[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEBRUARY 4, 2008
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 07-12466
CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00057-CV-FTM-34-SPC
JOE WAYNE JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
KAREN JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
versus
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT,
STEVE EMERSON,
Case Supervisor,
AUDREY L. JONES,
Special Agent,
BRIAN PUGH,
A.S.W.P.,
DAN DURYA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(February 4, 2008)
Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant is a Florida prison inmate. Proceeding pro se, he filed a complaint
in the district court against several officers of the Tallahassee, Florida police
department, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the ground that the
manner in which they obtained evidence from his residence infringed his
constitutional rights. The district court dismissed his complaint sua sponte
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), concluding that the complaint was
barred by the holding of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129
L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). He now appeals.
We review de novo a district court’s § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissal using the
same standards that govern dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). “A complaint is subject to
dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true, show the
plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” Jones v. Bock, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 910, 920,
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166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007).
Heck instructs that a state prisoner may not bring a claim for damages under
§ 1983 if a “judgment in [the prisoner’s] favor . . . would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. The most
obvious example of an action barred by Heck is one in which the plaintiff actually
“seek[s] damages directly attributable to [his] conviction or confinement.” Id. at
487 n.6, 114 S.Ct. at 2373. But even where the plaintiff does not seek such
damages, his suit may be barred if, for example, he must negate “an element of the
offense of which he has been convicted” in order to prevail. Id.
The Heck holding, however, does not necessarily bar a claim, such as the
one presented here, that the evidence the police obtained evidence was the result of
an illegal search and seizure. See id. at 487 n.7, 114 S.Ct. at 2373 (explaining that,
because of the doctrines of independent source, inevitable discovery, and harmless
error, not all unreasonable searches result in invalid conviction). To prevail,
however, the plaintiff must prove that the search caused him “actual, compensable
injury . . . [other than] the ‘injury’ of being convicted and imprisoned.” Id.
(internal citation omitted). In determining whether the claim necessarily
invalidates the underlying conviction, the district court must “look both to the
claims raised under § 1983 and to the specific offenses for which the § 1983
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claimant was convicted.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1161 n.2 (11th Cir.
2003). Where the circumstances surrounding the conviction are unknown from the
record, it is impossible for the district court to determine whether the § 1983 claim
necessarily implies the invalidity of the conviction. Id. at 1161.
That is the situation here. The record does not tell us whether appellant’s
constitutional claim necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction. At this
juncture, therefore, we cannot say that Heck bars appellant’s claim. The court’s
judgment is therefore vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
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