Following the decedent’s death, George Hershkowitz, the administrator of the estate of Cheryl Hershkowitz (hereinafter the petitioner), as administrator of her estate, unsuccessfully sought to sell the shares referable to the cooperative apartment. During that time, the mortgage payments fell into default, and the lender advised the corporation and its Board of Directors (hereinafter together the respondents) that it would commence foreclosure proceedings and sent the respondents a notice of sale. Thereafter, the petitioner, the lender, and Angela Yakutilova, as the proposed purchaser, agreed to enter into a “short sale” in which the lender would accept a purchase price of $141,000 from Yakutilova in satisfaction of the indebtedness of the decedent’s estate. According to the president of the Board of Directors, Yakutilova’s application was rejected solely on the basis that the purchase price was too low. Subsequently, the petitioner commenced this hybrid proceeding and action seeking, inter alia, declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the “short sale” of the subject apartment at the contract price of $141,000.
After the petitioner and the respondents made various motions, by order dated May 5, 2011, the Surrogate’s Court, inter alia, denied the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment on the first and second causes of action, which sought declaratory and injunctive relief, respectively, in effect, denied the petitioner’s separate motion for permissive joinder of Angela Yakutilova as a petitioner/plaintiff, denied those branches of the respondents’ cross motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first and second causes of action, and granted that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the third cause of action. In the order appealed from the Surrogate’s Court, inter alia, upon reargument, adhered to the determination in the order dated May 5, 2011, denying the petitioner’s motions and, upon renewal, granted those branches of the respondents’ cross motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first and second causes of action. We affirm.
The respondents established their prima facie entitlement to
The Surrogate’s Court properly, in effect, denied the petitioner’s motion for permissive joinder of Yakutilova as a party. As the contract vendee of shares in the corporation, Yakutilova was not a party to the proprietary lease between the corporation and the petitioner, and thus had no standing to enforce its terms (see Harris v Seward Park Hous. Corp., 79 AD3d 425 [2010]; Leist v Goldstein, 305 AD2d 468 [2003]; Aridas v 244 E. 60th St. Owners Corp., 292 AD2d 325 [2002]).
The petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit. Angiolillo, J.E, Belen, Roman and Sgroi, JJ., concur.