UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 92-2706
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
JOSE BLAS VASQUEZ-OLVERA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
August 24, 1993
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Jose Blas Vasquez-Olvera (Vasquez-Olvera), a Mexican national,
was convicted by a state court in Houston, Texas on April 16, 1990
of the felony offense of delivery of cocaine and was sentenced to
five years in state prison. Approximately six months later, he was
released to the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), which deported him to Mexico. Approximately one
month after being deported, the police again arrested Vasquez-
Olvera in Houston, Texas for delivery of cocaine. He was
subsequently convicted in state court of that offense and sentenced
to 10 years in state prison. The State of Texas then released
Vasquez-Olvera on parole to a detainer for the federal charge that
is the basis of the present case. An indictment was returned
against Vasquez-Olvera on April 8, 1992 in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, charging that on
December 6, 1990, Vasquez-Olvera, an alien who had previously been
deported, knowingly and unlawfully was found in the United States
without having obtained the consent of the Attorney General for
reapplication for admission to the United States, in violation of
8 U.S.C. § 1326. On June 8, 1992, Vasquez-Olvera pleaded guilty to
the charges contained in the indictment, and the district court
sentenced him to 78 months imprisonment, to be followed by a five
year term of supervised release. During Vasquez-Olvera's guilty
plea hearing, pursuant to Rule 11, the court advised him that he
could be sentenced up to 15 years in prison.1
II. DISCUSSION
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1326 provides:
(a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien
who--
(1) has been arrested and deported or excluded and
deported, and thereafter
1
The court stated:
[p]unishment is up to 15 years in prison, a
quarter of a million dollar fine, and a five
year supervised release. The effect of
supervised release means, that if you violate
the terms of your release, you can be sent up
to five years more in prison. So, you have
the potential of having 20 years in prison.
2
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at anytime found in,
the United States, unless (A) prior to his reembarkation
at a place outside the United States or his application
for admission from foreign contiguous territory, the
Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's
reapplying for admission; or (B) with respect to an alien
previously excluded and deported, unless such alien shall
establish that he was not required to obtain such advance
consent under this chapter or any prior Act,
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in
the case of any alien described in such subsection--
(1) whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction for
commission of a felony (other than an aggravated felony),
such alien shall be fined under Title 18, imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both; or
(2) whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction for
commission of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be
fined under such Title, imprisoned not more than 15
years, or both.
8 U.S.C. § 1326
Vasquez-Olvera contends that he was indicted and pleaded guilty to
a charge of reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a),
which has a maximum punishment of two years. However, he contends
the district court erroneously sentenced him under the provisions
of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), which provides for a maximum punishment
of 15 years. Consequently, according to Vasquez-Olvera, the
district court erred in sentencing him to 78 months imprisonment,
and his sentence must be vacated.
On the other hand, the government contends it was proper for
the district court to sentence Vasquez-Olvera under § 1326(b)(2),
because subsection (b) is a sentence enhancement provision, not an
element of the offense, and therefore it need not notify Vasquez-
Olvera of the prior conviction in the indictment. See United
3
States v. Lowe, 860 F.2d 1370, 1377-78 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1005 (1989); United States v. Affleck, 861 F.2d
97, 99 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1058 (1989).2
Vasquez-Olvera, however, contends subsection (b) is a separate
criminal offense, that his prior felony conviction was an element
of that offense, and thus the government is required to charge him
with that element of the offense in the indictment.3 Accordingly,
because the indictment did not charge him with a prior felony
conviction, Vasquez-Olvera contends it was error for the district
court to sentence him under subsection (b). See United States v.
Davis, 801 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1986).
In sum, the issue narrowly framed is this: whether subsection
(b) is a separate criminal offense or a sentence-enhancement
provision?
This court in United States v. Davis, 801 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.
1986), enumerated four factors that are helpful in determining
whether Congress intended a statutory provision to create an
independent federal offense or a sentence-enhancement provision.
2
In Affleck, the court held "[i]t was unnecessary for the jury
to make any determination regarding the prior convictions of
Affleck, since that was not an element of the offense for which he
was indicted and convicted."
3
Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that
the indictment be a "plain, concise, and definite written statement
of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." Fed. R.
Crim. P. 7(c)(1). See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117
(1974) ([A]n indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the
elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of
the charge against him which he must defend, and, second, enables
him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future
prosecutions for the same offense."))
