IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 93-2459
Summary Calendar
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CLYDE URA CAIN, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
HEARST CORPORATION,
d/b/a the Houston Chronicle Publishing Company,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
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(August 30, 1993)
Before GARWOOD, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
CERTIFICATE FROM THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, PURSUANT TO TEX. CONST. ART. 5, § 3-
C, and TEX. R. APP. P. 114.
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS AND THE HONORABLE JUSTICES THEREOF:
1. STYLE OF THE CASE.
The style of the case in which this certificate is made is
Clyde Ura Cain, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant v. Hearst Corporation,
d/b/a the Houston Chronicle Publishing Company, Defendant-Appel-
lee, No. 93-2459 in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, on appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.
2. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The plaintiff-appellant, Clyde Cain, is a prison inmate
serving a life sentence for murder. He filed suit in Texas state
court on January 6, 1993, against the defendant-appellee, Hearst
Corporation, d/b/a the Houston Chronicle Publishing Company ("the
Chronicle"), alleging that an article regarding his conviction,
published in the HOUSTON CHRONICLE on June 30, 1991, invaded his
privacy by placing him in a false light by stating that he had
been associated with a crime organization known as the Dixie Ma-
fia when in fact, according to Cain, he had no association with
any such group. The Chronicle removed on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction.
The Chronicle moved for dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6), arguing that Cain's alleged cause of action was identi-
cal to a libel complaint and thus barred by the one-year statute
of limitations in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.002 and that,
moreover, Texas does not recognize the "false light" tort. Cain
responded that he "seeks recovery under the recognized legal the-
ory of false light invasion of privacy" subject to the two-year
statute of limitations, presumably referring to TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003. The district court granted the motion,
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citing Hurlbut v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. 1987),
and reasoning therefrom "that irrespective of what the plaintiff
may call his suit, it is, nevertheless, a suit in libel."
The district court entered final judgment on May 3, 1993.
Cain filed a notice of appeal on May 10, 1993.
3. QUESTIONS CERTIFIED.
a. Does Texas recognize the tort of false light invasion of
privacy?
b. If Texas recognizes the tort of false light invasion of
privacy, which statute of limitations governs actions brought
pursuant thereto?
We disclaim any intention or desire that the Supreme Court
of Texas confine its reply to the precise form or scope of the
question certified.
4. THE PARTIES.
The parties are Clyde Ura Cain, Sr., plaintiff-appellant,
and Hearst Corporation, d/b/a the Houston Chronicle Publishing
Company, defendant-appellee.
5. THE ATTORNEYS.
Cain appears pro se. His address is as follows:
401418 Ellis I Unit
Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division
Huntsville, TX 77343
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The Chronicle is represented by the following attorney:
William W. Ogden
Ogden, Gibson & White, L.L.P.
1750 Pennzoil South Tower
711 Louisiana
Houston, TX 77002-3095
QUESTIONS CERTIFIED.
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