Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Allegany County (Thomas E Brown, A.J.), entered July 8, 2010. The order denied the application of plaintiffs-appellants for a preliminary injunction, vacated a temporary restraining order and compelled
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiffs-appellants (plaintiffs), owners of non-waterfront lots in defendant Rushford Lake Recreation District (RLRD), commenced this action seeking, inter alia, injunctive and declaratory relief requiring the RLRD to reinstate plaintiffs’ dock licenses and prevent the removal and destruction of their docks, which are situated on lakefront property that abuts several waterfront lots owned by defendant Bradley Coon. Supreme Court thereafter granted plaintiffs a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing the removal of their docks. Plaintiffs appeal from an order that denied their application for a preliminary injunction, vacated the TRO and compelled plaintiffs to accept the late answer filed by defendants-respondents RLRD, its Board of Commissioners (Board) and the members of the Board in their individual capacities (collectively, RLRD defendants). We affirm.
We conclude that the court properly required plaintiffs to accept the late answer of the RLRD defendants. Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, the specific request made by counsel for the RLRD defendants that the court direct plaintiffs’ counsel to accept the answer, while not made in a formal motion, was a sufficient “application . . . to . . . compel the acceptance of a pleading untimely served” pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d). Because the RLRD defendants “provide[d] a reasonable excuse for the default and demonstrate[d] a meritorious defense to the action” (Krieger v Cohan, 18 AD3d 823, 824 [2005]; see Watson v Pollacchi, 32 AD3d 565, 565 [2006]; Huckle v CDH Corp., 30 AD3d 878, 879 [2006]), the court did not abuse its discretion in requiring plaintiffs to accept the late answer (see Ayres Mem. Animal Shelter, Inc. v Montgomery County Socy. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 17 AD3d 904, 905 [2005], lv dismissed 5 NY3d 824 [2005], lv denied 7 NY3d 712 [2006]). We reject plaintiffs’ further contention that the court acted without authority when it sua sponte stayed their applications for default pending the return date on their order to show cause seeking a preliminary injunction (see generally CPLR 2201; Matter of Coburn v Coburn, 109 AD2d 984, 985-986 [1985]; A.B. Med. Servs., PLLC v Travelers Indem. Co., 26 Misc 3d 69, 70-71 [2009]).