4
Those factors are: (1) whether the statute predicates punishment
upon conviction under another section, (2) whether the statute
multiplies the penalty received under another section, (3) whether
the statute provides guidelines for the sentencing hearing, and (4)
whether the statute is titled as a sentencing provision. Davis,
801 F.2d at 756; United States v. Jackson, 891 F.2d 1151, 1152
(5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 939 (1990).
In our view, application of these factors indicates that
subsection (b) is a sentence enhancement provision. Initially, we
recognize that subsection (a) contains the elements of the offense
of unlawful reentry. Those elements are arrest, deportation,
reentry to the United States, and lack of the attorney general's
consent to reentry. See United States v. Campos-Asencio, 822 F.2d
506, 508 (5th Cir. 1987). Only after proof of the elements in
subsection (a), do the punishment provisions for special types of
offenders in subsection (b) apply. Therefore, the first Davis
factor, which is the foremost feature of a sentence enhancement
provision, is met.
Second, subsection (b)(1) raises the two year maximum penalty
for reentry set forth in subsection (a) to 5 years upon proof that
a deportation is subsequent to a felony other than an aggravated
felony. Subsection (b)(2) raises the maximum penalty to 15 years
for a deportation subsequent to an aggravated felony. While the
penalty provisions in subsection (b) may not in a strict sense of
the word be multipliers of the penalty provided for in subsection
5
(a), they are directly tied to it. This satisfies the second
factor of the Davis test. See Jackson, 891 F.2d at 1152.
Third, Congress titled Section 1326 "[r]eentry of deported
aliens; criminal penalties for reentry of certain deported
aliens."4 That title indicates that section 1326 provides for one
crime--reentry of deported aliens--, but harsher penalties for
certain classes of deported aliens--those committing felonies.
Therefore, the fourth Davis factor is also satisfied.
We do not consider the fact that Subsection (b) does not
satisfy the third Davis factor by providing guidelines for the
sentencing hearing to be dispositive of its status as a sentence
enhancement provision. Subsection (b) meets three of the four
Davis factors and has enough of the common traits of a sentence
enhancement provision for us to conclude that Congress intended for
it to be a sentence enhancement provision.
Another reason, we believe that section 1326(b) is a sentence
enhancement provision is because the plain language of the statute
so indicates. In drafting the introductory language of subsection
(a) and subsection (b), Congress intertwined the two subsections.
The introductory language of subsection (a) states "subject to
subsection (b) of this section," and the introductory language of
subsection (b), states "notwithstanding subsection (a) of this
4
Congress added subsection (b) and the initial line in
subsection (a) to section 1326 in an amendment that was part of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4181, 4471. Congress titled
the amendment "criminal penalties for reentry of certain deported
aliens," which was added to the old title, "reentry of deported
aliens."
6
section." It is highly unlikely that Congress would structure the
statute in such a way that subsection (b) is dependant on elements
of subsection (a), if it intended for subsection (b) to be a
separate criminal offense. We interpret section 1326 to provide
for one criminal offense, reentry of a deported alien, and to
provide in subsection (b) stiffer penalties for those who illegally
reenter after being convicted of a felony or an aggravated felony.5
Vasquez-Olvera urges us to follow the lead of the Ninth
Circuit, which in three cases has previously decided that
subsection (b) is not a sentence-enhancement provision, but is a
separate criminal offense.
In United States v. Arias-Granados, 941 F.2d 996 (9th Cir.
1991), the defendants were charged with violating 8 U.S.C. §
1326(b)(1), re-entry following deportation for a felony conviction,
which provided for a maximum punishment of five years. The
defendants then pleaded guilty under a plea agreement to violating
one count of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), simple reentry after deportation,
an offense with a maximum penalty of two years. Id. at 997. The
court noted that two years was the maximum sentence that could be
imposed upon the defendants and stated, "[a] prior felony
conviction is an element of the crime with which appellants were
5
No Senate or House Committee Report was submitted with the 1988
amendment to section 1326. See 1988 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News
5937. The government contends this alone suggests that Congress
was creating a sentence enhancement provision, not a separate
criminal offense. We do not interpret this lack of legislative
history to be indicative of Congress's intent.
7
charged, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1), but is not an element of the crime
to which they pleaded guilty, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)." Id. at 998-99.
Shortly thereafter, in United States v. Gonzalez-Medina, 976
F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1992), the defendants were charged with
illegally reentering the United States following deportation as
convicted felons. At trial, the defendants were convicted, but the
government did not offer evidence that the defendants had prior
felony convictions. Id. at 572. The district court then imposed
sentences in excess of two years. Id. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court and held that subsections (a)
and (b) constitute separate criminal offenses, and vacated the
sentences as exceeding the lawful maximum. Id. at 573.
