
grant of the Madison County School District’s motion for unitary status. I
nonetheless write separately to highlight the significant and sensitive issues
raised in this appeal.
When this lawsuit began in 1969, racial isolation of students was fostered
by a de jure system of racial segregation. Indeed, Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its progeny were primarily concerned with rooting out
racial isolation and the accompanying pernicious effects it has on children.
Here, the district court concluded and our panel affirms that the Madison
County School District has achieved unitary status even though it is undisputed
that many black students, particularly those in Zone I, continue to attend
schools that are racially isolated. Further, hundreds of black students who have
exercised their prerogative not to attend racially isolated schools will no longer
be able to do so once federal court supervision ends, and the majority-to-minority
transfer program with it. While the record provides a detailed account of the
many obstacles that prevent the existence of fully integrated schools—such as
the confluence of the geography and demography in the district—the cruel irony
is that racial isolation, albeit not as the product of de jure segregation, largely
remains as foreboding and potentially deleterious as it was when federal court
supervision began. Of course, this case is only the latest indication that despite
the societal progress that has been made in dismantling systems of segregation,
many of the concerns highlighted in Brown still remain as viable today as when
that opinion was first authored.
Justice Kennedy recently observed: “This Nation has a moral and ethical
obligation to fulfill its historical commitment to creating an integrated society
that ensures equal opportunity for all its children.” Parents Involved in Cmty.
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No. 06-60902
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2797 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Despite the grant of unitary status, this commitment undeniably
remains unfulfilled in Madison County.
Unquestionably, there have been substantial efforts on the part of the
district and all the parties involved to create a unitary school district while also
ameliorating the effects of the de jure segregation that was in place for so many
decades. Moreover, it is encouraging that the school district avowed to the
district court that even after unitary status is granted, it will remain committed
to improving any disparities between the facilities at majority-black and
majority-white schools and providing resources targeted at improving learning
and teaching opportunities at Zone I and similarly-situated schools. I take these
overtures to bespeak a continuing good faith effort on the part of the district to
seek out creative and effective remedies that are designed at maximizing
educational opportunities for all its students. Hopefully, the difficulties inherent
in this challenge will not hinder the district from moving closer to fully meeting
the promises of Brown.
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