Judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Beatrice Shainswit, J.), entered on May 23, 1988, which granted respondent’s cross motion to dismiss the petition pursuant to CPLR article 78, is unanimously reversed on the law and the petition reinstated, without costs or disbursements.
Petitioner, a rent-stabilized tenant residing in apartment 9-A at 880 West End Avenue in Manhattan, commenced the instant proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 on November 30, 1987 to challenge a determination by respondent New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal which was issued on September 28, 1987. The only issue on appeal is whether the Supreme Court properly dismissed the petition as untimely based upon the fact that it was not served until the sixty-third day. According to section 26-516 (d) of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, "[a]ny
Although the parties herein agree that 60 days is the operative limitations period, they differ concerning whether the statute begins to run on the date that the determination being appealed is issued, as urged by respondent, or when notice of the administrative order is received by the aggrieved party, as petitioner claims. In that connection, petitioner alleges that she received a copy of respondent’s determination by mail some 10 or 12 days after it was issued and no earlier than October 8, 1987. Respondent is silent regarding the date of mailing of its order or how service was otherwise effected. It simply rests its assertion of untimeliness upon a literal reading of the regulation that a proceeding for judicial review be commenced within 60 days after the "issuance” of the subject administrative determination. Significantly, section 26-516 (d) of the Administrative Code does not contain the word "issuance”, and respondent is thereby endeavoring to interpret a regulation (9 NYCRR 2530.1) whose purpose is, after all, to implement the statutory provision, in such a manner as would limit a party’s right to seek judicial review of an administrative order by making the period of limitations almost entirely dependent upon the arbitrary actions of the agency. Thus, if respondent delays in notifying a party of a particular ruling for several weeks, that party would be compelled to file papers within, for instance, 40 days rather than 60 days. Clearly, it would be violative of due process to compute the Statute of Limitations from the mere issuance of a determination regardless of when the affected party actually received notice of the administrative decision. As the Court of Appeals concluded in Matter of Edmead v McGuire (67 NY2d 714, 716), which involved a proceeding wherein there was a challenge to a determination of the board of trustees of a police pension fund, "the determination of the Board of Trustees became 'final and binding’ (CPLR 217) and, therefore * * * the four-month limitation period commenced to run, on the date petitioner was notified of the Board’s decision”. Similarly, in