With the exception of United States v. Campos-Martinez, 976
F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit has not given its
rationale for holding that subsection (b) is a separate criminal
offense.
In Campos-Martinez, the defendant, who had previously been
deported subsequent to a felony conviction, was indicted and
pleaded guilty under section 1326 to illegal reentry after having
been deported. The district court sentenced him to thirty months
in prison, holding that he had pleaded guilty to violating section
1326 generally, and that he could be sentenced under subsection
(b)(1). Id. at 590. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the
defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that
subsection (b) was a separate criminal offense. Id. at 591-92.
8
In reaching its decision in Campos-Martinez, the court relied
almost exclusively on case law interpreting section 1325(a), the
alien illegal entry statute, which it found to be an analogous
statute.6
We believe the two sections are too different for Congress to
have intended for them to be interpreted similarly. Section
1325(a) provides that the offense of illegal entry is a misdemeanor
with a maximum punishment of six months, while a subsequent illegal
entry after a previous conviction for violating section 1325(a) is
a felony with a maximum punishment of two years.7 Therefore,
having a prior conviction under section 1325(a) subjects a
defendant to more than a simple sentence enhancement; instead, it
6
The court relied on United States v. Arambula-Alvarado, 677 F.2d
51 (9th Cir. 1982), and United States v. Arriaga-Segura, 743 F.2d
1434 (9th Cir. 1984), both of which interpreted section 1325(a).
7
Section 1325(a) provides:
[a]ny alien who (1) enters or attempts to
enter the United States at any time or place
other than as designated by immigration
officers, or (2) eludes examination or
inspection by immigration officers, or (3)
attempts to enter or obtains entry to the
United States by a willfully false or
misleading representation or the willful
concealment of a material fact, shall, for the
first commission of any such offense, be fined
under Title 18 or imprisoned not more than six
months, or both, and, for a subsequent
commission of any such offense, be fined under
Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.
8 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
9
subjects that defendant to an entirely different class of offense,
a felony.8
In conclusion, the construction of section 1325(a) and section
1326 are quite different, and there is nothing to suggest that
Congress patterned section 1326 in a similar vein to that of
section 1325(a). We therefore decline to follow the Ninth
Circuit's prior case law in this regard.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED.
KING, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Because I believe that the majority incorrectly classifies 8
U.S.C. § 1326(b) as a sentencing enhancement statute rather than a
separate offense, I respectfully dissent. Rather than accepting
the majority's reasoning, I adopt the analysis of two other courts
that have addressed this precise issue. See United States v.
Campos-Martinez, 976 F.2d 589, 590-92 (9th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Vieira-Candelario, 811 F. Supp. 762, 765-68 (D.R.I.
1993).9 In those two cases, the courts held that § 1326(b) created
8
Further, we disagree with the premise that the Ninth Circuit
used in Campos-Martinez to reach its conclusion, which is that the
portion of section 1325(a) that provides the punishment for a
subsequent illegal entry is a sentence enhancement provision. In
our view, section 1325(a) has many of the common attributes of a
sentence enhancement provision and should be interpreted as a
sentence enhancement provision.
9
I observe that in a recent case the First Circuit expressly noted this issue but saw no need to resolve it. See
United States v. Zapata, ___ F.2d ___, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17992 at *15 n.5 (1st Cir. July 19, 1993) (citing
Vieira-Candelario, supra).
c:br:opin:92-2706p.mm 10
a separate offense, which requires the Government to allege and
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of that offense
in the indictment before a defendant may be sentenced under §
1326(b)'s separate penalties.10
In the instant case, the indictment charged Vasquez-Olvera as
follows:
On or about December 6, 1990, . . . JOSE BLAS VASQUEZ-
OLVERA, . . . an alien who had previously been deported,
knowingly and unlawfully was found in the United States
at Harris County, Texas, the said defendant having not
obtained the consent of the Attorney General of the
United States for reapplication by the defendant for
readmission into the United States.
The indictment then specified: "[v]iolation: Title 8, United States
Code, Section 1326."
