I concur only in the alternative result ' suggested in Justice Lupiano’s dissent: defendant-appellant should have a new trial, having been deprived of a fair one by reason of admission into evidence of an inculpatory statement, taken without appropriate Miranda warnings while he was in custody. This conclusion is derived from the facts alone. The appellant was virtually arrested by police at a railroad station as he was about to board a train to go to work, and continued to be under close surveillance thereafter while being conducted to the place of examination, there held until the questioning was completed without being permitted even to go to the bathroom alone. All that was lacking to convert this into a full-blown arrest was the use of handcuffs. In these circumstances, it cannot be fairly claimed that the questioning was not custodial. Nor is it a relevant factor that he had theretofore voluntarily appeared for questioning. It is significant that only in the presence of the described coercion did appellant say anything which inculpated him. As to the matter of misuse of appellant’s taped conversations, we could have properly reviewed this error by exercise of discretion in the interest of justice. We did not, however, record such a basis for taking up this point, as is shown by a reading of the pertinent portion of our last decision (65 AD2d 443, 446-467), and it is now beyond reach.* At a retrial, however, appropriate objection could be made.
"The other error on which the Appellate Division would have reversed (and granted a new trial) — namely, misuse of the taped conversations of defendant — was not preserved for appellate review, no timely protest on this theory having been registered. Accordingly, that issue is beyond the scope of our review (People v. Johnson, 47 NY2d 124).” (49 NY2d 928, 930.)