[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-12633 January 11, 2008
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 06-00348-CR-T-26-TGW
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JIMMY L. CONEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(January 11, 2008)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jimmy L. Coney appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1). Coney argues
that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. We affirm.
We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of
discretion, United States v. Crumbley, 872 F.2d 975, 977 (11th Cir. 1989), and
reverse only if the denial was “arbitrary or unreasonable,” United States v. Najjar,
283 F.3d 1306, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2), a defendant may
withdraw a guilty plea after the court accepts the plea but before sentencing if the
district court rejects the plea agreement or “the defendant can show a fair and just
reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(A)–(B). “The
decision to allow withdrawal is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.”
United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 471 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing United States
v. Stitzer, 785 F.2d 1506, 1514 (11th Cir. 1986)). In determining whether the
defendant has met his burden of showing a fair and just reason for requesting the
withdrawal, a district court may consider the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the plea, including “(1) whether close assistance of counsel was
available; (2) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; (3) whether judicial
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resources would be conserved; and (4) whether the government would be
prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea.” Id. at 472
(citation omitted).
Coney argues that his desire to go to trial from the beginning establishes
that his plea was not knowing and voluntary and, as a result, the district court
abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. This
argument fails. When it accepted Coney’s plea, the district court ensured that
Coney was of sound mind, had not been coerced, comprehended and could read
English, and had adequate representation. The district court explained at length
the implications of a guilty plea. Coney’s later assertion that he had wanted to go
to trial since he first appeared before the court is insufficient to establish an abuse
of discretion.
Coney also argues that the district court abused its discretion because it did
not explicitly consider whether judicial resources would be conserved and whether
the government would be prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to withdraw
his plea. The government argues that we should review for plain error because
Coney did not raise this argument at the district court. Regardless of the standard
of review, the district court did not err. A district court need not find prejudice to
the government, Buckles, 843 F.2d at 474, and the denial of Coney’s motion
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clearly served the goal of conserving judicial resources, see United States v.
Freixas, 332 F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2003).
We affirm Coney’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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