As the majority correctly observes, what is at issue is
whether the additional matter in subsection (b) of § 1326 -- the
requirement that the alien must have been deported "subsequent to
a conviction" of a felony or aggravated felony -- is a separate
"element," thus creating a separate offense from § 1326(a), or is
simply a sentencing enhancement factor applicable after conviction
under § 1326(a).11 Vasquez-Olvera argues that because he was
indicted for, and pled guilty to, nothing more than "simple
reentry" after deportation, the district court unlawfully sentenced
him under § 1326(b) rather than under § 1326(a). I agree.
10
It is well-established that the Government must include all elements of an offense in the indictment and
prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); see also
Jill C. Rafaloff, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act: Sentence Enhancement Statute or New
Offense?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1087 & nn. 10-13 (1988) (citing cases).
11
See Majority Opinion, slip op., at pp. 2-3, ___ F.2d at ___, for a full quotation of subsections (a) and (b).
c:br:opin:92-2706p.mm 11
As the majority correctly observes, in this circuit, the
leading case on distinguishing the two types of statutes is United
States v. Davis, 801 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1986). In Davis, we noted
a number of factors that are helpful in identifying a sentencing
enhancement statute:
i) whether the statute "impose[s] an increased punishment
for those convicted under another statutory provision";
ii) whether the statute's penalty is simply a
"multiplier" of another statute's penalty provision;
iii) whether the statute is titled as a "sentencing" or
"penalty" provision; and
iv) whether there are separate procedures for sentencing
under the statute.12
Davis, 801 F.2d at 756. The Davis court, in keeping with general
principles of statutory interpretation, also held that the
legislative history may be consulted to determine Congress' intent
where the language of the statute is ambiguous. Id. The majority
concludes that three of the four Davis factors apply -- (i)-(iii)
-- and thus holds that Vasquez-Olvera was properly sentenced under
§ 1326(b).
I believed that the majority errs in holding that the first
three Davis factors are clearly applicable. The majority states
that the first factor applies because § 1326(b) simply refers back
to § 1326(a) -- that is, only after the three elements of
subsection (a) are proven may an enhanced sentence possible under
12
Davis adopted those four factors from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Garrett v. United
States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985). Garrett involved the analogous issue of distinguishing between a separate offense
or lesser-included offense for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
c:br:opin:92-2706p.mm 12
subsection (b) be imposed in the case of an alien whose original
deportation was "subsequent to the commission of a felony." In
support of its position, the majority points to the first clause of
each subsection, which read, respectively, "(a) Subject to
subsection (b) of this section . . . " and "(b) Notwithstanding
subsection (a) of this section . . ." (emphasis added). The
majority states that Congress "intertwined" the two subsections,
suggesting that subsection (b) is dependent on subsection (a).
Majority Opinion, slip op. at p.6, ___ F.2d at ___.
I believe that, while the majority's interpretation is a
permissible one, there is another, equally permissible
interpretation of the statute. I believe that the drafters of the
1988 amendments to § 132613 could have intended simply to
incorporate the three elements of § 1326(a) into § 1326(b) and
simply add the additional element regarding a prior conviction of
a felony or aggravated felony.14 See Vieira-Candelario, 811 F.
Supp. at 767. In this regard, I observe that subsection (b) states
that "in the case of any alien described in" subsection (b). It
does not say "in the case of any alien convicted of" the offense
set forth in subsection (a). I further believe that the fact that
the use of the phrase "[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)," if
13
In 1988, Congress amended § 1326 by adding what is presently in subsection (b) and bifurcating the statute.
See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 6 n.4, ___ F.2d at ___ n.4.
14
Under the plain language of § 1326(a), the elements of that offense are: i) an arrest and deportation or
exclusion and deportation, ii) reentry or attempted reentry into the United States, and iii) the absence of consent
by the United States Attorney General. United States v. Campos-Asencio, 822 F.2d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 1987)
(interpeting § 1326 prior to its bifurcation into subsections (a) and (b), when the entire statute was what is
presently subsection (a)).
c:br:opin:92-2706p.mm 13
anything, argues in favor of holding that the drafters of
subsection (b) intended it to be a separate offense.15
As for the second Davis factor, the majority holds that the
enhanced sentencing range in subsection (b) may be interpreted to
be "multipliers" of the sentencing range prescribed in subsection
(a). See Majority Opinion, slip op. at pp.5-6, ___ F.2d at ___.
I disagree. Common sense suggests that a "multiplier" in the
context of a sentencing enhancement statute generally refers to an
increase by two or three fold at the most. However, the potential
for such an draconian increase under subsection (b) -- from a
maximum of two to fifteen years, i.e., over a seven-fold increase
-- suggests that a separate offense was intended. Cf. McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). In McMillian, the Court
suggested that in cases where a certain sentencing fact is a "tail
which wags the dog of the substantive offense" in terms of the
severity of the sentence, the reasonable-doubt standard of proof
rather than preponderance standard -- the latter typically being
used during the sentencing phase -- should be required because that
sentencing fact is in effect an element of the offense. Id. at 88.
The majority believes that the third Davis factor -- whether
the title of the statute suggests that it is a sentencing
enhancement provision -- also has been established by the
Government. The same argument was made by the Government in United
States v. Vieira-Candelario, 811 F. Supp. 762, 767 (D.R.I. 1993).
15
Although the use of the phrase "subject to" in subsection (b) admittedly could be interpreted to suggest that
subsection (b) is a penalty enhancement, the ambiguity of the statute as a whole requires the application of the
"rule of lenity," discussed infra.
c:br:opin:92-2706p.mm 14
In a persuasive opinion, the court rejected the Government's
argument by holding that the statute's title "is, at best,
ambiguous." Id. I agree. Section 1326 is entitled, "Reentry of
deported alien; criminal penalties for reentry of certain deported
aliens." The majority accepts the Government's argument that the
single crime provided for -- "[r]eentry of deported aliens" --
means that the statute's drafters must have intended subsection (b)
to only be a penalty enhancement provision. Majority Opinion, at
p.6, ___ F.2d at ___. While again I agree that is certainly a
permissible interpretation of the statute's title, I believe that
the bifurcated structure of § 1326 and the apparent incorporation
of subsection (a)'s elements into subsection (b) also suggests that
Congress intended the broad title of offense -- "[r]eentry of
deported aliens" -- to apply to both subsections (a) and (b).
Moreover, the majority ignores the fact that Congress could have
easily titled subsection (b) as a separate penalty provision, which
it chose not to do; the failure to do so is noteworthy. Instead,
it apparently incorporated subsection (a)'s elements into
subsection (b), suggesting that subsection (b) was intended to be
independent of subsection (a).
Thus, having applied the Davis factors, it is quite apparent
that the language and structure of § 1326 provide no definitive
answer to whether subsection (b) was intended to be a penalty
enhancement statute or a separate offense. As the majority notes,
there is no legislative history to which we could turn for
c:br:opin:92-2706p.mm 15
clarification of an ambiguous statute.16 Thus, we are faced with
a classic case where the longstanding "rule of lenity" is
appropriately applied. Simply put, that rule provides that
"ambiguities in criminal statutes must be resolved in favor of
lenity" for the criminal defendant. United States v. Batchelder,
442 U.S. 114, 121 (1979); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169,
177 (1958) ("Neither the wording of the statute nor its legislative
history points clearly to either [of two permissible] meaning[s].
In that circumstance, this Court applies a policy of lenity and
adopts the less harsh meaning."); see also United States v. Campos-
Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297 (1971); United States v. Wiltberger, 18
U.S. 76, 95 (1820); United States v. Abreu, 962 F.2d 1447, 1450-51
(10th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (discussing Supreme Court authority on
"rule of lenity"); Annotation, 62 L.Ed. 2d 827.
Because I believe that this is an appropriate case for
application of the "rule of lenity" to an ambiguous statute with no
clarifying legislative history, I respectfully dissent. I would
vacate Vasquez-Olvera's sentence and remand with instructions that
the district court must sentence him only under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
16
I agree with the Ninth Circuit's view that the fact that a previous conviction is a separate element under 8
U.S.C. § 1325 -- § 1326's sister statute regarding illegal entry of aliens -- is some indication that § 1326(b) was
intended to be a separate offense by the statute's drafters. See United States v. Campos-Martinez, 976 F.2d 589,
591 (9th Cir. 1992). It is well-established that a court may interpret an ambiguous statute by comparison to an
analogous statute. See United States v. Abreu, 962 F.2d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (citing United
States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940)).
In a footnote, the majority, with no discussion, states that it does not believe that a prior conviction is a
separate element under § 1325. See Majority Opinion, slip op., at p.10 n.8, ___ F.2d ___. My research reveals
that the only other authority regarding this issue is a series of Ninth Circuit cases, which hold that a prior
conviction is a separate element under § 1325. See United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th
Cir. 1988) (citing cases). Without going into an extended discussion here, my application of the Davis factors
to § 1325 indicates that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation is correct.
c:br:opin:92-2706p.mm 16